An acquittal based on 'benefit of doubt' does not necessarily disqualify a candidate from employment; appointing authorities must consider the context and evidence of the acquittal.

ORDER :

1. Union of India and the Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force ¹ [CISF] Bhilai are aggrieved by the common judgment and order dated 14th October, 2025 passed by the Delhi High Court, whereby the writ petitions of the respondents 1, 2 and 3, presented before it, have been allowed. Such petitions had challenged orders passed by the competent authority of the CISF holding the respondents 1, 2 and 3 ineligible for service under the CISF on the ground that their exoneration from criminal charges based on acquittals recorded by the trial courts were not honourable. Upon the orders under challenge being set aside, the petitioners were ordered to appoint the respondents 1, 2 and 3 in service as well as grant other benefits as indicated.

2. We have heard Mr. S.D. Sanjay, learned Additional Solicitor General for the petitioners.

3. In all the three cases under consideration, the respective complainants had accused the respondents 1, 2 and 3 of having committed offences, inter alia, against women which, if proved, could amount to moral turpitude. No doubt, in the judgment of the trial court acquitting the respondent 1, giving him the “benefit of doubt” is found to have been recorded. However, at the same time, it is noticed that the prime witnesses were not believed and the trial court specifically observed of practically no reliable evidence being available on record to substantiate the prosecution case. With respect to the respondent 2, after the matter reached the court, the complainant herself moved an application under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that she did not seek to pursue the complaint and wished to settle the matter. Such prayer was granted and an order was made under sub-section (8) of , having the effect of an acquittal. Regarding the respondent 3, the trial court recorded a categorical finding that the prosecution had “miserably failed” to establish its case, thereby entitling the accused to acquittal. There is no mention of “benefit of doubt” in this judgment.

4. For the purpose of guidance of the appointing authorities, we propose to emphasize that while dealing with cases of the present nature, the appointing authority ought not to get unduly swayed merely because of user of the expression “benefit of doubt” by the trial court in its judgment. An acquittal could be based on technicality or upon a full consideration of the prosecution case. The judgment of acquittal in its entirety has to be read to ascertain whether the acquittal that has been recorded is other than honourable. If witnesses do not turn up for tendering evidence or turn hostile or the investigation is found to be flawed or there be any such similar vitiating factor and if these give rise to a lingering suspicion in the mind of the trial court that the witnesses have been won over or that the evidence has deliberately been withheld but, at the same time, the evidence/materials on record are absolutely inadequate or insufficient to record a finding of guilt, the trial courts are generally prone to record acquittal of the accused by giving them the benefit of doubt. Such an acquittal being based on technical grounds or on “benefit of doubt” would obviously fall short of an honourable acquittal. But, if the trial court upon consideration of the entirety of the evidence on record finds that the charge has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, yet, acquits the accused by recording that he is given the benefit of doubt, a claim of honourable acquittal could certainly be raised notwithstanding such recording. After all, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Much