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2025 Supreme(SC) 2016

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.B. PARDIWALA, R. MAHADEVAN, JJ.
Harshbir Singh Pannu and Another – Appellants
Versus
Jaswinder Singh – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 14630 of 2025 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10389 of 2025]
Decided On : 08-12-2025

Advocates appeared:
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Samarth Sagar, Adv. Ms. Mithu Jain, AOR Mr. Sanchit Garga, Adv. Mr. Shashwat Jaiswal, Adv. Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, Adv.

The power to terminate arbitral proceedings is exclusively governed by Section 32(2) of the Act. Termination ends both the proceedings and the arbitrator's mandate. Aggrieved parties must first file a recall application before the arbitrator; if unsuccessful, they may invoke Section 14(2) of the Act for resolution.

Headnote:(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 14, 15, 25, 30, 32 and 38 - Termination of arbitral proceedings - Power of arbitral tribunal to terminate proceedings for non-payment of fees - Held, Section 32 is exhaustive regarding termination - Recourse for termination for any reason, including non-payment of deposits, falls under Section 32(2)(c) - Termination of proceedings results in the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator - Parties cannot initiate fresh arbitration proceedings for the same dispute after the termination of the mandate. (Paras 104, 144, 211 and 264)

(B) Remedy against termination - Tribunal possesses inherent procedural power to recall an order terminating proceedings to correct procedural errors - If recall is refused, party may approach a court to decide on the termination of mandate under Section 14(2) - A fresh petition for appointment of an arbitrator is not maintainable post-termination without the original order being set aside. (Paras 275, 297, 311 and 314)

(C) Fixation of fees - Fees settled at the threshold are binding - Unilateral revision of fees without consent of parties is impermissible - Arbitral tribunal must seek consent for fee revision; failure to reach consensus entitles the arbitrator to decline the assignment. (Paras 326, 335 and 338)

Facts of the case:
A dispute arose between partners in a business entity. An arbitrator was appointed to resolve the matter. During the proceedings, the arbitrator revised the fees payable based on the addition of a counterclaim, which the parties failed to pay as directed. Consequently, the arbitrator terminated the proceedings. The claimants challenged the termination and filed a fresh petition seeking the appointment of a new arbitrator, which was rejected by lower judicial forums, leading to the current proceedings.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that all order of termination of arbitral proceedings are fundamentally orders issued under Section 32(2)(c) of the Act. The tribunal stands divested of authority once the proceedings are terminated. The court established that the remedy against such termination is to move the arbitrator for a recall of the order first, and subsequently move the court under Section 14(2) if the recall application is dismissed.

Issues: Whether termination of proceedings for non-payment of fees is equivalent to termination of the mandate of the arbitrator; what is the appropriate remedy for a party aggrieved by an order of termination of arbitral proceedings; can a fresh petition for appointment of an arbitrator be maintained post-termination.

Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that Section 32 is the sole provision governing the termination of arbitral proceedings. The termination for non-payment of fees falls under the residuary clause of Section 32(2)(c). Because the Act is a complete code, no fresh appointment under the relevant section is allowed; rather, the aggrieved party must apply for recall or challenge the termination of the mandate under Section 14(2).

Result: Appeal partly allowed; matter remanded to the high court for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator.

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the detailed document provided, here are the key legal points:

  1. The power of the arbitral tribunal to terminate proceedings is primarily derived from Section 32(2) of the Act, 1996, which explicitly authorizes the tribunal to issue an order for termination under specific circumstances (!) (!) .

  2. Termination of arbitral proceedings can occur either through the final arbitral award or via an order issued by the arbitral tribunal under Section 32(2). The circumstances for such an order include withdrawal of claims, agreement between parties, or when continuation becomes unnecessary or impossible (!) (!) .

  3. The phrase "mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate" is specifically associated with the conclusion of proceedings under Section 32(3), indicating the end of the tribunal's authority and jurisdiction over the dispute (!) (!) .

  4. The provisions under Sections 25, 30, and 38 of the Act, 1996, describe various circumstances under which proceedings may be terminated, but these do not independently confer the power to terminate proceedings. Instead, they set the conditions that may lead to a termination order under Section 32(2) (!) (!) .

  5. The order for termination of proceedings, especially when based on defaults such as non-payment of fees or failure to participate, is considered an order under Section 32(2). Such an order effectively ends the arbitration process and the tribunal's authority, unless the proceedings are revived or the order is challenged (!) (!) (!) .

  6. Termination of proceedings does not necessarily mean the termination of the arbitral tribunal's mandate unless it is explicitly ordered under Section 32(2). The distinction is crucial because the tribunal's mandate can be revived if proceedings are reopened, but once the proceedings are conclusively terminated under Section 32(2), the tribunal's authority ceases (!) (!) (!) .

  7. The appropriate remedy against an order terminating proceedings is typically to seek recall or review of that order within the arbitral process, rather than challenging the mandate of the arbitrator under Section 14, unless the tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction or without authority (!) (!) (!) .

  8. The legal effect of an order terminating proceedings for reasons such as non-payment of fees is consistent with the finality of the arbitration process, and such orders are not considered awards. They are procedural in nature and can be challenged only through specific statutory remedies, such as applications for recall or setting aside under Sections 34 or 37, or through proceedings under Section 14(2) if the tribunal's authority is questioned (!) (!) (!) .

  9. The law recognizes that proceedings can be terminated for various reasons, including default, settlement, or impossibility, and each has specific procedural implications. However, once properly terminated under Section 32(2), the arbitration process is considered concluded, with the tribunal's jurisdiction extinguished (!) (!) .

  10. Challenges to procedural orders, including those for termination, are generally not permissible under Article 227 of the Constitution unless the tribunal acts without jurisdiction or beyond its authority, such as acting after its mandate has been lawfully terminated (!) (!) (!) .

  11. There is a recognized distinction between the termination of proceedings and the termination of the tribunal's mandate. The former is about ending the arbitration process, while the latter pertains to the arbitrator's authority, which can be revived if proceedings are reopened (!) (!) (!) .

  12. The legislative framework and judicial interpretations emphasize that the power to terminate proceedings is circumscribed and must be exercised within the specific provisions of the Act, primarily Section 32(2), and cannot be inferred from other provisions in isolation (!) (!) .

  13. The law also acknowledges that the remedies for wrongful termination are limited and generally involve challenging the order through statutory procedures rather than through broad judicial review, except where the tribunal acts outside its jurisdiction or in violation of fundamental principles (!) (!) .

  14. The principles underlying the law on arbitration include the importance of party autonomy, procedural self-responsibility, and the finality of arbitration awards, which collectively restrict unwarranted judicial interference in procedural orders, including termination orders (!) (!) .

  15. The law also recognizes that a party cannot reinitiate arbitration on the same dispute after its proceedings are lawfully terminated, to prevent abuse and forum shopping, unless explicitly permitted by law or specific provisions (!) (!) .

These points collectively outline the legal framework governing the power, scope, and remedies related to the termination of arbitral proceedings under the Act, 1996, and related procedural principles.


Table of Content
1. judicial intervention in arbitration is necessary when autonomy is exploited to delay proceedings. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4)
2. factual history regarding the initiation and eventual termination of arbitral proceedings for non-payment of fees. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23)
3. procedural history of high court writ and section 11 challenges regarding the termination order. (Para 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29)
4. appellants' contentions regarding the scope of section 32 and appropriate remedies for termination of proceedings. (Para 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47)
5. interpretation of sections 25, 30, 32, and 38 as the statutory framework for terminating arbitration proceedings. (Para 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 75 , 76 , 77 , 78 , 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96 , 97 , 98 , 99 , 100)
6. jurisprudential divergence on whether termination provisions operate independently or under section 32 as the overarching source of power. (Para 101 , 102 , 103 , 104 , 105 , 106 , 107 , 108 , 109 , 110 , 111 , 112 , 113 , 114 , 115 , 116 , 117 , 118 , 119 , 120 , 121 , 122 , 123 , 124 , 125 , 126 , 127 , 128 , 129 , 130 , 131 , 132 , 133 , 134 , 135 , 136 , 137 , 138 , 139 , 140 , 141 , 142 , 143 , 144)
7. legislative history and travaux préparatoires of uncitral model law establishing section 32 as the primary locus for termination of proceedings. (Para 145 , 146 , 147 , 148 , 149 , 150 , 151 , 152 , 153 , 154 , 155 , 156 , 157 , 158 , 159 , 160 , 161 , 162 , 163 , 164 , 165 , 166 , 167 , 168 , 169 , 170 , 171 , 172 , 173 , 174 , 175 , 176 , 177 , 178 , 179 , 180 , 181 , 182 , 183 , 184 , 185 , 186 , 187 , 188 , 189 , 190 , 191 , 192 , 193 , 194 , 195 , 196 , 197 , 198 , 199 , 200 , 201 , 202 , 203 , 204 , 205)
8. section 32(2) provides the sole power for termination; specific provisions like section 38 merely trigger the conditions for such termination. (Para 206 , 207 , 208 , 209 , 210 , 211 , 212 , 213 , 214 , 215 , 216 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 220 , 221 , 222 , 223 , 224 , 225 , 226 , 227 , 228 , 229 , 230 , 231 , 232 , 233 , 234 , 235 , 236 , 237 , 238 , 239 , 240 , 241 , 242 , 243 , 244 , 245 , 246 , 247 , 248 , 249 , 250 , 251 , 252 , 253 , 254 , 255 , 256 , 257 , 258 , 259 , 260 , 261 , 262 , 263 , 264 , 265 , 266)
9. remedies against termination include a recall application before the tribunal and, if unsuccessful, a challenge under section 14(2). (Para 267 , 268 , 269 , 270 , 271 , 272 , 273 , 274 , 275 , 276 , 277 , 278 , 279 , 280 , 281 , 282 , 283 , 284 , 285 , 286 , 287 , 288 , 289 , 290 , 291 , 292 , 293 , 294 , 295 , 296 , 297 , 298 , 299 , 300 , 301 , 302 , 303 , 304 , 305 , 306 , 307 , 308 , 309 , 310 , 311 , 312 , 313 , 314 , 315 , 316)
10. application of the fourth schedule and section 38: parties cannot object to fees if they align with the model schedule. (Para 317 , 318 , 319 , 320 , 321 , 322 , 323 , 324 , 325 , 326 , 327 , 328 , 329 , 330 , 331 , 332 , 333 , 334 , 335 , 336 , 337 , 338 , 339 , 340 , 341 , 342 , 343)
11. comparative analysis of siac, lcia, and hkiac rules on the termination of proceedings. (Para 344 , 345 , 346 , 347 , 348 , 349 , 350 , 351 , 352 , 353 , 354 , 355 , 356 , 357 , 358 , 359 , 360 , 361 , 362 , 363 , 364 , 365 , 366 , 367 , 368 , 369 , 370 , 371 , 372 , 373 , 374 , 375 , 376 , 377 , 378 , 379 , 380 , 381 , 382 , 383 , 384 , 385 , 386 , 387 , 388 , 389 , 390 , 391 , 392 , 393)
12. call for legislative reform to address the procedural uncertainty in the current arbitration act. (Para 394 , 395 , 396 , 397 , 398 , 399 , 400 , 401 , 402 , 403 , 404 , 405 , 406 , 407 , 408 , 409 , 410 , 411 , 412 , 413 , 414 , 415)
13. order to remand the matter for appointment of a substitute arbitrator despite the appellants' initial defa

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