JUDGMENT :

AJAY BHANOT, J.

1. By the impugned order dated 27.01.2021, the learned appellate court/Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Jhansi has rejected the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed along with the memo of appeal and has accordingly found that the appeal was not maintainable. The appeal was filed under Section 67(5) of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006.

2. Sri. Vinod Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the appeal of the petitioner has been rejected on grounds of delay. It is submitted that the delay was due to bona-fide reasons. The learned appellate authority took a highly technical view of the matter. It is further contended that the impugned order dated 27.01.2021 shows non application of mind.

3. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for the State - respondents submits that the delay in filing the appeal was not liable to be condoned and the learned appellate authority rightly rejected the appeal.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

5. The facts relevant from the adjudication of the controversy can be prised out from the impugned order.

6. The complete record is thus before this Court and no useful purpose will be served by exchange of pleadings and keeping this writ petition pending.

7. With consent of learned counsels for the parties, this writ petition is being decided finally.

8. The petitioner has meticulously explained the cause of delay in the delay condonation application. It has also been asserted that substantive rights of the petitioner are engaged in this controversy. The aforesaid facts have not been adverted to in the impugned order passed by the learned appellate court.

9. The Courts have consistently set their face against a pedantic approach in matters pertaining to condonation of delay, and insist on a justice oriented approach.

10. It would be apposite to predicate the narrative with good authority in point. The purpose of laws of limitation is to ensure that the parties remain vigilant to their causes and institute their claims in good time. The mandate of laws of limitation is not to shut the doors of justice to the parties or decline adjudication on merits. On the contrary it should be the constant endeavour of the courts and authorities to adjudicate issues on merits and dispense justice on a substantive basis.

11. There is good authority to hold that the courts and authorities should adopt a liberal, pragmatic and a justice oriented approach matters of condonation of delay. Equally a pedantic view should be avoided and servitude to procedure in such matters should be eschewed.

12. In Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Kati Ji and Others, 1987 (13) ALR 306 (SC) the Supreme Court took a liberal view of the phrase “sufficient cause” and held as follows:

“The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits.” The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy.”

And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:

1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties.

3. “Every” day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made.