The adopted son's right to property is limited to displacing titles acquired by inheritance and not to those acquired by outsiders in other ways.

( 1 ) THE appeals raise common questions of law and fact and could therefore be disposed of together.

( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to these appeals could be stated in a few words. One Potaraju Sreeramulu had a son Venkata Subba Rao and a grand-son Ramakrishna Rao. Both of them predeceased him. The son died in February 1947 and the grand-son on 1/12/1945, the latter leaving a widow by name Papayamma. Sreeramulu had also a daughter by name Chittamma whose daughter is the afore-mentioned Papayamma. On the death of Venkata Subba Rao misunderstandings arose between Sreeramulu and his son-in-law i. e. , the husband of Chittamma consequent upon the latters attempt to get at all the properties of Sreeramulu. The son-in-law set up one Chenchal Rao to claim to be the adopted son. of Sreeramulu. In this state of strained feelings, Sreeramulu executed a will bequeathing all his properties to his wife Ramayamma and also conferring power on her to adopt a boy. Pursuant to this authority, Ramayamma adopt-ed one Srinivasa Sarma who is one of the parties to the litigation and the respondent in all these appeals, on 22-8-1948 and also executed a deed of adoption evidencing it. She also settled on him the properties which she acquired under the will of her husband as also her stridhana properties. More than a year thereafter, Papayamma took one Parthasarathi Rao who is the appellant in all these appeals in adoption. Several suits were filed in the court of the District Munsiff, Masulipatam, by Ramayamma and her adopted son Srinivasa Sarma against Parthasarathi Rao and some others for the recovery of possession of various items of property and for profits. All the suits ended in decrees in favour of the plaintiffs which were confirmed on appeal.

( 3 ) THE aggrieved defendant Parthasarathi Rao has carried these matters in second appeal which open up some questions of importance. Though in the trial court, the validity of the appellants adoption was challenged on several grounds, it is not brought into question in these appeals. We may, therefore, proceed on the basis that Parthasarathi Rao was validly adopted by Papayamma.

( 4 ) NOW the point raised is that since his adoption dates back to the date of the death of his adoptive father, he is entitled to be put into possession of his adoptive fathers share of the family estate. The stress of the argument on behalf of the appellant is that, although on the death of his son, Sreeramulu became the sole surviving co-parcener in whom the whole estate of the family vested, it was an estate subject to defeasance and as such was divested on the adoption of Parthasarathi Rao. It is urged that a coparcenary should be deemed to subsist so long as there was a widow of a coparcener who could adopt and that adoption relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father. Since the adopted son must be taken to be in existence at the time when his adoptive father died, his title as a coparcener would prevail not only as against the other coparceners or any title based on inheritance but against every person who is in possession of the property as well. The property in the hands of the surviving coparcener or his heir is impressed with the character of coparcenary property so long as there is a widow alive who could bring into existence a son. The moment an adoption is made by the widow, the adopted son is entitled to get the interest of his adoptive father to whomsoever it might have passed.

( 5 ) THE principle is that the male line is not regarded as extinct or the man to have died without 1959 Andh. Pra. D. F. /33 issue until the continuation of the line by adoption becomes impossible, that the adoption has retrospective effect and that, whenever an adoption is made there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line. See Pratapasingh Shivsingh v. Thakor Shri Agarsinghi Rajasanghi ILR 43 Bom 778: 46 Ind App, 97: (AIR 1918 PC 192) and Neelangoude v. Ujjangouda AIR 1948 PC 165.

( 6 ) THUS, there can be