SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
N.V. RAMANA, SURYA KANT, ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.
M/S. KALAMANI TEX & ANR – APPELLANTS
VERSUS
P. BALASUBRAMANIAN – RESPONDENT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 123 of 2021 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1876 of 2018]
Decided on : 10-02-2021
(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal – High Court would not reverse an order of acquittal merely on formation of an opinion different than that of trial Court – High Court ought to have compelling reasons to tinker with an order of acquittal and no such interference would be warranted when there were to be two possible conclusions – On a similar analogy, powers of this Court under Article 136 of Constitution also do not encompass reappreciation of entirety of record merely on premise that High Court has convicted appellants for first time in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction – While entertaining an appeal by way of special leave, there shall not ordinarily be an attempt to reappreciate evidence on record unless decision(s) under challenge are shown to have committed a manifest error of law or procedure or conclusion reached is ex-facie perverse. (Paras 12 and 13)
(B) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 read with Sections 118 and 139 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 378 – Dishonour of cheque – Reversal of acquittal by High Court – Trial Court completely overlooked provisions and failed to appreciate statutory presumption drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA – Statute mandates that once signature(s) of accused on cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these ‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative – In such a situation, obligation shifts upon accused to discharge presumption imposed upon him – Once 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on cheque and Deed, trial Court ought to have presumed that cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt – Trial Court fell in error when it called upon Complainant-Respondent to explain circumstances under which appellants were liable to pay – Such approach of trial Court was directly in teeth of established legal position and amounts to a patent error of law – Defence raised by appellants does not inspire confidence or meet standard of ‘preponderance of probability’ – In absence of any other relevant material, High Court did not err in discarding appellants’ defence and upholding onus imposed upon them in terms of Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA – Provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for dishonour of cheque as well as civil liability for realisation of cheque amount – There needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation and unless there exist special circumstances, Courts should uniformly levy fine up to twice cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum – Respondent, in any case, is entitled to receive cheque amount of Rs.11.20 lakhs which appellant has already deposited with Registry of this Court – Appellant No.2 shall not be required to undergo awarded sentence. (Paras 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 and 22)
Facts of the case:
M/s. Kalamani Tex (Appellant No.1) and its managing partner–B. Subramanian (Appellant No.2) are in appeal challenging judgment dated 09.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, whereby the order of acquittal of the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruppur was reversed and the appellants have been convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Consequently, Appellant No.2 has been sentenced to undergo three months Simple Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Short question which falls for our consideration is whether the High Court erred in reversing the findings of the trial Court in exercise of its powers under Section 378 of Cr.P.C.?
Findings of Court:
Considering the fact that there has been an admitted business relationship between the parties, we are of the opinion that defence raised by the appellants does not inspire confidence or meet standard of ‘preponderance of probability’. In the absence of any other relevant material, it appears to us that the High Court did not err in discarding the appellants’ defence and upholding the onus imposed upon them in terms of Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA.
Result : Appeal dismissed.
JUDGMENT :
Surya Kant, J:
Leave Granted.
2. M/s. Kalamani Tex (Appellant No.1) and its managing partner–B. Subramanian (Appellant No.2) are in appeal challenging the judgment dated 09.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, whereby the order of acquittal of the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruppur was reversed and the appellants have been convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, ‘NIA’). Consequently, Appellant No.2 has been sentenced to undergo three months Simple Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/.
Facts
3. The instant proceedings have originated out of a complaint preferred by P. Balasubramanian (Complainant-Respondent) against the appellants. The respondent is the proprietor of a garment company named and styled as ‘Growell International’, which along with Appellant No.1 was engaged in a business arrangement, whereby they agreed to jointly export garments to France. Certain issues arose regarding delays in shipment and payment from the buyer, due to which, the appellants had to pay the respondent a sum of Rs 11.20 lakhs. To that end, Appellant No.2 issued a cheque on behalf of Appellant No. 1 bearing no.897993 dated 07.11.2000 in favour of the respondent and also executed a Deed of Undertaking on the same day wherein Appellant No.2 personally undertook to pay the respondent in lieu of the initial expenditure incurred by the latter. The respondent presented the said cheque to the bank on 29.12.2000 for collection but it was returned with an endorsement that there were insufficient funds in the account of appellants. In wake of the cheque being dishonoured, the respondent issued a notice dated 08.01.2001 asking the appellants to pay the amount within 15 days. The appellants in their reply dated 27.01.2001 denied their liability and claimed that blank cheques and signed blank stamp papers were issued to help the respondent in some debt recovery proceedings, and not because of any legally enforceable debt.
4. The respondent then lodged a private complaint under section 138 and 142 of the NIA read with Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘CrPC’) before the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruppur. In order to substantiate his claim, the respondent himself entered the witness box and produced documentary evidence such as the cheque issued by Appellant No.2. The respondent in his chief-examination initially contended that the subject amount had been received by the appellants from the foreign buyer. However, when recalled on a later date, the respondent produced the Deed of Undertaking dated 07.11.2000, whereunder, the 2nd Appellant had acknowledged the liability towards respondent. One PS Shanmugham (PW2) who was working as Manager in State Bank of India, Tiruppur Overseas Branch, was also examined by the respondent.
5. Appellant No.2 in his statement under Section 313 CrPC plainly denied the allegations and disputed the existence of any liability towards the respondent. The appellants also examined one V. Rajagopal (DW1) who at the relevant time was working as Assistant Manager in State Bank of India, Tiruppur Overseas Branch. DW1 mainly deposed on the inability of the respondent to pay back the credit that was advanced to him, and the subsequent debt recovery proceedings initiated against him. The appellants did not lead any documentary evidence in their defence.
6. The trial Court disbelieved the respondent’s claim and observed that he had failed to establish a legally enforceable liability on the date of issue of cheque. The Court held that since the basic ingredients of an offence under Section 138 of the NIA were not satisfied, the complaint was liable to be dismissed.
7. Discontented with the order of the trial Court, the respondent preferred a criminal appeal before the High Court, wherein, the Court noted that Appellant No.2 had admitted his signatures on both the Cheque and the Deed of Undertaking and had thus acknowledged the appellants’ liability. The High Cou
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(1) High Court ought to have compelling reasons to tinker with an order of acquittal and no such interference would be warranted when there were to be two possible conclusions.(2) Dishonour of cheque....
Presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act requires the accused to present credible evidence to rebut the holder's claim of legal liability regarding the cheque issued.
Dishonor of cheque - Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability
The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable, and the burden of proof lies on the accused to establish a probable defense against the existence of a legally enforceable debt.
The court determined that under Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the presumption that a cheque was issued to discharge a debt is rebuttable, placing the burden on the accused t....
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