SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2024 Supreme(Kar) 44

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD BENCH
SURAJ GOVINDARAJ, J.
T. Younis S/o Hajit Amirsab – Petitioner
Versus
National Highway Authority of India – Respondent
Writ Petition No. 105176 of 2023
Decided On : 22-01-2024

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Archana Magadum.
For the Respondents: Praveen Uppar, Shilpa Shah, Rakesh M. Bilki, Shivasai M. Patil.

Headnote:

NHAI - Compulsory Acquisition of Land - National Highways Act, 1956, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 33(1)(a), Section 34 - The court discussed the maintainability of the application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and its impact on the benefit of extension of limitation under Sub-Section (3) Section 34. The court held that for a person to avail the benefit under Sub-Section (3) Section 34, the said person ought to have filed an application under Section 33 of the Act of 1996 which is maintainable under the said provision and not an application which is not maintainable. The court also emphasized the importance of timely disposal of applications under Section 33 and the time-bound nature of arbitration proceedings.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, owner of the land, sought relief against the compulsory acquisition of land for widening of the National Highway. The respondent NHAI filed applications under Section 33(1)(a) and Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, leading to a dispute over the maintainability of the application under Section 33(1)(a) and its impact on the limitation period for filing under Section 34.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the application filed by NHAI under Section 33(1)(a) was not maintainable, and therefore, NHAI could not claim the benefit of extension of limitation under Sub-Section (3) Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The court also directed the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department to issue instructions for timely disposal of applications under Section 33.

Issues: The key issues were the maintainability of the application under Section 33(1)(a) and its impact on the benefit of extension of limitation under Sub-Section (3) Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of Section 33(1)(a) and Section 34 of the Act of 1996, emphasizing the requirement for maintainability of the application under Section 33 for claiming the benefit of extension of limitation under Sub-Section (3) Section 34. The court also highlighted the time-bound nature of arbitration proceedings and the importance of timely disposal of applications under Section 33.

Final Decision: The writ petition was allowed, the order dated 5.08.2023 was quashed, and the petitions filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 were dismissed as they were filed beyond the limitation period.

ORDER :

1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:

    (a) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 5/8/2023 produced at Annexure-A & A1 passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge Ballari.

(b) Issue any other order or writ in the interest of justice and equity.

2. The petitioner being the owner of the land bearing Sy. No. 503/A1 and 503/B2 of Amarathi village, Hospet, being aggrieved by the compulsory acquisition of land sought for by respondent No. 2 for widening of the National Highway from 4 to 6 lanes of N.H.13 from Hungund to Hospete, was constrained to approach the Methodology of Compulsory Arbitration prescribed under Sub-Section (g) of Section 3 of the National Highways Act, 1956 [‘Act of 1956’for short]. An Arbitral award was passed on 3.02.2022.

3. The respondent No. 1-National Highway Authority of India [NHAI] filed an application on 8.3.2022 under Section 33(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [‘Act of 1996’ for short] contending that the award copy had been received in the second week of February 2022 [date neither given in the application nor before this court]. The said application came to be dismissed by the respondent No. 3-Arbitrator-Deputy Commissioner on 04.07.2022.

4. The respondent No. 1-NHAI thereafter filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 on 29.10.2022, along with the said petition, an application for condonation of delay was filed which came to be allowed condoning a delay of 25 days in filing the petition under Section 34 calculating the time from 04.07.2022 being the date on which the application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act of 1996 came to be dismissed. It is aggrieved by the same, the petitioner-land loser is before this Court.

5. Smt. Archana Magadum, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that:

    5.1. The application under Section 33(1)(a) was filed by NHAI only to delay and protract the proceedings so as to make available additional time to the NHAI to file its petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

5.2. She relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Arunachal Pradesh vs. Damani Constructions Company, (2007) 10 SCC 742 : 2007 INSC 230 more particularly Para 8 and 9 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

8. Firstly, the letter had been designed not strictly under Section 33 of the Act because under Section 33 of the Act a party can seek certain correction in computation of errors, or clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the award with notice to the other party or if agreed between the parties, a party may request the Arbitral Tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. This application which was moved by the appellant does not come within any of the criteria falling under Section 33(1) of the Act. It was designed as if the appellant was seeking review of the award. Since the Tribunal had no power of review on merit, therefore, the application moved by the appellant was wholly misconceived. Secondly, it was prayed whether the payment was to be made directly to the respondent or through the court or that the respondent might be asked to furnish bank guarantee from a nationalised bank as it was an interim award, till final verdict was awaited. Both these prayers in this case were not within the scope of Section 33. Neither review was maintainable nor the prayer which had been made in the application had anything to do with Section 33 of the Act. The prayer was with regard to the mode of payment. When this application does not come within the purview of Section 33 of the Act, the application was totally misconceived and accordingly the arbitrator by communication dated 10-4-2004 replied to the following effect:

“However, for your benefit I may mention here that as per the scheme of the Act of 1996, the issues/claims that have been adjudicated by the interim award date

            Click Here to Read the rest of this document
            1
            2
            3
            4
            5
            6
            7
            8
            9
            10
            11
            SupremeToday Portrait Ad
            supreme today icon
            logo-black

            An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

            Please visit our Training & Support
            Center or Contact Us for assistance

            qr

            Scan Me!

            India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

            For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

            whatsapp-icon telegram-icon
            whatsapp-icon Back to top