S. Panchalingu vs People’s Education Trust (R)

Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Sections 92, 94, 141 and 151; Order XL Rule 1 - Suits against Public Charities - Appointment of Receiver - Leave of the Court - Whether a Civil Court possesses the power to pass protective or preservatory interim orders during the pendency of an application for leave to institute a suit under Section 92: The grant of leave under Section 92 is an essential and mandatory pre-condition to the institution of a suit; in its absence, there exists no pending proceeding in which interlocutory applications can be entertained (Paras 31, 38). Interlocutory orders are granted in aid of the final relief in a suit and cannot be passed in a proceeding which the Court cannot entertain until leave has been granted (Para 50).

(B) Order XL Rule 1 - Appointment of Receiver - The provision contemplating the appointment of a receiver "before or after decree" presupposes the existence of a validly instituted suit; thus, it has no applicability prior to the institution of a suit against public charities ( Paras 41, 45). The appointment of a receiver in a public trust is intrusive and may defeat the purpose of Section 92, which aims to protect trusts from vexatious litigation (Para 54).

(C) Section 151 - Inherent Powers - Inherent powers cannot be relied upon in contravention of express statutory provisions; the principle of "generalia specialibus non derogant" implies that the special provisions of Section 92 prevail over the general inherent powers under Section 151 (Paras 48, 49).

(D) Grant of Leave - While notice to proposed defendants should ordinarily precede the grant of leave, in cases of compelling urgency, notice may be dispensed with to grant leave ex parte, thereby allowing the suit to be instituted and interim orders to be passed thereafter (Paras 57, 58, 59).

Facts of the case:
A suit was filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure along with an application seeking leave to institute the suit. The Trial Court passed an order under Order XL Rule 1 of the Code appointing an ad hoc committee to manage the day-to-day affairs of a public trust pending the disposal of the leave application. The High Court set aside this order, holding that the court was denuded of jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders until leave was granted. The matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Findings of Court:
The Court found that an application for leave under Section 92 is a "threshold proceeding" and not a substantive proceeding. Until leave is granted, no "lis" exists before the Court, and consequently, there is no jurisdiction to invoke supplemental powers under Section 94 or Order XL.

Issues: Whether a Civil Court, seized of a plaint filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, together with an application seeking leave to institute the suit, possesses the power to pass protective or preservatory interim orders during the pendency of the leave application?

Ratio Decidendi: Section 92 is a special provision embodying a balancing act to protect public trust property while shielding trusts from harassment. Since obtaining leave is a mandatory condition precedent to the institution of the suit, the court lacks the jurisdiction to pass interlocutory or preservatory orders during the leave stage. Inherent powers under Section 151 cannot bypass this statutory requirement. If urgent relief is needed, the appropriate course is to grant leave ex parte upon recording cogent reasons, rather than passing orders while the leave application is still pending.

Result: Appeals dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

1. Whether a Civil Court can pass protective interim orders pending leave under Section 92 CPC for public charitable trusts. (Para 2 , 4 )

2. Parties disputed whether court has jurisdiction to appoint receiver or exercise inherent powers before grant of leave. (Para 5 , 18 )

3. Section 92 requires leave as condition precedent; supplemental proceedings and inherent powers cannot override express provisions. (Para 28 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 )

4. A Civil Court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders during pendency of leave application under Section 92 CPC. (Para 60 )

5. Appeals dismissed; clarified that leave may be granted ex parte without notice for compelling urgent reasons. (Para 61 )

6. Can a civil court appoint a receiver pending leave under Section 92 CPC?

No, because no suit exists until leave is granted and supplemental proceedings presuppose a valid suit. (Para 39 , 40 , 41 , 60 )

7. Can inherent powers under Section 151 CPC be used to pass interim orders before leave is granted?

No, inherent powers cannot override the express safeguards in Section 92 and the principle generalia specialibus non derogant. (Para 48 , 49 )

8. Is notice to defendants mandatory before granting leave under Section 92 CPC?

No, notice may be dispensed with where facts disclose urgent necessity, but leave must be granted with caution and recorded reasons. (Para 57 , 58 , 59 )

9. How does Section 92 CPC differ from other leave provisions in the Code?

Section 92 uses 'having obtained the leave' making it a mandatory precondition, unlike other provisions using 'with the leave of the Court'. (Para 36 , 37 )

10. Is the appointment of a receiver merely preservatory or intrusive in nature?

Appointment of a receiver is intrusive and dislodges management, defeating the protective purpose of Section 92. (Para 53 , 54 )

JUDGMENT :

MANMOHAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW

2. The substantial question of law arising for consideration in these appeals is whether a Civil Court, seized of a plaint filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘Code’), together with an application seeking leave to institute the suit, possesses the power to pass protective or preservatory interim orders during the pendency of the leave application?

CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS OF DIFFERENT HIGH COURTS

3. On this question, a divergence of judicial opinion has emerged amongst the High Courts. The High Court of Allahabad in Muhammad Ali Khan vs. Ahmad Ali Khan & Ors., ILR 1945 All 818; Sri Vir Digambar Jain Dharmashala and Sri Mahavir Jain Dharmarth Aushadhalai (Trust) & Anr. vs. Pramod Kumar Jain, 2008 SCC OnLine All 445, the Bombay High Court in Bai Sakri vs. Bai Dhani , ILR 1947 Bom 784, the Kerala High Court in Sulaiman vs. Chunakara S.M. Jama Ath, 1982 SCC OnLine Ker 145 and the Madras High Court in N. Anandan vs. Ayyanna Gounder & Ors., 1993 SCC OnLine Mad 165; R. Shanmugam & Ors. vs. M. Ganesa Mudaliar & Ors., 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 917 have recognised the existence of a protective jurisdiction pending grant of leave. The High Court of Orissa in Kintali China Jaganadham & Ors. vs. K. Laxmi Naidu & Ors., 1987 SCC OnLine Ori 44 and Karnataka in Shree Beereshwara Swamy Devaru Temple vs. G.N. Sathya , W.P. No. 9267/2022 , decided on 30.09.2022, however, have taken the contrary view that such jurisdiction stands excluded.

4. By the impugned judgment dated 25th June 2025, the High Court of Karnataka reaffirmed its earlier view that a suit under Section 92 remains ‘stillborn’ in the absence of leave, and that the Court is denuded of jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders pending the grant of such leave. On this basis, the High Court set aside the order dated 2nd May 2025 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, under Order XL Rule 1(a) of the Code, whereby an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees had been constituted to manage the day-to-day affairs of Respondent No. 1 – People's Education Trust, pending further directions.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

5. Dr. Aditya Sondhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the Appellants, submitted that once a Court is seized of an application under Section 92 of the Code, it cannot be relegated to the position of a ‘mute spectator’ until leave is granted. He contended that the Court retains the power to appoint a receiver under Section 94, read with Order XL Rule 1 of the Code and further, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 thereof.

6. He submitted that an application for leave under Section 92 constitutes a civil proceeding to which the provisions of the Code apply mutatis mutandis, by virtue of Section 141 of the Code, which reads as under:

“Section 141. Miscellaneous proceedings.

The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.

[Explanation.— In this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution.]”

7. He drew attention to the KARNATAKA CIVIL RULES OF PRACTICE , 1967 framed under Section 122 of the Code. He pointed out that Rule 16-A of the said Rules expressly treats an application seeking leave under Section 92 of the Code as an ‘independent and substantive application’ to be registered as a miscellaneous petition and stipulates that upon grant of leave, the Suit shall be deemed to be instituted on the date of filing of the miscellaneous petition.

8. Learned senior counsel submitted that nothing in the Code, either expressly or by necessary implication, restricts the appointment of a receiver to Suits alone. According to him, the appointment of a receiver in miscellaneous proceedings, unlike the grant of any other interim

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2026 Supreme(SC) 1137

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
MANOJ MISRA, MANMOHAN, JJ.
S. Panchalingu & Ors. – Appellants
Versus
People’s Education Trust (R) & Others Etc. – Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 13001-13003 of 2026 (Arising Out Of SLP (C) Nos. 25577-25579 of 2025)
Decided On 18-09-2026

Legal Category Hierarchy

Table of Contents

6. Can a civil court appoint a receiver pending leave under Section 92 CPC?

7. Can inherent powers under Section 151 CPC be used to pass interim orders before leave is granted?

8. Is notice to defendants mandatory before granting leave under Section 92 CPC?

9. How does Section 92 CPC differ from other leave provisions in the Code?

10. Is the appointment of a receiver merely preservatory or intrusive in nature?

Judicial Analysis

2026 Supreme(SC) 1137

SUPREME COURT OF INDIAMANOJ MISRA, MANMOHAN, JJ.S. Panchalingu & Ors. – AppellantsVersusPeople’s Education Trust (R) & Others Etc. – RespondentsCivil Appeal Nos. 13001-13003 of 2026 (Arising Out Of SLP (C) Nos. 25577-25579 of 2025)Decided On 18-09-2026

Legal Category Hierarchy

Table of Contents

6. Can a civil court appoint a receiver pending leave under Section 92 CPC?

7. Can inherent powers under Section 151 CPC be used to pass interim orders before leave is granted?

8. Is notice to defendants mandatory before granting leave under Section 92 CPC?

9. How does Section 92 CPC differ from other leave provisions in the Code?

10. Is the appointment of a receiver merely preservatory or intrusive in nature?

Cases Referred (24)

Judicial Analysis

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
MANOJ MISRA, MANMOHAN, JJ.
S. Panchalingu & Ors. – Appellants
Versus
People’s Education Trust (R) & Others Etc. – Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 13001-13003 of 2026 (Arising Out Of SLP (C) Nos. 25577-25579 of 2025)
Decided On 18-09-2026