IMPORTANT POINT
The court ruled that leniency in corruption cases is unjustified, and the appropriate punishment for proven misconduct is dismissal, not compulsory retirement.

ORDER :

S.G. Pandit, J.

The State and its authorities are before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, questioning the correctness and legality of order dated 04.01.2018 in Application No.6122/2014 on the file of the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, at Bengaluru (for short “Tribunal”) by which, penalty of dismissal is substituted by penalty of compulsory retirement.

2. The brief facts leading to the filing of this writ petition are that:

The respondent was working as Typist in the third petitioner office and Articles of charge dated 11.01.2010 was issued against one Sri. Sampath Rao S. Bommannavar, Commercial Tax Officer as well as against the respondent alleging demand and acceptance of Rs.2,000/- and Rs.300/- respectively from the complainant Sri. Ganesh Shetty and there by failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty which would be unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby committed misconduct under Rule 3(1)(i) to (iii) read with Rule 16 of Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) Rules 1966 (for short “1966 Rules”). After detailed enquiry, the charges against the respondent as well as another were held proved. The first petitioner-Government issued second show-cause notice dated 04.02.2014 enclosing enquiry report as well as recommendation of Upa Lokayukta. The respondent under Annexure-A6 dated 22.02.2014 submitted her reply. The first petitioner-Government, by its order dated 24.07.2014 (Annexure-A7) imposed punishment of dismissal of respondent in exercise of its power under Rule 8(viii) of the Karnataka Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1957 (for short “CCA Rules”). Challenging the said order of dismissal, the respondent was before the Tribunal in Application No.6122/2014. The Tribunal, under impugned order allowed the application and substituted penalty of dismissal by penalty of compulsory retirement. The Tribunal, while substituting punishment, following the judgment of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v/s GYAN CHAND CHATTAR reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78 opined that a lenient view is to be taken insofar as the order of punishment is concerned and by observing that applicant/petitioner being a lady having put in only 11 years and 8 months of service, if the dismissal order were to be up held, she would be put to great hardship and inconvenience, substituted the punishment of compulsory retirement. Challenging the said order of the Tribunal, the State authorities are before this Court in this writ petition.

3. Heard learned Additional Government Advocate Sri. M. Rajkumar for petitioners and learned counsel Sri. N.S. Sriraj Gowda for Smt. Vandana N., learned counsel for the respondent. Perused the writ petition papers.

4. Learned AGA would submit that the Tribunal committed an error in substituting the punishment of dismissal by compulsory retirement for proved misconduct of accepting illegal gratification. It is submitted that for proved misconduct of accepting illegal gratification or bribe, the appropriate punishment would be dismissal or removal from service. Learned AGA would point out that the Tribunal without recording a finding that the punishment imposed is excessive when compared to the nature and gravity of charge, could not have substituted the punishment of dismissal by compulsory retirement. It is also contended that the Tribunal could not act as Appellate Authority. To impose proper punishment taking note of the gravity and nature of charge, vests with the Disciplinary Authority and not with the Tribunal or Court. Further, it is submitted that the Tribunal, only on the ground of sympathy, could not exercise its power to substitute punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority on the proved misconduct. Learned AGA would contend that the respondent was acquitted of the charges in criminal proceedings i.e., in Spl. Case No.70/2007 by judgment dated 02.12.2011 only on the ground that there is no demand by the respondent and the amount recovered was paid