Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J.

The petitioner has called into question the order, dated 14.03.2006 (Annexure-A) passed by the second respondent/Assistant Commissioner taking up the Appeal No. 67/2015-16 for reconsideration based on the representation and application of the respondent No. 4.

2. The facts of the case in brief are that the Tahasildar effected M.R.No. 23/1997-98 in respect of the land measuring 30 guntas at Sy.No. 98/11 of Rayasandra Village. By the said M.R., the mutation entry and the khatha were effected in favour of the respondent No. 4. The petitioner challenged the said M.R. by way of appeal in 2015 invoking Section 136(2) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (for short 'KLR Act'). On finding that the respondent No. 4 had not purchased the land standing at Sy.No. 98/11, the Assistant Commissioner set-aside the said entry and directed the restoration of the entries, as they stood prior to the said M.R. This was done on 19.12.2015. The respondent No.4 submitted a representation on 06.01.2016 (wrongly shown as 06.01.2015). The said representation was for reconsideration and the recalling of the order, dated 19.12.2015. On the representation, the Assistant Commissioner has endorsed 'put up recall '. On the same day, the Assistant Commissioner also stayed his own order, dated 19.12.2015 as is evident from his order, dated 06.01.2016 (Annexure-G) addressed to the Special Tahasildar. On 14.03.2016, the Assistant Commissioner adjourns the matter to 31.03.2016 for the appearance of the petitioner.

3. The petitioner's Learned Advocate Sri D.P. Mahesh submits that once the Assistant Commissioner passes the final order under Section 136(2) of the KLR Act, he becomes fimctus-officio. He has no power to recall his order, reconsider or review the matter. In support of his submissions, he relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and others, (1966) 1 SCR 817 to advance the submission that if there is no provision in the statute granting express power of review, the officer can not review his previous order.

4. Nextly he relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi and others v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, 1971 (3) SCC 844. The relevant portion of para 4 read by him is as follows:

"......... It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order........."

5. He submits that the review is only a creation of statute and that therefore if the reviewing power is not expressly granted, the question of exercising the review jurisdiction would not arise at all. Drawing support from the case of Dr.(Sml) Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindukanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and others, (1987) 4 SCC 525, wherein it is held that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction.

6. He relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and another, (2005) 13 SCC 777 to advance the submission that the power of review is not an inherent power and that therefore it cannot be exercised invoking Section 25 of the KLR Act. He submits that review of the final order, dated 19.12.2015 is not traceable to any provision in the KLR Act. He read out paras 31 and 33 from the Apex Court's decision in the case of Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain and others, (2008) 2 SCC 705:

"31. The section makes it clear that a court cannot alter or review its judgment or final order after it is signed except to correct clerical or arithmetical error. The scheme of the C