SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.M. JOSEPH, HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.
M.P. Power Management Company Limited - Appellant
Versus
M/s. Sky Power Southeast Solar India Private Limited & Others – Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 8515-8516 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.4609-4610 OF 2021)
Decided on : 16-11-2022
(A) Constitution of India – Articles 162 and 298 – Power Purchase Agreement (‘PPA’) – Termination of – PPA is a contract which has been entered into by appellant which is a fully owned Government Company – It is one thing to hold that appellant, as a fully owned Government Company, would be State for the purpose of Article 12 of Constitution of India and, quite another, to find that a contract is one which is made in executive power of State within meaning of Article 162 of Constitution – What is contemplated is power of Union or State read in conjunction with Article 73 and Article 162 of Constitution of India, respectively – Appellant, being a Company, would not be entitled to exercise executive power contemplated in Article 162 of Constitution which is power with Union or State Governments. (Para 17)
(B) Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 63 – Power Purchase Agreement (‘PPA’) – Termination of – It is common case that appellant is incorporated under Companies Act – It is not a statutory body or a corporation – Court cannot describe the contract as a Statutory Contract – PPA is not made either in purported compliance with statutory dictate, either in form of parent enactment or a subordinate legislation – Terms and conditions of PPA are not transplanted into PPA from any Statutory provision – Appellant being company under Companies Act, would be free as any other contracting party, subject to its position as an instrumentality of State under Article 12 of Constitution of India and law otherwise. (Para 26)
(C) Constitution of India – Article 14 – Arbitrary decision – If the act betrays caprice or mere exhibition of whim of authority it would sufficiently bear insignia of arbitrariness – In this regard supporting an order with a rationale which in circumstances is found to be reasonable will go a long way to repel a challenge to state action – Reasons need not in every case be part of order as such – If there is absence of good faith and action is actuated with oblique motive, it could be characterized as being arbitrary – A total non-application of mind without due regard to rights of parties and public interest may be a clear indicator of arbitrary action – A wholly unreasonable decision which is little different from a perverse decision under Wednesbury doctrine would qualify as an arbitrary decision under Article 14 – Ordinarily visiting a party with consequences of its breach under a contract may not be an arbitrary decision. (Para 48)
(D) Constitution of India – Article 32/226 – Judicial review of State action – Writ jurisdiction is a public law remedy – A matter, which lies entirely within a private realm of affairs of public body, may not lend itself for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction of Court – Mere fact that relief is sought under a contract which is not statutory, will not entitle respondent-State in a case by itself to ward-off scrutiny of its action or inaction under the contract if complaining party is able to establish that action/ inaction is, per se, arbitrary – Existence of an alternate remedy is a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a Writ Petition in a contractual matter – While there is no prohibition in Writ Court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, Court may relegate the party to remedy by way of a civil suit – Existence of a provision for arbitration which is a forum intended to quicken pace of dispute resolution, is viewed as a near bar to entertainment of a Writ Petition – In a case State is a party to contract and a breach of a contract is alleged against State, a civil action in appropriate Forum is maintainable – However, every case involving breach of contract by State, cannot be dressed up and disguised as a case of arbitrary State action – Violation of natural justice has been recognised as a ground signifying presence of a public law element and can found a cause of action premised on breach of Article 14. (Para 54)
(E) Constitution of India – Article 32/226 – Power Purchase Agreement (‘PPA’) – Termination of – PPA is not a statutory contract – Even if it is a non-statutory contract, there is no absolute bar in dealing with a cause of action based on acts or omission by State or its instrumentalities even during course of working of a contract – Monetary claim arising from a contract may be successfully urged by a writ applicant but premise would not be a mere breach of contract – Being part of public law case must proceed on the basis of there being arbitrariness vitiating the decision – Matter should not fall within a genuinely disputed question of facts scenario – Dispute which must be capable of being resolved on a proper understanding of documents which are not in dispute may furnish a cause of action in a writ court – Termination of contract again may not be immune if it is found to be afflicted with vice of arbitrariness – Interference again may be refused if court finds that case really belongs to small area with unclear contours where it can be appropriated as a private law dispute – Distinction between public law and private law has concededly been reduced to nearly imperceptible terms but distinction in law remains. (Para 78)
(F) Contract Act, 1872 – Section 63 – Principle of Public Interest – Once State enters into contract, rights are created – If case is brought to constitutional court and it is invited to interfere with State action on the score that its action is palpably arbitrary, if action is so found then an appeal to public interest must be viewed depending on facts of each case – If aspect of public interest flows entirely on the basis that rates embodied in contract which is arbitrarily terminated has with passage of time become less appealing to State or that because of free play of market forces or other developments, there is a fall in rate of price of services or goods then this cannot become determinative of question as to whether court should decline jurisdiction – Fact that power has become cheaper in market subsequently by itself should not result in non-suiting of complaint of first respondent if it is found that a case of clear arbitrariness has been established by first respondent – Public interest cannot also be conflated with an evaluation of monetary gain or loss alone. (Paras 88 and 89)
(G) Government Contract – Power Purchase Agreement (‘PPA’) – Termination of – Termination of a contract results in intrusion into and deprivation of valuable rights which are vouchsafed to awardee of contract – Action of appellant in departing from unambiguous regime of PPA without any justification would make its actions arbitrary – PPA clearly provided for issuance of a default notice, providing an opportunity to remove defect – This obligation has been observed in its breach – Essentially appellant’s attempt was to secure a reduction in rate – Rate of first respondent was found to be lowest after a clearly keenly competitive international bidding, involving a large number of bidders – View taken by High Court upheld. (Paras 115, 126, 128, 130 and 131)
Facts of the case:
Appellant impugns Judgment of High Court dated 27.02.2020 in Writ Petition No. 420 of 2019. It further challenges Order dated 28.12.2020 in Review Petition No. 682 of 2020. By said Judgment in Writ Petition, High Court allowed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent and quashed Order dated 07.07.2018, which was passed by appellant, terminating Power Purchase Agreement (‘PPA’) which was entered into by appellant and first respondent. Review filed by appellant was dismissed.
Findings of Court:
Inspection by the CEIG would necessarily have to be carried out in which the appellant would have to be involved to facilitate the exercise. In the facts of this case, on being satisfied, CEIG would necessarily have to grant the re-validation of earlier Report. It would also involve an opportunity to the CEIG to look into the aspects which have been projected by fist respondent itself in its letter dated 16.09.2020.
Result : Appeals dismissed.
JUDGMENT :
K.M. JOSEPH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant impugns the Judgment of the High Court dated 27.02.2020 in Writ Petition No. 420 of 2019. It further challenges the Order dated 28.12.2020 in Review Petition No. 682 of 2020. By the said Judgment in the Writ Petition, the High Court allowed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent and quashed the Order dated 07.07.2018, which was passed by the appellant, terminating the Power Purchase Agreement (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PPA’, for short), which was entered into by the appellant and the first respondent. The review filed by the appellant was dismissed. Hence the appeals.
THE FACTS
3. The appellant, which is “a wholly owned company of the Government of Madhya Pradesh” (as described by the appellant in the Special Leave Petition), is responsible for the bulk purchase of electricity in the State of Madhya Pradesh for onward sale/supply to the distribution utilities (DISCOMS). The appellant issued a request for proposal (RFP) dated 06.05.2015 for long-term procurement of 300 MW of solar energy through tariff-based competitive bidding. The bid of M/s Sky Power Southeast Asia Holding Limited was accepted. It was declared the successful bidder for three units of 50 MW each at different tariff rates. The bidder subsequently incorporated the first respondent, viz., M/s Sky Power Southeast Solar India Private Limited as a special purpose company. This was for developing one project of 50 MW. The rate, which is applicable in respect of the first respondent, was Rs.5.109 per unit.
In respect of the other two bids, the bidder incorporated other companies, viz., M/s Sky Power Solar India Private Limited and M/s Sky Power Southeast Asia One Private Limited. The rates applicable in respect of said companies for the other two projects consisting of 50 MW each was Rs.5.298 per unit and Rs.5.051 per unit, respectively. The PPA was entered into on 18.09.2015. The agreement, inter alia, provided for pre-commissioning activities. They are described as satisfaction of conditions subsequent by the seller. The first respondent is the seller under the PPA.
4. The Agreement contemplated completion of the conditions subsequent, within a period of 210 days. In other words, the Agreement, admittedly, provided that the first respondent was to achieve fulfilment of conditions subsequent by 15.04.2016. The Agreement further contemplates an extension of the period of fulfilment of the condition subsequent on payment of penalty for a further period of nine months. Thus, calculating 210 days and an additional nine months from 18.09.2015, which is the date of the PPA, the period would come to an end on 15.01.2017. A communication was addressed dated 12.01.2017 by the first respondent. The first respondent purported to refer to Article 2.1 of the PPA, which, inter alia, reads as follows:
“Article 2.1 Seller agrees and undertaken to duly perform and complete all of the following activities seller's own cost and risk within 210 days from the effective Date unless such completion is affected by any force Majeure event, or if any of the Effective is specifically waived in writing by MPPMCL:
a) The Seller shall obtain all Consents, Clearance and Permits required for supply of Power to MPPMCL as per the terms of this Agreement;”
5. The first respondent purported to present certain documents and contend that there was compliance of its obligations under the PPA. This led to communication dated 22.02.2017 addressed by the appellant to the first respondent. It referred to the status of the documents, which the appellant noted. Furthermore, appellant sought certain documents. It is, inter alia, pointed out by the appellant that the first respondent had no documents in regard to 34.12 hectare of land and an unregistered lease deed for only 12 months was submitted, which could not be considered as fulfilme
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Kerala SEB and another v. Kurien E. Kalathil and others (2000) 6 SCC 293 – Discussed [Paras 10 & 18]
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The court reinforced that the existence of an arbitration clause limits the scope for judicial intervention in contractual disputes involving the state.
The judgment emphasizes the limited scope of judicial review in contractual matters involving public authorities and the importance of resolving disputed questions of fact through alternate remedies,....
(1) Determination of capital cost of project and rate of tariff at which power has to be purchased would always be subject to regulatory control of State Commission.(2) Every action of State is requi....
A writ petition can be dismissed for lack of maintainability if an arbitration clause exists; however, constitutional violations may warrant judicial review.
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