The judgment established that a writ petition for enforcement of a contract of service is not maintainable if the services are not controlled or regulated under any statute.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Shri Shireesh Kumar the counsel for the petitioner, Mohd. Zafar Khan and Sri Gaush Beg, the counsel for the respondents.

2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 13.04.2023 whereby the services of the petitioner as Principal, Army Public School, Nehru Road, Lucknow have been terminated. The contention is that the order of termination is in defiance of the Army Welfare Education Society Rules and is also in violative of the terms and conditions of the appointment order dated 24.03.2022. The said order is also challenged as being arbitrary and in violation of the principles of natural justice.

3. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the school in question is being run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act in the name of Army Welfare Education Society, which according to the petitioner, is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner had applied in terms of the advertisement issued by the respondents and finding her to be qualified, was issued an appointment order on 24.03.2022 appointing the petitioner on probation for a period of two years from the date of joining which could be extended at the discretion of the Chairman, Board of Administration, Central Command. The said appointment order provides that the period after probation can be extended, however in absence of any such communication, the services shall be deemed to be terminated. The appointment order in paragraph 18 provided as under :

"18. You will redress grievances, if any, through Chairman, SAMC. The decision of the Appointing Authority shall be final and binding on you. It may be noted that Army Public School Nehru Road, Lucknow comes under the category of 'Unaided Private School' and it is not a 'Government Institute'."

4. In pursuance of the said appointment letter, the petitioner joined and started to discharge her duties. The petitioner, after joining the services, raise an issue with regard to pay protection, which the petitioner was getting as a Principal, posted at Binnaguri, Jalpaiguri, West Bengal, prior to the petitioner joining the present services.

5. It is argued that the respondents were not happy with the said claim of the petitioner, as such, an order came to be passed dismissing her services, although the same was passed after issuance of a show cause notice alleging certain infractions against the petitioner.

6. In sum and substance, the counsel for the petitioner argues that the order impugned terminating the services of the petitioner is contrary to the agreement and is in violation of the principles of natural justice, as such, liable to be quashed and the petitioner should be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits.

7. A pointed query was raised by the counsel for the petitioner with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition against the school run by a Society as well as for enforcement of the contract of service, the counsel for the petitioner raised substantial arguments in support of his claim that the respondents are a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and further in any case, the respondents are discharging public functions and in any case it comes within the phrase 'other authority' as they are discharging the public function of imparting education and thus, are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

8. The counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argues that the writ petition is not maintainable against the society, as is being argued by the petitioner, and it is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He further argues that in any case, petition for enforcement of a contract of service is not maintainable. He argues that in terms of the manual, the petitioner has made a representation in which the prayer is similar to the one made in the writ petition. He, thus, argues that the writ p