2023 Supreme(SC) 662

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Aniruddha Bose, Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.
Vernon – Appellant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Anr. - Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 639 of 2023 With Criminal Appeal No.640 of 2023
Decided On : 28-07-2023

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Bail – Statutory restrictions, per se, do not oust jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of Constitution of India.
(2) Mere holding of certain literatures through which violent acts may be propagated would not ipso facto attract provisions of Section 15(1)(b) of UAPA, 1967.
(3) Bail – Elgar Parishad (Bhima-Koregaon) incident – When statutes have stringent provisions duty of Court would be more onerous – Graver the offence, greater should be care taken to see that offence would fall within four corners of Act.

Headnote:

(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 439 – Bail – Statutory restrictions, per se, do not oust jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of Constitution of India – There is duty of Court to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusations against such persons are prima facie true while considering prayer for bail, to reject prayers for bail of appellants. (Paras 6 and 9)

(B) Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 2(k), 15 and 43D(5) – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 439 – Bail – Elgar Parishad (Bhima-Koregaon) incident – Charge-sheet contains Sections 121, 121A, 124A, 153A, 505(1)(b), 117, 120B read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38, 39 and 40 of 1967 Act – Charges against appellants are yet to be framed – “Terrorist act” as defined under Section 2(k) of 1967 Act carries meaning assigned to it in Section 15 – Association with a terrorist organisation and keeping literatures propagating violence and promoting overthrowing of a democratically elected government through armed struggle – It is not NIA’s case that either of two appellants is author of materials found from their residences, as alleged – None of these literatures has been specifically proscribed so as to constitute an offence, just by keeping them – There is nothing against appellants to prima facie establish that they had indulged in activities which would constitute overawing any public functionary by means of criminal force or show of criminal force or attempts by appellants to do so – Neither there is allegation against them of causing death of any public functionary or attempt to cause death of such functionary – Mere holding of certain literatures through which violent acts may be propagated would not ipso facto attract provisions of Section 15(1)(b) of Act – Witness statements do not refer to any terrorist act alleged to have been committed by appellants – Neither provisions of Section 18 nor 18B can be invoked against appellants, prima facie, at this stage – Mere participation in seminars by itself cannot constitute offence under bail-restricting Sections of 1967 Act. (Paras 24, 26, 29 and 32)

(C) Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 20 and 38 – Membership of a terrorist organisation – To bring within scope of Section 38 of 1967 Act, it would not be sufficient to demonstrate that one is an associate or someone who professes to be associated with a terrorist organisation – But there must be intention to further activities of such organisation on part of person implicated under such provision – But same line of reasoning in respect of membership of a terrorist organisation under Section 20, ought to apply in respect of an alleged offender implicated in Section 38 of 1967 Act – There must be evidence of there being intention to be involved in a terrorist act – So far as appellants are concerned, at this stage there is no such evidence. (Para 34)

(D) Interpretation of Statute – It is one of basic rules of statutory construction that an expression used in different parts of a statute shall ordinarily convey same meaning unless contrary intention appears from different parts of same enactment itself. (Para 32)

(E) Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 2(k), 15 and 43D(5) – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 439 – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 21 – Bail – Elgar Parishad (Bhima-Koregaon) incident – Court ought to carefully examine every case, before making an assessment if the Act would apply or not – When statutes have stringent provisions duty of Court would be more onerous – Graver the offence, greater should be care taken to see that offence would fall within four corners of Act – No covert or overt act of terrorism has been attributed to appellants by witnesses – There has been no credible evidence against appellants of commission of any terrorist act or enter into conspiracy to do so to invoke provisions of Section 43D (5) of 1967 Act – Appellants have made out a case for granting bail – Impugned Judgments set aside and bail granted to appellants against stern conditions. (Paras 35, 37, 38, 43, 45 and 46)

Facts of the case:

Appellants assail two judgments of High Court of Judicature at Bombay rejecting, in substance, their prayers for bail. Both applications were filed on 27th October 2018 after Special Judge, Pune under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 had dismissed their bail plea. Decisions of the High Court were delivered on the same date i.e. 15th October 2019.

Findings of Court:

In the event there is breach of any of these conditions, or any of conditions to be imposed by Trial Court independently, it would be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of the bail of each or any of the defaulting appellants without any further reference to this Court. Similarly, if appellants seek to threaten or otherwise influence any of the witnesses, whether directly or indirectly, then also the prosecution shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail of concerned appellant by making appropriate application before the Trial Court.

Result : Appeals allowed.