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2026 Supreme(SC) 1329

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Alok Aradhe, JJ.
Mangala Bhimrao Ingle - Appellant
Versus
The Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division & Ors. - Respondents
Civil Appeal No(s). of 2026 @ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 30772 of 2025
Decided On : 04-11-2026

Important Points

Laws disqualifying candidates from elections for having more than two children are potentially unconstitutional as the demographic rationale of population explosion has vanished. Such restrictions violate reproductive autonomy under Article 21 and the doctrine of temporal reasonableness.

Subject

Constitutional Law - Electoral Law

Act Referred

Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959: S.14(1)(j-1)
Constitution of India: Art.21, Art.14
Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 2015

Headnote

(A) Village Panchayats Act, 1959 - Section 14(1)(j-1) - Constitution - Articles 14 and 21 - Disqualification from contesting local elections for having more than two children - Validity of such disqualification in light of current demographic changes - Doctrine of temporal reasonableness suggests that a law justified at the time of enactment may become arbitrary and unreasonable over time due to shifted social and factual circumstances (Paras 3, 39).

(B) Reproductive Autonomy - The right to make reproductive choices, including the number of children, is an integral part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21; imposing political disqualifications for bearing a third child forces an unconscionable choice between reproductive autonomy and democratic participation (Paras 4, 63-64).

(C) Political Representation - Disqualifying citizens from local self-governance on grounds unrelated to their capacity to hold office is manifestly arbitrary and impairs the right to hold public office (Paras 4, 54-56).

Facts of the case:
The election of a candidate as the head of a village panchayat was set aside on the ground of disqualification for having more than two children, pursuant to the relevant statutory provision under a State Village Panchayats Act.

Findings of Court:
The Total Fertility Rate has fallen from 3.0 to 1.9, which is below the replacement level of 2.1. Consequently, the original rationale of preventing a population explosion has crumbled, rendering laws that penalize having more than two children irrelevant, as the nation is transitioning towards an older population with a declining share of the working-age population.

Issues: Whether laws disqualifying individuals from contesting local elections for having more than two children remain constitutionally sustainable given the current demographic shift and the right to reproductive autonomy.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the factual foundation of previous precedents upholding the two-child norm has fundamentally changed. Applying the doctrine of temporal reasonableness, a law that was once rational may become arbitrary if the circumstances justifying it disappear. Such restrictions are now viewed as an infringement on Article 21 and a barrier to democratic representation, particularly disproportionately impacting women in a patriarchal framework.

Result: Matter referred to a larger bench for reconsideration of the ratio laid down in the governing precedent; judgement and order passed by the High Court stayed, permitting the appellant to continue in her elected position.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • constitutional law
    • fundamental rights
      • right to equality (Para 8, 39, 52)
      • right to life and personal liberty (Para 4, 63)
    • judicial review
      • doctrine of temporal reasonableness (Para 39, 40)
      • constitutional morality (Para 65)
  • administrative law
    • disqualification from elected office (Para 2, 4, 49, 50, 61)
    • statutory interpretation (Para 31, 35)
  • family law
    • reproductive autonomy (Para 4, 63, 64)

Advocates appeared:
For Petitioner(s): Mr. Pratik R. Bombarde, AOR Mr. Devendra Singh, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Kumar, Adv. Mr. Ashish Bansal, Adv.
For Respondent(s): Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Adv. Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv. Mr. Vinayak Aren, Adv. Mr. Jatin Dhamija, Adv. Ms. Aishwarya Nigam, Adv. Mr. Siddharth Gautam, AOR Mr. Harnish R. Gadhia, Adv. Mr. Virendra Zadokar, Adv. Mr. Aniket Sawal, Adv. Mr. Satyam Chauhan, Adv. Mr. Mayur Gadhia, Adv. Mr. Vedant Sarda, Adv. Mr. Kartik Kamwani, Adv.

Table of Contents

1. Election as local government representative set aside based on statutory disqualification for having more than two children. (Para 2 , 5 )

2. Appellant disputed the proof of the third child's birth, while the court questioned the underlying constitutional validity and contemporary relevance of the statutory disqualification. (Para 5 , 6 )

3. Legislation penalizing having more than two children has lost its relevance due to falling fertility rates, raising concerns about equality, political representation, and reproductive autonomy. (Para 3 , 4 , 31 , 56 , 61 , 64 )

4. The doctrine of temporal reasonableness allows the court to re-examine the constitutionality of legislation when the factual and demographic foundations of the original policy have fundamentally changed. (Para 39 , 40 , 48 )

5. Stayed the lower court judgment and referred the matter to a larger Bench to reconsider the binding precedent. (Para 66 , 67 )

6. Can constitutional courts declare a statute unconstitutional if its original justification has eroded over time?

Yes, under the doctrine of temporal reasonableness, courts can re-evaluate the constitutional validity of a law if the social or economic conditions that provided its original rational basis have materially disappeared. (Para 39 , 40 )

7. Do legislative disqualifications for local body elections based on family size infringe upon reproductive autonomy?

Yes, such disqualifications create a coercive choice between exercising reproductive autonomy under Article 21 and the right to political participation, thereby impinging upon individual dignity and personal liberty. (Para 4 , 63 , 64 )

8. Does the fall in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) affect the validity of laws aimed at curbing population growth?

Yes, with the TFR falling below the replacement rate of 2.1, the demographic concern of population explosion has been replaced by the risk of an ageing population, rendering population-control-based electoral disqualifications devoid of their original rationale. (Para 3 , 20 , 21 , 29 )

9. Are electoral restrictions in local self-government institutions susceptible to indirect discrimination?

Yes, restrictions often disproportionately impact vulnerable populations, including women and marginalized communities, violating principles of substantive equality by imposing barriers not mandated for higher-level legislative bodies. (Para 50 , 60 , 61 )

JUDGMENT :

Table of Contents

I.

Facts

II.

Decision of this Court in Javed in 2003

III.

Two Decades since the ruling in Javed

(a) Fall in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) from 3.0 to 1.9

(b)India is now below replacement level fertility

(c)Lessons from abroad

IV.

Role of Constitutional Courts in adapting to change

V.

Precedents discussing Javed

(a) Javed followed by Rajbala v. State of Haryana

(b) Discontentment with Javed and Rajbala: Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India

VI.

Assessing the assumptions in Javed

(a) Impact of Javed on political rights of representation

(b) Impact of Javed on rights of women

(c) Impact of Javed on reproductive autonomy

VII.

Conclusion

1. Leave granted.

2. The Appellant’s election as Sarpanch of Kakoda Gram Panchayat was set aside on the ground that she was disqualified from contesting panchayat elections because she had more than two children and it is in violation of Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 .

3. We are of the strong opinion that laws that penalise having more than two children have lost their relevance. The foundation of such laws, i.e. the fear of overpopulation, has crumbled due to demographic changes in the past few decades. We have explained how since 2003 when Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369 (hereinafter referred to as “Javed”) upheld such laws, India’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has fallen from 3.02[Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Women and Men in India 2006 (Central Statistical Organisation 2006) 14, table 7 (source: Sample Registration System, Office of the Registrar General, India).] to 1.9.3[Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India, Sample Registration System Statistical Report 2024 (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2026) 85, para 3.19.] A TFR of 2.1, known as the replacement rate, would allow one generation to completely replace itself. So, even though India’s population is not yet declining, the TFR falling below the replacement rate will soon result in a demographic transition towards an older population with a declining share of the working-age population. Therefore, laws aimed at limiting population growth have now lost their significance. If we fail to take note of such demographic changes, India will face serious consequences. Adapting to change is important for achieving justice, as failure to adapt produces injustice and is, in a sense, an abuse of power. Thus, failure to use power to adapt to change is in its own way an abuse of power. This has compelled us to stay the proceedings herein, and refer the matter to a larger Bench for immediate re-visitation of the precedent in Javed.

4. Apart from the above, equally concerning is the reasoning employed in Javed to justify a manifestly arbitrary act. Allowing such laws to stand excludes an entire class of citizens from political representation on grounds bearing little rational connection to their capacity to hold public office. Further, it compels an unconscionable choice between bearing children and democratic participation, impinging on the right to reproductive autonomy under Article 21.

I. Facts

5. It was found that the appellant gave birth to a third child in 2014 but contested and got elected as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat in the 2022 elections. Compelled by the reality of the fact that the appellant did in fact have a third child and did contest the election, the only argument that her advocate could think of is to contend that there is no conclusive proof of the third child as the birth certificate’s place of issue is allegedly not valid.

6. More than two decades ago, similar laws disqualifying citizens from participating in Panchayat and Municipal elections were upheld by this Court in Javed.4[Supra Note 1] As we entertained the Special Leave Petition and iss

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