1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. The parties are referred to by their rank before the Trial Court for the sake of convenience.

2. The present appeal is filed by the defendants in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had executed an agreement of sale, dated 1-7-1988 in respect of the suit properties and had received a sale consideration of Rs.12,000/- and had agreed to execute a sale deed in respect of the suit properties upon the repeal of the Karnataka Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Fragmentation Act’ for brevity). The Act was repealed by Karnataka Act No. 4 of 1991 and was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 5-2-1991. Inspite of such repeal, the defendants having failed to execute and register the sale deed as agreed on repeated demands, the plaintiff had issued a notice dated 9-10-1995, which was returned unserved and thereafter, the suit was filed. The defendants contested the suit denying the very execution of the agreement of sale and the receipt of sale consideration while also contending that in any event, the suit was barred by limitation. The suit was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. An appeal having been filed before the lower Appellate Court, the same was allowed which is sought to be questioned in the present second appeal.

3. The substantial question of law framed at the time of admission was.--

“Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in construing that the cause of action has arisen only upon issuance of legal notice by the respondent, whereas, it is admitted in the plaint that demands were made by the plaintiff immediately upon the repeal of the Karnataka Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1966 and the legal notice demanding the execution and registration of the sale deed having been issued only in the year 1995, whether it could be said that the cause of action arose only in 1995?”

4. And at the time of hearing, additional substantial questions of law were framed as follows:-

(1) Whether an agreement having been executed in the face of a prohibition under the Karnataka Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1966, could be enforced in law?

(2) When the appellant was a willing party to an illegal contract, could the agreement be set aside at the instance of the appellant?

The learned Counsel for the parties were heard on these substantial question of law.

5. The learned Counsel for the appellants would argue and the lower Appellate Court has misconstrued the scope of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The lower Appellate Court has applied the second part of the provision in column (3) of the Schedule in relation to Article 54 which provides for the time from which the period of limitation begins to run. Article 54 provides for a period of limitation of three years for a suit for specific performance of a contract and the time from which the period begins to run is the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. In the instant case, it is contended that the agreement was a contingent contract and had prescribed the time for performance as the date of repeal of the Fragmentation Act. The Act having been repealed in the year 1991 and the admitted averments in the plaint that several demands were made on the defendants to execute and register the sale deed after such repeal of the Fragmentation Act, it cannot be said that time did not begin to run from the date of repeal of the Fragmentation Act. Therefore, the lower Appellate Court has committed an error in the interpretation of Article 54 in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation, and as the suit was filed five years from the date of repeal of the Fragmentation Act, it was clearly barred by limitation. Secondly, it is also conte