IMPORTANT POINT
Only special courts or sessions courts have the authority to extend the investigation period beyond 90 days under the UAPA, not magistrates.

JUDGMENT :

(Ravindra Maithani, J.) :

The challenge in this revision is made to the order dated 20.03.2024, passed by the court of Judicial Magistrate 1st, Roorkee, District Haridwar. By the impugned order, the Investigating Officer has been given 90 days further time to complete the investigation in Case Crime No. 599 of 2023, under Section 387, 506, 120B IPC and Section 15 (c), 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967(“UAPA”) (“the case”).

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

3. Learned counsel for the revisionist would submit that the case is under the provisions of the UAPA also. He would submit that by virtue of Section 43D of the UAPA, the period of detention given under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”) has been extended. From 15 days, it has been extended to 30 days and for 60 days or 90 days, it has been maintained as 90 days. But, he would submit that the extension of time for investigation beyond 90 days can only be granted by the court, under the proviso to Section 43D (2) of the UAPA. It is argued that in the instant case, the magistrate has extended the period from 90 days up to 180 days and has granted 90 days extra time for completion of investigation, which is not in accordance with law. Learned counsel has also raised following points in his submission:-

(i) The time for completion of investigation may be extended beyond 90 days by the court only. The court may be either special court constituted under Section 11 or under Section 22 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (“NIA Act”) or in the absence of any special court, the court of session under Section 22 (3) of the NIA Act.

(ii) The time for completion of investigation may not be extended by the magistrate under the UAPA.

4. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the principles of law, as laid down in the cases of Bikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2020) 10 SCC 616, Sadique and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 6 SCC 339, State of West Bengal Vs. Jayeeta Das, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 550 and in the matter of Pratik Bhowmik, 2022 SCC Online Cal. 4286.

5. In the case of Bikramjit Singh (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of Section 43 D (2) (b) of the UAPA and observed as follows:-

“26. Before the NIA Act was enacted, offences under the UAPA were of two kinds — those with a maximum imprisonment of over 7 years, and those with a maximum imprisonment of 7 years and under. Under the Code as applicable to offences against other laws, offences having a maximum sentence of 7 years and under are triable by the Magistrate's courts, whereas offences having a maximum sentence of above 7 years are triable by Courts of Session. This scheme has been completely done away with by the NIA Act, 2008 as all Scheduled Offences i.e. all offences under the UAPA, whether investigated by the National Investigation Agency or by the investigating agencies of the State Government, are to be tried exclusively by Special Courts set up under that Act. In the absence of any designated court by notification issued by either the Central Government or the State Government, the fallback is upon the Court of Session alone. Thus, under the aforesaid scheme what becomes clear is that so far as all offences under the UAPA are concerned, the Magistrate's jurisdiction to extend time under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b) is non-existent, “the Court” being either a Sessions Court, in the absence of a notification specifying a Special Court, or the Special Court itself. The impugned judgment in arriving at the contrary conclusion is incorrect as it has missed Section 22(2) read with Section 13 of the NIA Act. Also, the impugned judgment has missed Section 16(1) of the NIA Act which states that a Special Court may take cognizance of any offen