The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 43D(2)(b) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, as discussed in the Supreme Court cases of HITENDRA VISHNU THAKUR and BIKRAMJIT SINGH.

ORDER

1. The petitioner, in this writ petition, calls in question an order dated 14-02-2022 passed by the XLIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge (Special Court for Trial of NIA Cases), Bangalore, in Spl.C.C.No.595 of 2021 whereby the Special Court extended the custody of the petitioner and consequently, seeks a direction by issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus for grant of bail with immediate effect.

2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition, as borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:-

The petitioner is accused No.2 in Spl.C.C.No.595 of 2021 registered for offences punishable under Sections 120B and 125 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 17, 18 and 18B of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 ('the Act' for short). The petitioner claims to be working in Saudi Arabia and staying there along with his family earning his livelihood. The petitioner was taken into custody in Saudi Arabia on 05-10-2020 about 13 months prior to his deportation to India, on the request of National Investigating Agency. The family of the petitioner is completely evacuated from Saudi Arabia and then deported to India on 14-11-2021. The moment he landed on the shores of India, he was taken into custody at Kochi and then brought to Bangalore. On his arrival, a case was registered in Crime No. RC-33/2020/NIA/DLI on 19-09-2020 for the aforesaid offences. The allegation against the petitioner was that he had affiliation with banned terrorist organizations and had entered into criminal conspiracy to radicalize and motivate gullible Muslim youths to join Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ('ISIS').

3. The further allegation against the petitioner was that he travelled to raise funds and facilitated travel of ISIS to the conflict zone - Syria. The petitioner was produced before the Court on 18-11-2021 and was remanded to judicial custody for 30 days and the same stood extended from time to time. The petitioner, even as on date, is in judicial custody. After 90 days of the petitioner being in judicial custody, a report is submitted by the Investigating Officer to the Special Public Prosecutor ('SPP' for short) for extension of the custody of the petitioner from 90 days to 180 days. On filing of the report, the petitioner filed his objections for extension on the ground that there was no warrant to extend judicial custody of the petitioner as no charge sheet is filed within 90 days as is required in law and also filed an application seeking his release on grant of bail under sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. The Special Court by its order dated 14-02-2022 extended judicial custody of the petitioner from 90 days to 180 days and consequently, rejected the application filed by the petitioner for grant of default bail as obtaining under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. It is these two orders - one of extension of judicial custody and the other, rejection of the application of the petitioner under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. that have driven him to this Court in the subject writ petition.

4. Sri P.Usman, learned counsel appearing for petitioner would vehemently argue and contend that the order of extension of judicial custody bears no application of mind as is required under Section 43 of the Act, as the custody is extended mechanically without the SPP applying his mind on the report given by the Investigating Officer. He would submit that on account of non-application of mind, the very order of extension is vitiated and the petitioner is entitled to be considered for a default bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. He would place reliance upon two judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of:

(i) HITENDRA VISHNU THAKUR AND OTHERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602 and

(ii) BIKRAMJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB reported in (2020) 10 SCC 616.

5. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and have perused the material avail