JUDGMENT :

MOHAN, CJI.

1. The writ petition and the transferred cases challenge the validity of Handlooms (Reservation of Articles for Production) Act, 1985 (22 of 1985) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the order bearing No. DCP/BNP/1(2) 1986 dated 4th August, 1986 issued under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. This Act is to provide for reservation of certain articles for exclusive production by handlooms and for matters connected therewith. On 31st of March, 1986, the Act came into force. Section 4 of the Act provides for constitution of an Advisory Committee to make recommendations to the Central Government to determine the nature of any article or class of articles that may be reserved for exclusive production by handlooms. On 2nd June, 1986, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4 of the Act, the Central Government constituted an Advisory Committee. The said Advisory Committee submitted its recommendations. After considering those recommendations the impugned order dated 4th of August, 1986 was issued directing certain articles/class of articles to be exclusively reserved for production by handlooms. It is this order which is attacked on the following grounds in all these cases.

2. The Act and the impugned order are violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

3. According to Mr. M. N. Krishnamani, learned counsel for the petitioners total reservation of certain items of textiles in favour of handloom would have the effect of creating a monopoly. This Court in State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal Vyas, (1971) 3 SCC 705 has categorically laid down that no monopoly can be created in favour of an individual. Similar views have been expressed by the High Courts as seen from Municipal Committee v. Haji Ismail, AIR 1967 Punjab 32 and Maniram Budha Chamar v. Pannalal Motiram Chamar, AIR 1962 Madhya Pradesh 275.

4. Equally, when there is a total prohibition of manufacture of these clothes by the powerloom sector, that again, violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relies on Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCR 530 and also Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 375 .

5. The next argument of the learned counsel is that though under Rule 3(5) the Advisory Committee is to meet once a year, that has not taken place at all. The idea of such a provision is that there must be a periodic review which review has not taken place at all.

6. The restriction in this case if, are to be justified, it should be in public interest. Here, no public interest is sub-served. On the contrary, when the powerloom goods are available at a lower rate to the detriment of powerloom manufacturers, the restrictions have come to be imposed. This submission is sought to be fortified by relying on Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1959 SCR 629 and State of Madras v. V. G. Row, 1952 SCR 597 at 607 .

7. Mr. R. F. Nariman, learned counsel appearing for Textile Mills from Gujarat in Transferred Cases Nos. 111-117 of 1988 would argue as under :

8. The Cotton Textile (Control) Order 1948 dated 2nd August, 1948 and the impugned Act cannot operate in the same field. Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 contains a non obstante clause. Clause 20 of the Cotton Textile (Control) Order, 1948 confers power on the Commissioner to reserve just as the Notification issued under the Handlooms Act. Therefore, these orders will prevail as against the impugned order because Section 3 of the Act says "notwithstanding Industrial Development Regulation Act". The Cotton Textile Commissioner while issuing orders under clause 20 is enable to augment production of handloom industry. Therefore, this order cannot operate against the same.

9. Under Section 3 of the Act, the authority only looks at the handloom industry while under clause 20 the Cotton Textile Commissioner must have regard to the over all textile industry. Hence, the Notification under Section 3 is ul