A prima facie case for a temporary injunction requires not only proof of legal rights but also considerations of balance of convenience and prevention of irreparable loss in property disputes.

ORDER :

1. This writ petition is filed seeking to quash the order dated 30.03.2021 passed in M.A.No.9/2020 passed by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Shivamogga (Annexure-E) (herein after referred to as “the Appellate Court” for short).

2. The petitioner herein was the plaintiff before the Trial Court and the respondent before the Appellate Court. Respondent Nos.1 to 12 were defendant Nos.1 to 12 and appellant Nos.1 to 12 before the Trial Court and the Appellate Court respectively.

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

The petitioner filed a suit for the relief of specific performance contending that the husband of the first respondent Sri.Mohammed Ibrahim, during his life time executed an agreement of sale, to sell the suit schedule property for a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- and received an advance of Rs.1,60,000/-. It was agreed that the sale deed to be executed after the lease to run the petrol bunk which comes to an end on 17.08.2015. However, the respondents failed to perform their part of obligation by defaulting in coming forward to execute the sale deed.

4. Having left with no other option, the petitioner herein was constrained to file a suit in O.S.No.69/2018 on the file of the V Addl. Civil Judge and JMFC, Shivamogga, wherein, I.A.No.1 was filed seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondents from alienating or encumbering the suit schedule property and an ex-parte ad interim injunction was passed by an order dated 21.01.2020. Relevant portion of order passed by the trial court on I.A.No.1 reads as under:

While granting temporary injunction the court must be satisfied that there exists prima facie case; irreparable loss is likely to be caused from the injury before legal right can be established and greater inconvenience is likely to be caused by withholding than by granting it. Having answered the points in affirmative and also that no loss or injury would be caused to the defendant if the relief of temporary injunction is granted and also that to avoid multiplicity of litigations, I pass the following order:

ORDER

I.A. No.I filed by the plaintiff U/o 39 Rule 1 and 2 is hereby allowed.

The defendants or any persons on their behalf are hereby restrained and directed not to alienate or to encumber suit schedule property in any manner during the pendency of the suit.

5. The Trial Court having heard both sides continued the order of temporary injunction. The respondents, aggrieved by this order, filed Miscellaneous Appeal in M.A.No.9/2020 on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Shivamogga.

6. This court, while hearing the matter for admission, on hearing both the counsels, vide order dated 23.08.2021, directed the parties to maintain status quo as regards the subject property without creating any third party rights and the interim order is in operation till date. Thereafter, the matter came up for final hearing on 30.07.2025.

7. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Appellate Court has failed to observe that the power in the miscellaneous appeal is very much limited and it can interfere only if the order of the Trial Court was ambiguous. It was further contended that the Trial Court, by reaching to a conclusion that there was a prima facie case, granted an interim injunction and the same does not suffer from any illegality.

8. It was also contended that the Appellate Court has not considered the issue of balance of convenience and hardship that would be caused to the parties. It was further contended that the Appellate Court came to an erroneous conclusion that the observation of the Trial Court has to be interfered with as the prima facie case was without looking into the agreement.

9. The other contention that was raised was that the Appellate Court committed an error by holding that the agreement was on plain paper and not on stamp paper and as such, it cannot be defined as document of agreement to sale.

10. It was also contended that the Appellate