SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, HIMA KOHLI, JJ.
The State of Jharkhand – Appellant
Versus
Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 1441 of 2022
Decided On : 31-10-2022
(A) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – Dying declaration – There is no rule to the effect that a dying declaration is inadmissible when it is recorded by a police officer instead of a Magistrate – Although a dying declaration ought to ideally be recorded by a Magistrate if possible, it cannot be said that dying declarations recorded by police personnel are inadmissible for that reason alone – Issue of whether a dying declaration recorded by police is admissible must be decided after considering facts and circumstances of each case – Fact that dying declaration is not in form of questions and answers does not impact either its admissibility or its probative value – It may not always be possible to record dying declarations in form of questions and answers – There is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. (Paras 41, 43, 44 and 52)
(B) Indian Penal Code 1860 – Sections 302, 376, 341 and 448 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – Murder, rape, wrongful restraint and house trespass – Acquittal by High Court – Dying statement clearly described that respondent raped her and poured kerosene on her and set her on fire – Post-mortem report concludes that cause of death is septicaemia caused by burn injuries sustained by deceased – Statement of deceased indicates that she sustained burn injuries as a result of respondent having poured kerosene on her and setting her on fire – Dying declaration was made voluntarily and is true – Deceased was in a competent state of mind when she made a statement to I.O. – Victim’s death was a direct result of injuries inflicted upon her by respondent – There is nothing on record which gives rise to reasonable doubt as to respondent’s guilt – Lack of medical evidence as to commission of rape cannot be taken to mean that no rape was committed upon deceased – Witnesses who know deceased victim may turn hostile because they wish to move on with their lives – Certain witnesses including family members of deceased were declared hostile is insufficient to cast doubt upon prosecution’s case – Absence of evidence which establishes consistency of dying declaration over a period of time is not fatal to prosecution’s case – Prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt before Sessions Court – High Court ought not to have overturned Sessions Court’s judgment – Judgment of High Court set aside and life sentence awarded by Trial Court restored. (Paras 39, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55 and 59)
(C) Indian Penal Code 1860 – Section 375 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 53A – Rape – Two-Finger Test – In terms of Section 53A of Evidence Act, evidence of a victim’s character or of her previous sexual experience with any person shall not be relevant to issue of consent or quality of consent, in prosecution of sexual offences – Whether a woman is “habituated to sexual intercourse” or “habitual to sexual intercourse” is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether ingredients of Section 375 of IPC are present in a particular case – So-called test is based on incorrect assumption that a sexually active woman cannot be raped – Nothing could be further from truth – A woman’s sexual history is wholly immaterial while adjudicating whether accused raped her – Probative value of a woman’s testimony does not depend upon her sexual history – It is patriarchal and sexist to suggest that a woman cannot be believed when she states that she was raped, merely for reason that she is sexually active – Although “two-finger test” in this case was conducted over a decade ago, it is a regrettable fact that it continues to be conducted even today – Any person who conducts “two-finger test” or per vaginum examination (while examining a person alleged to have been subjected to a sexual assault) in contravention of directions of Supreme Court shall be guilty of misconduct. (Paras 62, 65 and 68)
Facts of the case:
Present appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand dated 27 January 2018. High Court allowed the appeal by the respondent and set aside the order of conviction and, consequently, of sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-II Deoghar, on 10 October 2006 and 11 October 2006 respectively. The Sessions Judge had convicted the respondent for offences punishable under Sections 302, 376, 341 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life.
Findings of Court:
A copy of this judgment shall be shared with the Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India. The Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India shall transmit copies of this judgment to the Principal Secretary (Department of Public Health) of each state. Principal Secretaries in the Departments of Health of each state shall also be responsible for ensuring the implementation of the directions issued in Part E of this judgment. Secretaries in the Departments of Home of each state shall in addition issue directions to the Directors General of Police in this regard. Directors General of Police shall, in turn, communicate these directions to the Superintendents of Police.
Result : Appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT :
DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.
| Table of Contents | ||
| (A) | Background | |
| (i) | An overview of the testimonies of the witnesses examined by the prosecution | |
| (a) | Lallan Prasad, PW-11 | |
| (b) | Dr. R.K. Pandey, PW-6 | |
| (c) | Dr. Minu Mukherjee, PW-9 | |
| (d) | Dr. R. Mahto, PW-8 | |
| (e) | Suresh Yadav, PW-12 | |
| (f) | Rekha Dasgupta, PW-7 | |
| (g) | Hostile witnesses | |
| (ii) | An overview of the testimonies of the witnesses examined by the defence | |
| (a) | Dhirendra Rai, DW-1 | |
| (b) | Dasrath Tiwary, DW-2 | |
| (c) | Balmukund Rai, DW-3 | |
| (iii) | The decision of the Sessions Court | |
| (iv) | The High Court’s judgment on appeal | |
| (B) | Issues | |
| (C) | Submissions | |
| (D) | Analysis | |
| (i) | The statement of the deceased is relevant under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 | |
| (a) | The victim died due to the burn injuries sustained by her | |
| (b) | The statement of the deceased relates to the cause of her death and the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death | |
| (c) | The admissibility and probative value of the dying declaration | |
| (ii) | The prosecution has proved its case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt | |
| (E) | Parting remarks | |
1. This appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand dated 27 January 2018. The High Court allowed the appeal by the respondent and set aside the order of conviction and, consequently, of sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-II Deoghar, on 10 October 2006 and 11 October 2006 respectively. The Sessions Judge had convicted the respondent for offences punishable under Sections 302, 376, 341 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code 18601 [“IPC”] and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life.
(A) Background
2. The case of the prosecution is that the respondent entered the house of the victim and deceased in Narangi village, on the afternoon of 7 November 2004. It is alleged that he pushed her to the ground and committed rape upon her, while threatening to kill her if she sounded an alarm. She called out for help, at which point the respondent allegedly poured kerosene on her and set her on fire with a matchstick. Her cries for help led to her grandfather, mother and a resident of the village to come to her room. The respondent is alleged to have fled the scene upon seeing them.
3. The victim’s family (along with the villager) extinguished the fire and took her to Sadar Hospital, Deoghar, where she was admitted and underwent treatment for the injuries sustained by her. The station in-charge at P.S. Sarwna, received information regarding the incident and travelled to Deoghar, where he recorded the victim’s ‘fard beyan’ on the same day (i.e. 7 November 2004). In her statement, she narrated the incident as described in paragraph 2 above.
4. FIR No. 163 of 2004 was registered at P.S. Sarwna on the basis of the statement of the victim and the investigation commenced. Lallan Prasad was the IO and later, Suresh Yadav took over the investigation from him. Upon the completion of the investigation, the IO submitted a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 for offences under Sections 307, 341, 376 and 448 of the IPC. The victim died on 14 December 2004, leading to the submission of a supplementary charge-sheet against the respondent, with reference to Section 302 of the IPC.
5. The respondent denied his guilt.
6. During the trial, the prosecution examined twelve witnesses in support of its case and the defence examined three witnesses. An overview of their testimonies in chief and cross-examination as well as their status as witnesses follows.
(i) An overview of the testimonies of the witnesses examined by the prosecution
(a) Lallan Prasad, PW-11
7. Lallan Prasad, the station in-charge of Police Station Sarwna, deposed t
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(1) Rape – Two-Finger Test is based on incorrect assumption that a sexually active woman cannot be raped – Any person who conducts “two-finger test” in contravention of directions of Supreme Court sh....
The dying declaration made by the deceased was voluntarily made and in a conscious state of mind, and it was supported by witness testimonies, medical and forensic evidence, leading to the conviction....
A dying declaration is only valid if the victim was in a fit mental state to give it, which wasn't established; thus, conviction based solely on it is unsafe.
A dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it is found to be true and voluntary, and if the court is satisfied that the statement is reliable and not the result of tutoring, prompting....
The voluntary and truthful nature of dying declaration and the competency of a child witness to depose are crucial in establishing guilt and determining the appropriate criminal offense.
The dying declaration of the victim was admissible in evidence as it was truthful, voluntary, and not a product of tutoring or prompting.
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