The main legal point established in the judgment is the precedence of the ID Act over the Advocates Act in the context of appearance of lawyers before labour courts, and the need for a detailed consideration of whether the Advocates Act can be treated as a general piece of legislation in this regard.

ORDER

1. Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 12632 of 2018 and 27440 of 2018.

2. The writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('ID Act') was dismissed by the High Court, aggrieved by which the above appeal is filed. The High Court relied upon a judgment of this Court in Paradip Port Trust, Paradip versus Their Workmen [(1977) 2 SCC 339] to hold that Section 36(4) of the ID Act has been interpreted by this Court. The High Court was also of the opinion that Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 which was relied upon by the appellant was also taken into consideration by this Court.

3. Writ Petition (Civil) 1169 of 2018 is filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India assailing the vires of Section 36(4) of the ID Act. Civil Appeal No. 6587 of 2019 is filed against the order of the Labour Court dismissing the application filed by the appellant seeking permission to engage an advocate.

4. After hearing the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in the two appeals and the petitioner in the writ petition, the learned Additional Solicitor General, the learned senior counsel appearing for the Bar Council of India and the learned senior counsel for the workmen, we are of the opinion that these matters require consideration by a larger Bench.

5. Section 36(4) of the ID Act provides that a party to a dispute in a proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or a National Tribunal may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be. The scope of Section 36(4) of the ID Act was examined in Paradip Port Trust (supra). In the said case, it was urged on behalf of the appellant therein that an advocate shall be entitled to practice in all courts including the Tribunal as of right. Such submission was dealt with by this Court by holding that Section 30 of the Advocates Act has not come into force in view of which there is no right that could be claimed by Advocates to appear before the Labour Courts. Moreover, this Court was of the opinion that the ID Act is a special piece of legislation with the avowed aim of labour welfare. It was further held that the ID Act being a special Act will prevail over the Advocates Act, which is a general piece of legislation with regard to the subject matter of appearance of lawyers before all Courts, Tribunals and other authorities.

6. During the course of arguments, we entertained a doubt regarding the correctness of the finding recorded by this Court that the Advocates Act is a general piece of legislation. We have heard the learned counsel on the point as to whether this matter has to be referred to a larger Bench to consider whether the Advocates Act can be treated as a general piece of legislation in respect of appearance of lawyers before all Courts, Tribunals and other authorities.

7. In Queen versus London County Council [(1893) 2 QB 454], Bowen, L.J. lucidly explained the difference between a General Act and a Special Act.

"Now, a general Act, prima facie, is that which applies to the whole community. In the natural meaning of the term it means an Act of Parliament which is unlimited both in its area and, as regards the individual, in its effects; and as opposed to that you get statutes which may well be public because of the importance of the subjects with which they deal and their general interest to the community, but which are limited in respect of area - a limitation which makes them local - or limited in respect of individuals or persons - a limitation which makes them personal."

8. In LIC vs. D.J. Bahadur [(1981) 1 SCC 315], this Court held that the ID Act is a special act vis-a-vis the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. Krishna Iyer, J. was of the view that in determining whether a legislation is a general or a special legislation, focus should be on the principal subject matter and