Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2025 Supreme(SC) 1674

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
PANKAJ MITHAL, PRASANNA B. VARALE, JJ.
Vaneeta Patnaik – Appellant
Versus
Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 11786 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 17936 of 2025)
Decided On : 12-09-202

Advocates appeared:
For the Petitioner(s): Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rishad Ahmed Chowdhury, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Ms. Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv. Mr. Satya Ranjan Swain, Adv. Mr. Vishnu Kant, AOR Mr. Ankush Kapoor, Adv. Mr. Kautilya Birat, Adv. Ms. Aandrita Deb, Adv. Ms. Rajnandini, Adv. Mr. Vishwadeep Chandrakar, Adv. Mr. Aayush Gupta, Adv. Mr. Kunal Chatterji, AOR Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Adv. Mr. Varij Nayan Mishra, Adv. Mr. C. K. Rai, AOR Mr. Vinay Kumar Gupta, Adv. Mr. Sumit Panwar, Adv.

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Limitation – Issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of fact and law and it may not be possible to throw out a complaint at threshold without collecting material on factual aspects relating to limitation.
(2) Sexual harassment – Distinction has to be made between a “continuing wrong” and a “recurring wrong”.
(3) It is advisable to forgive wrongdoer, but not to forget wrongdoing.

Headnote:
(A) Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Sections 3 and 9 – Sexual harassment – Not only unwelcome act or behaviour in form of physical contact or advances, a demand or request for sexual favours, making sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography or any unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature but also any other circumstances connected with act or behaviour of sexual harassment, like implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in employment, threat about present and future employment status, interference with work or creating an intimidating, offensive or hostile work environment or subjecting to humiliating treatment which may likely affect her health or safety, would also amount to acts or behaviour of sexual harassment – Complaint of sexual harassment is mandatorily required to be filed within a period of three months from date of the last incident of such harassment or within a further extended period of three months, i.e., within a maximum period of six months from date of last incident of sexual harassment – Issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of fact and law and it may not be possible to throw out a complaint at threshold without collecting material on factual aspects relating to limitation – Nonetheless, where a complaint on simple reading of averments made therein appears to be patently barred by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance on analogy of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, without even calling other side to participate in proceedings. (Paras 12, 14 and 15)
(B) Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Section 9 – Sexual harassment – Complaint – Limitation – Incident of removal of appellant as Director of CFRGS cannot be attributed as an act of sexual harassment in connection with previous incidents – It was based upon report of NFCG, an independent body – Enquiry into project funds was taken up by Executive Council and it was a collective decision and not a unilateral action of Vice-Chancellor – Said act would also not amount to an act of sexual harassment in conjunction with previous reported acts – Alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter – Distinction has to be made between a “continuing wrong” and a “recurring wrong” – Subsequent events have no connection to earlier act of sexual misconduct and as such, fall clearly out of preview of acts or behaviours amounting to sexual harassment – In this way, incident of April 2023, remains last event related to sexual harassment – Division Bench of High Court committed no error of law in restoring decision of LCC that complaint of appellant is time barred and is liable to be dismissed – It is advisable to forgive wrongdoer, but not to forget wrongdoing – Wrong which has been committed against appellant may not be investigated on technical grounds, but it must not be forgotten – Incidents of alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever – This judgment shall be made part of resume of respondent no.1, compliance of which shall be strictly ensured by him personally. (Paras 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 34 and 35)
Facts of the case:
Neat question which falls for consideration of this Court is: whether Division Bench of High Court is justified in non-suiting appellant on the ground that her complaint regarding Sexual Harassment was barred by limitation.
Findings of Court:
The very fact that appellant was conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed, proves that she herself treated act of April 2023, to be last incident of sexual harassment and as such, tried to explain the delay in filing the complaint.
Result : Appeal dismissed.

ORDER :

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Leave granted

2. Heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, senior counsel and Ms. Madhavi Divan, senior counsel, appearing for the appellant and the respondent no.1 respectively.

3. The appellant-Ms. Vaneeta Patnaik is a faculty member of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences¹[Hereinafter referred to as “NUJS” or “University”], Kolkata. Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, respondent no.1 was appointed as a Vice Chancellor of NUJS on 03.07.2019

4. The appellant lodged a formal complaint on 26.12.2023 with the Local Complaint Committee²[Hereinafter referred to as “LCC”] alleging sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1. The LCC rejected the complaint as barred by time inasmuch as the last alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred in April 2023; whereas the complaint was filed on 26.12.2023 which was not only beyond the prescribed period of limitation of three months but also beyond the extendable period of limitation of six months.

5. The appellant, aggrieved by the rejection of her complaint, preferred a writ petition before the High Court. The single Judge of the High Court vide judgment and order dated 22.05.2024 quashed the order of the LCC and directed for rehearing of the complaint on its merit. The single Judge held that the appellant was subjected to threat of detrimental treatment in her employment even after April 2023 and as the Vice-Chancellor created an intimidating, offensive and hostile work environment for her, as such the complaint was within time, taking the subsequent event as the last incident of sexual harassment.

6. The aforesaid judgment and order of the single Judge of the High Court was taken up by the Division Bench in a writ appeal, FMA No. 873 of 2024 (M.A.T. No. 1295 of 2024) and the same was allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 23.12.2024.

7. The Division Bench held that administrative actions taken against the appellant after April 2023 were collective decisions of the Executive Council, consisting of eminent academicians, jurists and even Supreme Court Judges and were not just personal actions of the Vice-Chancellor. It was improbable for the Vice-Chancellor to have prevailed over the decision of the Executive Council, exerting his pressure. He was not in a position to manipulate the decision of the Executive Council. The alleged incidents of harassment, if any, after April 2023, did not constitute sexual harassment and that even the appellant in all her communications to the Chancellor and Executive Council prior to December 2023, had not made any allegation of such sexual harassment against the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, the complaint filed on 26.12.2023, after the last incident of sexual harassment that took place in April 2023, is beyond the normal period of limitation and even the extended period. It was, therefore, rightly rejected by the LCC as barred by time and the Single Judge of the High Court was not justified in overturning the said decision.

8. The neat question which falls for consideration of this Court is: whether the Division Bench of the High Court is justified in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that her complaint was barred by limitation.

9. To decide the above issue in the facts of the present case, it would be beneficial to first consider not only the definition of ‘sexual harassment’ but also what other circumstances, acts or behaviours would constitute as sexual harassment, vis-a-vis the period of limitation provided for making complaint in that regard.

10. ‘Sexual harassment’ is defined in Section 2(n) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013³[Hereinafter referred as the “POSH Act”] to include any one or more of the unwelcome act or behaviour (whether directly or by implication) such as physical contact and advances; or a demand or request for sexual favours; or making sexually coloured remarks; or showing pornography; or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal