1. Dispute over whether an educational institution managed by a society is a state or authority under Article 12, affecting the maintainability of writ petitions against service termination. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 )
2025 Supreme(SC) 891
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Abhay S. Oka, Augustine George Masih, JJ.
Dileep Kumar Pandey – Appellant
Versus
Union of India & Ors. – Respondents
R1: Union Of India
R2: Chairman, School Management Committee Air Force School
R3: Executive Director/ Wing Commander, Air Force School
R4: Shikshak Kalyan Samiti – Intervenor
Civil Appeal No. 10899 of 2013
With
Sanjay Kumar Sharma - Appellant
Versus
Central Board Of Secondary Education & Ors.- Respondents
R1: Central Board Of Secondary Education
R2: School Management Committee
R3: Officer In-Charge/Education Officer
R4: Sqr. Ldr. U. S. Pabla Enquiry Officer
R5: Principal, Air Force School, Bamrauli
R6: Smt. Shalini Kaul
Civil Appeal No.11378 of 2013
Decided On : 21-05-2025
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Sanjay R Hegde, Sr. Adv. Mr. Anand Singh, Adv. Mr. S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Adv. Ms. Abhilasha Shrawat, Adv. Mr. Kartik Malhotra, Adv. Mr. Anindit Mandal, Adv. Mr. Darsh Bansal, Adv. Ms. Shreya Mansi James, Adv. Mrs. Aarthi Rajan, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. K M Nataraj, A.S.G. Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mr. Rajat Nair, Adv. Mr. Kanu Agarwal, Adv. Ms. Sairica S Raju, Adv. Mr. Ashutosh Ghade, Adv. Mr. Shreeyash U Lalit, Adv. Ms. Ameya Vikrama Thanvi,Adv. Ms. Shreya Jain,Adv. Ms. Manisha Chava,Adv. Ms. Neelam Sharma , AOR Mr. Anant Vijay Palli, Sr. Adv. Mr. Anupam Raina, Adv. Mr. Nikhil Palli, Adv. Mr. Deepak Goel, AOR Ms. Alka Goyal, Adv. Mrs. Urvashi Sharma, Adv. Mrs. Archana Preeti Gupta, Adv. 1 Mr. Sanjay R Hegde, Sr Adv. Mr. Anand Singh, Adv. Mr. S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Adv. Ms. Abhilasha Shrawat, Adv. Mr. Kartik Malhotra, Adv. Mr. Anindit Mandal, Adv. Mr. Darsh Bansal, Adv. Ms. Shreya Mansi James, Adv. Mrs. Aarthi Rajan, AOR
Air Force Schools, being under the control of the IAF, are deemed 'State' under Article 12, allowing for writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 12 and Article 226 - Employment law in educational institutions - Question whether Air Force School is a 'State' or 'authority' under Article 12 - Court ruled that Air Force School is controlled by the IAF, thus warranting writ jurisdiction. (Paras 1, 2, 13, 31)
(B) Public function - Discharge of public duty through education - The court emphasized that while imparting education is a public function, the relationship between the institution and teachers falls into the realm of private law unless governed by statutory provisions. (Paras 16, 20)
Facts of the case:
The appellants were teachers at Air Force Schools and claimed their rights for confirmation and against disciplinary actions, asserting that the school is a State under the Constitution. The High Court initially ruled against this claim.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court found that the IAF was deeply involved in the management of the Air Force Schools, thus affirming their status as a 'State' and upholding the maintainability of writ petitions under Article 226.
Issues: The main issue was whether the Air Force School constituted a 'State' or 'authority' under Article 12, creating a basis for challenges under Article 226.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that for a body to be deemed a 'State' under Article 12, it must be shown that it is under substantial government control, which the court found applicable to Air Force Schools.
Result: Appeals allowed.
Key Points: - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!)
What is the status of Air Force School, Bamrauli, under Article 12 in relation to writ jurisdiction under Article 226?
What is the test for determining whether a body is a "State" or "authority" under Article 12, and does pervasive control by the government/IAF render the School an "authority" for Article 226 purposes?
What are the implications for public law remedies when an educational institution is privately managed but discharges a public function, in relation to mandamus under Article 226?
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Appellants claim pervasive government control and public funding; respondents contend the institution is a private, unaided society funded by non-public welfare funds. (Para 6 , 7 , 9 , 10 , 11 )
3. The court analyzed the degree of financial, functional, and administrative control exercised by the government and whether the employment relationship involved a public law element. (Para 15 , 16 , 19 , 21 , 22 , 26 )
4. A body is State under Article 12 if it is financially, functionally, and administratively dominated by pervasive government control, rather than mere regulatory oversight. (Para 16 , 8 )
5. The court delivered conflicting opinions on whether the institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction, with one judge dismissing and the other allowing the appeals. (Para 25 , 31 )
6. When is a body considered State under Article 12 of the Constitution?
A body is considered State if it is financially, functionally, and administratively dominated by or under the pervasive control of the government. Such control must be particular to the body and pervasive, rather than merely regulatory. (Para 16 , 8 )
7. Is an educational institution performing a public duty always amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226?
Not necessarily. While imparting education is a public function, service disputes in unaided private schools are often viewed as private contracts without a public law element, unless the service conditions are regulated by statutory provisions. (Para 19 , 20 , 13 )
8. Does the use of Non-Public Funds preclude a body from being an authority under Article 12?
The majority held that lack of direct government funding suggests a private character. However, the dissent argued that indirect support, such as providing land and granting tax exemptions, can indicate a public nature. (Para 21 , 23 )
9. What is the difference between the scope of Article 12 and Article 226 regarding the term authority?
Article 12 is narrower, focusing on the definition of State for enforcing fundamental rights. Article 226 is broader, allowing writs against any person or authority performing a public duty, regardless of whether they are a statutory authority. (Para 15 , 20 )
JUDGMENT :
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. The issue involved in these two appeals is whether the Air Force School, Bamrauli, in District Allahabad, is a ‘state or authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
2. Air Force Schools were established in the year 1966 for imparting education to the children of the personnel of the Indian Air Force (IAF). Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society (for short, ‘the Society’) was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It was registered on 10th November 1987. It was established to manage Air Force Schools. The Air Force Schools at Bamrauli (for short, ‘the said school’) applied for affiliation with the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) in 1985.
FACTS IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.10899 OF 2013
3. According to the case of the appellant (Dileep Kumar Pandey) in Civil Appeal No.10899 of 2013, pursuant to a public advertisement and selection process conducted by the officers of the IAF, on 1st July 2005, he was appointed as a trained graduate teacher in the subject of physical education in the said school. According to his case, he was appointed on probation, and the probation period was extended from time to time. On 28th June 2007, an order was served upon the appellant stating that he was rendered surplus as the said school decided to appoint a more qualified teacher. An option was given to the appellant either to remain employed in the said school on contractual basis on a fixed salary from 1st July 2007 to May 2008 or to remain employed under the existing arrangement under which his service would come to an end on 3rd July 2007. Therefore, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Single Judge of the High Court, inter alia, praying for a declaration that the appellant is a confirmed teacher in the said school. The writ petition was allowed by order dated 13th January 2010 by a learned Single Judge by holding that the said school was a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned Single Judge, after setting aside the impugned orders, observed that it will be open to the Society to consider the claim of the appellant for confirmation in accordance with the law. An appeal was preferred before the Division Bench essentially on behalf of the management of the said school, which was allowed by the impugned judgment dated 12th July 2010. The Division Bench held that the said school was not a state within the meaning of Article 12, and as a result, a writ petition under Article 226 could not be entertained. Hence, the judgment of the learned Single Judge was set aside.
FACTS IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.11378 OF 2013
4. The appellant Sanjay Kumar Sharma was appointed as a post-graduate teacher (Commerce) on 19th June 1993 and was later on confirmed by the Officer-in-Charge of the said school. The Officer-in-Charge was an officer of the IAF. On 3rd March 2003, he was appointed as the officiating Principal of the said school by Wing Commander Ajay Kumar, Officer-in-Charge. According to the case of the appellant, the 6th respondent, Smt. Shalini Kaul has started acting as the principal without taking over charge of the post. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by the 6th respondent. Later on, at the instigation of the 6th respondent, girl students filed a complaint against the appellant. On the basis of various allegations, a show cause notice dated 19th December 2005 was issued to the appellant. On 23rd February 2006, a charge sheet was filed against the appellant. There were two writ petitions filed by the appellant. First was the writ petition No.12437 of 2006, wherein the appellant sought to challenge the appointment of the 6th respondent as the principal. Writ petition No.19915 of 2006 was filed by the appellant for challenging the charge sheet dated 23rd February 2006. By the order dated 5th July 2006, though the learned Single Judge held th