SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2004 Supreme(SC) 533

2004(3) Supreme 637
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Kerala High Court)
V.N. Khare, CJI., S.B Sinha & S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
Vareed Jacob -Appellant
versus
Sosamma Geevarghese and Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2634 of 2004
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 18699/2001)
Decided on 21-4-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Fazlin Anam, E.M.S. Anam, Advocates.
For the Respondents : P. Krishnamurthy, Sr. Advocate, M.T. George, Siby Sebastian, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
Interlocutory orders which have been passed before the dismissal of the suit would stand revived along with the suit when the dismissal is set aside and the suit is restored unless the Court expressly or by implication excludes the operation of interlocutory orders passed during the period between dismissal of the suit and the restoration.

Headnote:Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Sections 94, 151; Order 39, Rules 1 and 2-Interlocutory orders-Revival with restoration of suit-Right of Court to exercise inherent powers-Suit for partition-Final decree passed on 21-5-1964-Defendant 6, granted recovery of some items died after the decree-Third defendant filed suit for setting aside the decree-Court passed an order of temporary injunction on 25-6-1969 restraining the decree holder from executing the decree-Dismissal of suit in default-Restoration of suit-Suit ultimately dismissed on 21-3-1975-Appeal filed against the decree dismissed on 11-6-1979-Execution petition filed-Judgment debtor objected on ground that Execution Petition was barred by limitation, as it was not filed within 12 years from the date of the decree-Whether decree holder was entitled to exclude the period of 5 years 8 months and 26 days between 25-6-1969 and 21-3-1975 in computing period of limitation for execution of decree-(Yes)-Whether on restoration of a suit an order of injunction passed is automatically revived-(Yes) (Majority Opinion).

       Held : V.N. Khare, CJI and S.H. Kapadia, J. (Majority Judgment)

       The source of power of the Court to grant interim relief is under Section 94. However, exercise of that power can only be done if the circumstances of the case fall under the rules. Therefore, when a matter comes before the Court, the Court has to examine the facts of each case and ascertain whether the ingredients of Section 94 read with the rules in an Order are satisfied and accordingly grant an appropriate relief. It is only in cases where circumstances do not fall under any of the rules prescribed that the Court can invoke its inherent power under Section 151 CPC. Accordingly, the courts have to grant relief of attachment before judgment, if the circumstances fall under Order 38 CPC. Similarly, courts will grant temporary injunction if the case satisfies Order 39. So depending on the circumstances falling in the prescribed rules, the power of the court to grant specified reliefs would vary. Therefore, each set of rules prescribed are distinct and different from the other and therefore, one cannot equate rules of temporary injunction with rules of attachment before judgment although all are broadly termed as interlocutory orders. (Para 11)

       Attachment is a part of execution process. It is granted to protect the decree. Under Order 38 Rule 11 it is further provided that when the suit is decreed the courts will continue attachment before judgment and the plaintiff is not required to re-apply for attachment. The scheme of Order 38 is different from Order 39 or Order 40. Hence, we cannot compare attachment under Order 38 with power of the court to grant temporary injunction under Order 39 as interlocutory orders. Similarly, Order 21, Rule 57 indicates the duty on the courts to order whether the attachment shall continue or cease on the dismissal of the execution suit. (Para 15)

       For all the afore-stated reasons, the decree holder in this case was entitled to exclude the period of 5 years 8 months and 26 days between 25th June, 1969 and 21st March, 1975 in computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree. (Para 22)

       Minority Judgment (S.B. Sinha, J.)

       The consequences of an order of attachment before judgment as also, an order of injunction can be grave. By reason of such an order, a right of a party to the lis may be affected or remained under animated suspension. By reason of an interlocutory order whether in terms of Order 38, Order 39 or Order 40, a person s right to transfer a property may remain suspended as a result whereof he may suffer grave injury. When the suit is dismissed for default, he may exercise his right. If it is to be held that on restoration of the suit the order of attachment before judgment or an order, an injunction is automatically revived, as a result whereof the status of the parties would be in the same position as on the date of passing of the initial interlocutory order, they may be proceeded with for violation of the order of injunction or an order of attachment before judgment. The right of subsequent purchaser may also be affected. By reason of taking recourse to a supplemental proceedings, the rights of the parties and in some cases the right of even a third party cannot be allowed to be taken away. In this case, this Court is not concerned with the question as to whether substantive changes have been made in Order 38 Rule 5 by Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 vis-a-vis Code of Civil Procedure, 1859. The question is as to whether the power of the court to pass an order of attachment before judgment is an ancillary power or a supplemental power. The provisions of Order 38 and Order 39 have been equated by the court presumably not on the ground that they provide for different interlocutory reliefs but having regard to the nature of the proceedings vis-a-vis the reliefs which can ultimately be granted. It would also not be correct to hold that the attachment proceeding is in effect and substance different from an order of injunction on the ground that the former is a part of execution process. (Paras 58 and 59)

       From the decisions rendered by different High Courts, therefore, the law that emerges is that there exists a distinction between ancillary orders which are required to be passed by the court in aid of or supplemental to the ultimate decision of the Court; as contradistinguished to an order passed under Part VI of the Code of Civil Procedure in terms whereof an order is passed in favour of a party to the lis which may not have a bearing on the ultimate result of the suit. An interlocutory order passed in a suit may not also have anything to do with the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. An order for injunction or appointment of receiver can be passed even at the instance of the defendant. An order which has been obtained by the defendant may not revive on restoration of the suit. Supplementary proceedings, thus, envisage that such a power must be specially conferred upon the Court which are required to be passed in the interest of justice irrespective of the fact as to whether the same would ultimately have any bearing with the reliefs claimed in the suit or not. In absence of any statutory provisions such a power cannot be exercised whereas a power which is ancillary or incidental, can always be exercised by the Court in aid of and supplemental to the final order that may be passed. Furthermore, a jurisdiction expressly conferred by a statute and an inherent power, subject to just exceptions, must be treated differently. (Para 65)

       I am, therefore, of the opinion that the interim order of injunction did not revive on restoration of the suit. The Courts, however, would be well-advised keeping in view the controversy to specifically pass an order when the suit is dismissed for default stating when interlocutory orders are vacated and on restoration of the suit, if the court intends to revive such interlocutory orders, an express order to that effect should be passed. I respectfully dissent with the opinion of Hon ble the Chief Justice of India. (Paras 66 & 67)

       

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:

  1. Interlocutory orders passed before the dismissal of a suit generally revive along with the suit when it is restored, unless the court explicitly or implicitly excludes their operation during the period between dismissal and restoration (!) (!) .

  2. Orders of temporary injunction or attachment before judgment do not automatically revive upon the restoration of a suit that was dismissed for default, unless the court specifically states that such orders are revived (!) (!) (!) (!) .

  3. The nature of interlocutory orders—whether they are ancillary or supplemental—affects their revival status. Ancillary orders, which aid in the final adjudication, tend to revive automatically, whereas supplemental orders, which are independent and in aid of justice, may require a specific order to be revived (!) (!) (!) (!) .

  4. The scheme of the relevant procedural rules distinguishes between incidental proceedings (which are in aid of the main suit and tend to revive automatically) and supplemental proceedings (which are independent and may not revive automatically) (!) (!) (!) .

  5. The effect of a suit's dismissal for default or on merits on interlocutory orders depends on the terms of the order and the manner of restoration. If the order specifically vacates ancillary orders, they do not automatically revive; if not, they generally do (!) (!) (!) .

  6. When a suit is restored, courts should explicitly pass an order regarding the revival of interlocutory orders to avoid ambiguity. Clear directions help determine whether such orders are revived or not (!) (!) .

  7. The interpretation of statutory provisions and procedural rules emphasizes that ancillary or incidental orders are generally intended to support the final decision and tend to revive automatically upon suit restoration, whereas supplemental orders are more independent and require explicit revival orders (!) (!) (!) (!) .

  8. Courts are advised to specify when interlocutory orders are vacated or revived during the restoration process to prevent unintended consequences, especially in cases where such orders may impact third-party rights or ongoing proceedings (!) (!) .

Please let me know if you need further elaboration or specific legal advice based on these points.


JUDGMENT

[Majority Judgment]

V.N. Khare, CJI and Kapadia, J.-Leave granted.

2. Suit No. 332/1122 (NE) was a suit for partition filed in the Munsiff Court, Kottarakara, in which final decree was passed on 21st May, 1964. Under the decree, defendant No. 6 (since deceased) was granted recovery of items 10-16. Defendant No. 6 died after the decree. The third defendant in the said Suit No. 332/1122 (NE) in turn filed suit No. 209 of 1969 on 25th June, 1969 against defendant No. 6 (decree holder) and others for setting aside the decree dated 21st May, 1964 in Suit No. 332/1122 (NE). On 25th June, 1969, the Court passed an order of temporary injunction restraining the decree holder from executing the decree dated 21st May, 1964 in Suit No. 332/1122 (NE). On 2nd April, 1973, Suit No. 209 of 1969 filed by the third defendant was dismissed for default. Thereafter application was moved for restoration of Suit No. 209 of 1969 and that Suit was ultimately restored to file on 20th December, 1974. However, ultimately on merits, suit No. 209 of 1969 was dismissed on 21st March, 1975. The above facts show that the decree holder was prevented from executing the decree dated 21st May, 1964 in Suit No. 332/1122 (NE), during the period 25th June, 1969 up to 21st March, 1975 when Suit No. 209 of 1969 was pending and ultimately dismissed on merits. Further, against the dismissal of the Suit No. 209 of 1969 the matter was taken in appeal before the first Appellate Court which also dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff in Suit No. 209 of 1969. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff in Suit No. 209/69 carried the matter in appeal before the High Court, which appeal was finally dismissed on 11th June, 1979. In other words, the decree in Suit No. 332/1122 (NE) could not be executed during the period 25th June, 1969 up to 11th July, 1979. On 18th March, 1981, Execution Petition was filed and the decree dated 25th June, 1964 in Suit No. 332/1122 (NE) was put in execution to which the judgment debtor (the petitioner herein) objected on the ground that the Execution Petition was barred by limitation, as it was not filed within 12 years from the date of the decree i.e. 21st May, 1964. The Executing Court as also the High Court in revision held that the decree holder in Suit No. 332/1122 (NE) was precluded from executing the decree during the period 25th June, 1969 to 21st March, 1975, when the Suit No. 209 of 1969 filed by the judgment debtor came to be finally dismissed on merits and if that period was excluded, the Execution Petition was well within time. Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court dated 25th July 2001, in Civil Revision Petition (CRP) No. 2003 of 1998 (B), the judgment debtor has come by way of special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

3. Mr. Fazlin Anam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the judgment debtor (petitioner) contended that the suit filed by the judgment debtor being Suit No. 209 of 1969 was dismissed for default on 2nd April, 1973. That during the pendency of Suit No. 209 of 1969, there was an order of temporary injunction dated 25th June, 1969, but with the dismissal of the Suit for default on 2nd April, 1973 the order of temporary injunction dated 25th June, 1969 came to an end and that order did not revive even after restoration of Suit No. 209 of 1969 on 20th December, 1974, and consequently nothing prevented the decree holder from executing the decree dated 21st May, 1964, after the restoration of the suit. In this connection, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Raj Chander Gupta Vs. Ramesh Kishore reported in AIR 1965 Allahabad 546 in which it has been held that with the dismissal of the suit, either on merit or for default, the attachment before judgment comes to an end and even if the suit is restored subsequently the order of attachment before judgment will not revive automatically. In deciding the matter the Allahabad High Court placed rel
























































































Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top