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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
KRISHNA S. DIXIT, J.
Sri. Clarence Pais, S/o. Late L.C. Pais & Ors. - Petitioners
Versus
The State of Karnataka, Represented by its Chief Secretary & Ors. - Respondents
W.P. No. 11158 of 2013 (LR) c/w W.P. Nos. 43928 of 2012, 11966 of 2013, 23287 of 2013, 62434 of 2016 (LR)
Decided On : 22-05-2023
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 31(2), C, 38, 39, 254(2), 300A, 19(1), (1)(f), 21, 26 - Karnataka Conferment of Ownership on Mulageni or Volamulageni Tenants Act, 2011 - Section 7, (1), (2) - Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 - Section 40 - Challenge constitutionality - Sought full ownership - Payment of compensation - Challenge to constitutionality of Karnataka Conferment of Ownership on Mulageni or Volamulageni Tenants Act, 2011 (whereby full ownership is sought to be bestowed on tenants/sub-tenants on payment of compensation to be determined by Competent Authority on normative basis – In an organized State, law operates as an instrument of social change which Fundamental Document of country aspires for - Para XV.
Finding of the Court:
Court is of a considered view that ours being a constitutionally ordained Welfare Governance, State action be it legislative, executive or otherwise should not give scope for grievance of the kind which muldars are debating in these cases - Their arguable grievance regardless of its legal tenability would hopefully disappear, if rate of compensation i.e., 500 times rental value in absence of non-restrictive clause in lease and 1000 times in case of restrictive clauses, is upwardly revised - After all, State can legislate mass justice, courts not being only sanctuary in a democracy - Matter essentially lies in domain of legislature - This court hopes and trusts that something in this regard would happen at hands of Powers That Be, before long.
Result: Petitions dismissed.
Based on the provided legal document, the question of land acquisition without compensation is addressed within the framework of constitutional and statutory provisions. The document indicates that, generally, the law recognizes that the acquisition of private property for public purpose necessitates the payment of compensation, and this obligation is embedded in the constitutional guarantee of the right to property, particularly under Article 300A. It emphasizes that, in principle, no land can be taken without providing just and adequate compensation, and the absence of compensation or a determination of illusory compensation could render such acquisition unconstitutional.
However, the document also clarifies that the constitutional guarantee of compensation is not absolute and that, in certain exceptional circumstances, the State may acquire property without compensation. These extreme cases are usually justified only when the legislation is enacted for a public purpose, and the measure is not confiscatory in nature. The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a legislative function, and courts generally exercise limited review, primarily scrutinizing whether the purpose is primarily public and whether the legislation is enacted in good faith.
Furthermore, the document discusses that the normative determination of compensation, as prescribed by the legislation, may be considered sufficient and not necessarily require market-value assessment. It also notes that the State’s power to acquire property for public purposes is broad, and the requirement of compensation can be waived only in extraordinary situations where the measure is not intended to benefit private interests but to serve a public purpose.
In summary, land acquisition without compensation is typically impermissible unless it falls within narrowly defined exceptional circumstances where the law is enacted for a clear public purpose, and the measure is not confiscatory. In such cases, the constitutional protections may be relaxed, but only under strict scrutiny and with a strong presumption of legislative validity.
ORDER :
The following observations of Justice Krishna Iyer, in STATE OF KARNATAKA vs. RANGANATHA REDDY, (1977) 4 SCC 471, at paragraph 53, should prelude the framing of this judgment :
Petitioners claiming to be owners of tenanted non-agricultural lands, are invoking writ jurisdiction of this court for laying a challenge to the constitutionality of the Karnataka Conferment of Ownership on Mulageni or Volamulageni Tenants Act, 2011 (hereafter ‘impugned Act’), whereby full ownership is sought to be bestowed on the tenants/sub-tenants on payment of compensation to be determined by the Competent Authority on normative basis. After service of notice, the Respondent-State has entered appearance through the learned AGA and the private Respondents are represented through their Advocates on record. Statements of Objections, Addl. Statements of Objections, Replies/Rejoinders & Statements of Facts have been filed voluminously.
II. SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
(a) The State Legislature lacks competence to enact the impugned Act inasmuch as the subject matter thereof is relatable to Entries 6 & 7, List-III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and that the field is already occupied by the Central Legislations namely the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 & the Registration Act, 1908. Respondents’ reliance on Entry 18, List-II of Seventh Schedule for supporting legislative competence is misplaced since it does not authorize acquisition of property.
(b) Presidential Assent purportedly granted under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, is without due application of mind; there was no sufficient material made available to the President whilst securing his Assent. This apart, purportedly the Assent being for a specific purpose, its efficacy would be confined to that purpose only and therefore, does not put the Act under the protective umbrella of Article 31C, more particularly when it is not intended to give effect to Article 39(b) & (c).
(c) Although after the 44th Amendment to the Constitution in 1978, the Right to Property is no longer a Fundamental Right in terms of erstwhile Article 19(1)(f), its being recognized as a human right, assumes the character of a Fundamental Right to the extent other Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1) & 21 depend upon the property for their meaningful exercise; under Article 26, the religious denominations too have a Fundamental Right to own property. The impugned Act being in gross violation of these rights, is liable to be struck down.
(d) The impugned Act is violative of Article 300A that guarantees Right to Property inasmuch as there are no elements of public purpose/public interest; the doctrine of eminent domain recognized under the said Article is not invocable; further, the compensation normatively determinable under the Act being apparently illusory, renders the legislative action as a confiscatory measure unsustainable on the anvil of Constitution.
(e) The impugned Act is grossly discriminatory inasmuch as it singles out only permanent leases for a detrimental treatment leaving out leases of long tenures such as 99 years, 999 years or the like. It is discriminatory also because of its selective application to the districts of Dakshina Kannada & Udupi, wh
Sub-section (2) of section 7 of impugned Act reads amount payable under sub-section (1) shall be 500 times of lease rental as is evidenced in records.
State legislation cannot provide lesser compensation than that guaranteed under parliamentary law, rendering it repugnant and unconstitutional.
Legislation affecting an individual is constitutional if justified by public interest and adequate grounds, confirming state legislative authority over property transactions.
A law that extinguishes leasehold rights without providing constitutionally adequate compensation violates rights under Article 31-A.
The provisions of S.11A do not apply to emergency acquisitions under S.17 of the Land Acquisition Act, and non-compliance with S.17(3A) does not invalidate the proceedings.
S.3(1)(c) of the Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965 is unconstitutional for violating Article 14 by allowing arbitrary recovery procedures without guiding standards.
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