On 10.8.1998 this Court made the following order:

“This appeal is admitted to consider the following question of law:

Whether the appellate Court is correct in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court having held that Bapanamma had no pre-existing interest and as such Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act does not apply and consequently dismissed the plaintiff’s suit on the ground that the impugned sale deeds were executed by the plaintiff’s father for legal necessity, which fact is neither pleaded nor proved in the case on the basis of the material on record.”

2) Sri G. Krishna Murthy, learned counsel representing the appellant had pointed out that apart from the said substantial question of law on the strength of which the second appeal was admitted the following substantial questions of law also would arise for consideration:

(1) Whether the sale deed executed by Bapanamma relating to item No.1 can be said to be valid and binding as she got only life interest?

(2) Whether the transactions made by such a life interest holder to be treated as void transactions?

(3) Whether the sale deed dated 10.3.1966 executed by the said Bapanamma and the father of the plaintiff can be said to be valid and binding on the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case?

3) Sri G. Krishna Murthy, learned counsel representing the appellant had also taken the Court through the finding of the Court of first instance and would maintain that the well considered findings of the court of first instance had been reversed by the appellate Court without any valid or acceptable reasons. The learned counsel would also submit that as far as applicability of Section 14

(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is concerned, since Bapanamma had no pre-existing right or interest in the property in question, Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be made applicable. The learned counsel after elaborating his submissions had taken this Court through the relevant events after the sale transactions viz., death of Bapanamma, filing of the suit and also pointed out that the suit, in fact, had been filed within the period of limitation. The learned counsel would also maintain that the plaintiff was not born by the date of the settlement deed executed by his father (D3) in favour of Bapanamma in respect of the ancestral property and even as per the settlement deed, Bapanmma was given only life estate to enjoy the property and the remainder interest shall vest in the male issues of D.3 and in their absence, on the female children and only in their absence, on the other female members and, therefore, the findings recorded by the

appellate Court cannot be sustained. The counsel also pointed out to the reliefs prayed for in the suit and would maintain that the settlement deed as such was not questioned at any point of time. He had also taken this Court through Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and also Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The learned counsel would also maintain that in the case of such property of a minor, obtaining permission of the Court is mandatory and inasmuch as the transactions in question had been entered into in contravention of the statutory mandate, the said transactions cannot be said to be valid and binding on the plaintiff and the same can be avoided and hence the findings recorded by the Court of first instance are in accordance with law; that the said findings are to be restored and the findings recorded by the appellate Court are to be set aside and the second appeal is liable to be allowed.

4) Per contra, Sri G. Jaganadha Rao, representing Sri Chidambaram, learned counsel representing the respondents had taken this Court through the respective findings of the Court and the evidence available on record and would maintain that the property in question continues to be ancestral property of the father and son though the son is an after born son, since