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2025 Supreme(SC) 656
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, K. VINOD CHANDRAN, JJ.
The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Gopu and Another - Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 5300 of 2025 [Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 2466 of 2020]
Decided On : 08-04-2025
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Adv. Ms. Shuchi Singh, Adv. Mr. Shuchi Singh, AOR Mr. Vivek Kumar Pandey, Adv. Ms. Shivani Mishra, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Venkita Subramoniam T.R., AOR
IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Limitation – It is not for Courts to extend period of limitation on misplaced sympathies.
(2) Appeal is a continuation of original proceeding.
Headnote:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Sections 6 and 7 – Death in motor accident – High Court enhanced amount of compensation from Rs. 6,53,000/- to Rs. 14,95,000/-, alongwith 7% interest – Deceased aged 32 and getting Rs.5,955/- per month – Father as natural guardian has instituted original proceeding before Tribunal, for compensation on death of his wife in a motor vehicle accident, with both minor children in party array of claimants, represented by father – Father who is natural guardian took a conscious decision not to file appeal and was satisfied with award – Exemption by reason of disability applies to institution of original proceeding or application for execution of a final decree, which will not apply in case of appeal – Statements made in application for condonation of delay, that father had married again and children were abandoned; who were in care of their grandparents are not substantiated – Any substantiation would also have not enabled filing of appeal under Section 6, exemption under which, based on a disability, is confined to suits and applications for execution of decree – Intention of Legislature being very clear, it is not for courts to extend period of limitation on misplaced sympathies – Judgment of Single Judge set aside, being grossly delayed and not maintainable. (Paras 12, 13 and 14)
Facts of the case:
Present appeal is directed against an order dated 01.03.2019, passed by High Court of Kerala in MACA No. 627 of 2016, by which compensation awarded to the claimants by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha was enhanced.
Findings of Court:
Even Section 5 has no application in facts of the case, insofar as long delay occasioned, especially when in original proceedings, children were represented by father, the natural guardian.
Result : Appeal allowed.
ORDER :
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against an order dated 01.03.2019, passed by the High Court of Kerala in MACA No. 627 of 2016, by which the compensation awarded to the claimants by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha (for short 'the Tribunal') was enhanced.
3. On 02.06.2000 at 3.00 P.M. the deceased was riding pillion on a motorcycle being driven by one V.G. Shibu, 1st respondent before the Tribunal. Near the Avalookunnu Post office, respondent No. 1 applied sudden brake to save a cyclist and the deceased fell and was injured. Ultimately, the deceased succumbed to her injuries on 07.06.2000 at the Medical College Hospital. It is alleged that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving by the bike driver. The owner and driver were ex-parte in the Tribunal.
4. The legal representatives of the deceased, husband two minor children, preferred a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 6,53,000/- (Rupees Six Lakh Fifty Three Thousand only). Against the award dated 23.11.2006, after 10 years, in 2016, the children alone preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court of Kerala enhanced the compensation from Rs. 6,53,000/- to Rs. 14,95,000/- and further directed the appellant-Insurance Company to pay interest @ 7% p.a. interest. This is the order which has been challenged before us.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the material placed on record.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent-claimants submits the deceased was working as a Junior Public Health Nurse at PHC, Thenipalam and was getting an amount of Rs.5,955/- per month. The appellants Gopu and Goukul are her children, who were minors, when the deceased aged 32 died as a result of the accident. Learned counsel submits that just amount was not awarded by the Tribunal; as after the death of Rasimol (the deceased), three Pay Commission Reports dated 25.03.2006, 26.02.2011 and 20.01.2016 were implemented. And a considerable increase in the salary was recommended in the Pay Commission. Learned counsel contends that the future prospects and the hike in salary was not considered by the Tribunal while awarding compensation.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant- Insurance Company submits that there are discrepancies in the judgment of the High Court in apportioning the enhanced compensation and that the cause of action had occurred in the year 2000, hence the salary received at the time of accident alone can be considered. Learned counsel further submits that the judgment passed by the High Court is not sustainable in the eye of law as respondent No. 1-Gopu himself attained majority in the year 2011 as per his affidavit filed with the MAC appeal in year 2016 and he has not given any satisfactory explanation as to why the MAC Appeal was not filed immediately thereafter; when he attained majority. The respondents/claimants have filed the MAC appeal after 10 years of the award and further after about 8 years (2877 days) from the date of attaining majority.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents rely upon Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which read as under:
“6. Legal disability:
(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule.
(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would ot
