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2022 Supreme(SC) 267

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
AJAY RASTOGI, ABHAY S. OKA, JJ.
Arjun S/o. Ramanna @ Ramu – Appellant
Versus
Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 1555 of 2022 [@ SLP(C) No. 26384 of 2019]
Decided on : 16-02-2022

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant :C.B. Gururaj, Prakash Ranjan Nayak, K.P. Singh, Advocates
For the Respondent:Shivam Singh, Gopal Singh, Advocates

IMPORTANT POINT
Injury in course of employment – A new case cannot be allowed to be set up on facts which have not been admitted or established.

Headnote:

Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 – Section 2(1)(1) – Injury in course of employment – Appellant has suffered from functional loss of 100% of right upper limb and cannot perform job of a driver forever due to amputation of his right upper limb – Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation was right in holding that disability of appellant will have to be treated as 100% disability – Case of appellant will be covered by definition of ‘total disablement’ – Only ground on which High Court reduced compensation was that appellant did not suffer from total disablement – Order of High Court set aside – Order passed by Commissioner restored. (Paras 6, 8, 10, 11 and 12)

Facts of the case:

The appellant was an employee of the second respondent. He was doing the job of driving an auto-rickshaw used as a goods carrier. On 18th February 2009, while the appellant was driving the vehicle, he suddenly noticed a pothole on the road. Therefore, he applied brakes. As a result, the vehicle went out of control, and it overturned. The appellant sustained severe injuries. The vehicle was insured with the first respondent company. Commissioner held that due to amputation of the right upper limb, he has rendered himself unfit for driving a vehicle and, therefore, the appellant has suffered total disablement.The first respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court. The appeal was partly allowed by holding that the disability ought to have been assessed as 70% partial permanent disability instead of 100%. To that extent, the compensation was reduced. The only question which is required to be decided is whether appellant suffered from total disablement, which is defined in clause (l) of sub-section (1) of section (2) of the said Act.

Findings of Court:

Entire compensation amount as directed by the Commissioner was deposited by the first respondent in the High Court and the appellant has withdrawn the amount payable as per the impugned Judgment of the High Court. Therefore, the appellant will be entitled to withdraw the balance amount lying deposited in the High Court with interest, if any, accrued thereon.

Result : Appeal allowed.

ORDER :

Leave granted.

1. The appellant was an employee of the second respondent. He was doing the job of driving an auto-rickshaw used as a goods carrier. On 18th February 2009, while the appellant was driving the vehicle, he suddenly noticed a pothole on the road. Therefore, he applied brakes. As a result, the vehicle went out of control, and it overturned. The appellant sustained severe injuries. The vehicle was insured with the first respondent company.

2. The appellant filed a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1983, now titled as the Employees Compensation Act 1923 (for short, "the said Act"). The claim was filed on the footing that due to amputation of his right upper limb above the wrist joint, he has completely lost the capacity to drive a vehicle. He contended that he had suffered total disablement due to the said injury. The learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation allowed the petition by upholding the said contention. The learned Commissioner held that due to amputation of the right upper limb, he has rendered himself unfit for driving a vehicle and, therefore, the appellant has suffered total disablement.

3. The first respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court. The appeal was partly allowed by holding that the disability ought to have been assessed as 70% partial permanent disability instead of 100%. To that extent, the compensation was reduced.

4. Shri C.B. Gururaj, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that as a result of amputation of the right upper limb above wrist joint, the appellant will not be in a position to discharge his duty as a driver. Therefore, it is a case of total disablement. He relied upon decisions of this Court in the cases of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr, (1976) 1 SCC 289. and K. Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd, (2008) 8 SCC 518.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent invited our attention to the deposition of Dr. Laxmi Narayanana, who opined that the appellant suffered from permanent partial disability to the extent of 40%. He submitted that the Commissioner committed an error by proceeding on the footing that the appellant suffered from total disablement. He submitted that Section 4 of the said Act is mandatory. Therefore, the case of the appellant was of partial permanent disability. He urged that the first respondent will not be liable to pay compensation as the appellant did not possess a driving licence to drive a commercial goods carrier. He would, therefore, submit that no interference is called for with the judgment of the High Court.

6. The impugned judgment of the High Court proceeds on the accepted position that the appellant was employed as a driver to drive an auto-rickshaw used for carrying goods. The only ground on which the High Court reduced the compensation was that the appellant did not suffer from total disablement. Therefore, the Commissioner for workmen's compensation committed an error by taking the disability at 100%. The first respondent cannot dispute its liability to pay compensation as the High Court has held the said respondent liable. The first respondent has not challenged the impugned Judgment. Therefore, the argument that the appellant did not possess a driving licence to drive a commercial goods vehicle is not open to the first respondent.

7. The only question which is required to be decided is whether the appellant suffered from total disablement, which is defined in clause (l) of sub-section (1) of section (2) of the said Act. On the issue of disability, what is relevant is the statement of Dr. Laxmi Narayanana, who examined the appellant for making an assessment of disability.

    "3) When presented he had a crush injury of right forearm with fractured ends of radius and ulna and triple nerve injury of the right forearm and Guillotine Amputation with stump reconstruction was done on 19-02-2009 and was further managed by me since then with follow up treatment over a period

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