ORDER :

1. Arguments concluded.

2. Broadly the following questions fall for consideration of this Court:-

I. What are the relevant considerations as contemplated by Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the PC Act') which the appropriate authority or government is expected to look into before the grant of approval for initiation of any enquiry, inquiry, or investigation by the police?

II. Whether the considerations which weigh with the appropriate authority or government while granting approval under Section 17A of the PC Act are fundamentally so different from the one that a Magistrate is ordinarily expected to apply while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Cr.P.C.') so as to preclude the Magistrate from fulfilling the object underlying Section 17A of the PC Act?

In other words, whether the considerations under Section 17A of the PC Act are of such a nature that they are necessarily beyond the ambit or scope of consideration by a Magistrate while directing an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.?

III. As a natural corollary of the aforesaid, could it be said that once a Magistrate has applied his mind under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the requirement of a prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act is meaningless, redundant and no longer necessary? Could it be said that a police officer, despite a direction under Section 156(3) by a Magistrate, would remain inhibited from conducting any enquiry, inquiry, or investigation without prior approval as required by Section 17A? If yes, how does the standard of application of mind by the appropriate authority differ from that of the Magistrate?

IV. In case of a private complaint, whether Section 19 of the PC Act, more particularly parts (i) and (ii) of the First Proviso therein contemplates that sanction would be required only after the Magistrate first completes the stage of examining the complainant and / or causing a magisterial inquiry wherever necessary in terms of Section(s) 200 and 202 of the Cr.P.C. respectively? In other words, whether the three conditions envisaged under the First Proviso, namely that a complaint has been filed as per Part (i) and that the court has not only not dismissed such complaint but also explicitly directed the obtainment of sanction as per Part (ii), necessarily implies that it is open for the Magistrate to proceed in terms of Chapter XV more particularly under Section(s) 200, 202 and 203 even without the grant of sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act? If so, whether such an interpretation is limited only for the purpose of 'cognizance' under Section 19 of the PC Act?

V. Whether, Part (ii) of the First Proviso to Section 19 of the PC Act, more particularly the expression 'the court has not dismissed the complaint under Section 203 ' necessarily envisages that the Magistrate ought to have first considered the statements of the complainant and the witnesses(s) and/or of any magisterial inquiry in terms of Section(s) 200 and 202 of the Cr.P.C.? In other words, could it be said that the Magistrate takes cognizance only after deciding not to dismiss the complaint under Section 203 especially in light of the decision in Legal Remembrancer vs. Abani Kumar Banerji, reported in 1950 SCC OnLine Cal 49, which observed thus:-

'9. I have for myself no hesitation in feeling that there is nothing which would justify our referring the matter to the Full Bench. As I read s. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the subsequent sections, it seems to me to be clear that a magistrate is not bound to take cognizance of an offence, merely because a petition of complaint is filed before him. Mr. Mukherji's argument is that a magistrate cannot possibly take any action with regard to a petition of complaint, without applying his mind to it, and taking cognizance of the offence mentioned in the complaint necessarily takes place, when the magistrate's mind is appli