The trial court must ascertain the actual receipt date of the arbitral award to determine limitation status under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.

JUDGMENT :

S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR, J.

This appeal by the petitioner in FR AP No.12/2025 is directed against the impugned order on I.A.No.2 dated 11.03.2025 whereby the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Belagavi (for short, ‘trial Court’) dismissed the application I.A.No.2 filed by the petitioner under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘said Act of 1996’) and consequently dismissed the petition filed by the appellant.

2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record.

3. A perusal of the material on record would indicate that the respondent instituted arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Case (MSS) No.1/2023 before the sole arbitrator against the appellant herein. The appellant remained ex-parte in the said arbitration proceedings and did not contest the same and the same culminated in an arbitral award dated 17.01.2024 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. Being aggrieved by the said arbitral award dated 17.01.2024 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, the appellant filed a petition/application under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 on 01.03.2025. Along with the said application/petition filed under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996, the appellant also filed an application – I.A.No.2 under Section 34 (3) seeking condonation of delay of 275 days in filing the petition/application under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996. The said application and main petition having been opposed by the respondent, the trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned order declining to condone the delay on the ground that the Section 34 application/petition having been filed beyond the maximum statutory period of 120 days, the petitioner would not be entitled to prosecute the petition on merits and consequently refused to condone the delay and dismissed the application as well as the petition thereby confirming the arbitral award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in favour of the respondent against the appellant who is before this Court by way of present appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the various contentions urged in the memorandum of appeal and referred to the material on record in order to point out that the appellant was not aware of the arbitration proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal nor was aware of the arbitral award having been passed against him. It is also contended that the appellant obtained certified copy of the award only on 07.02.2025 and the application/petition filed by him under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 on 01.03.2025 was well within the prescribed period of limitation of 90 days as contemplated under Section 34 (3) of the said Act of 1996. It was further submitted that without recording a finding as to whether the appellant received copy of the arbitral award after its pronouncement, the trial Court fell in error in coming to the erroneous conclusion that the application/petition filed by the appellant was beyond the prescribed period of 90 days as well as the condonable/extendable period of 30 days and consequently the impugned order passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside and the matter remitted back to the trial Court for reconsideration of I.A.No.2 afresh in accordance with law.

5. Per contra while supporting the impugned order, the learned counsel for the respondent does not dispute that the trial Court did not record any finding as to whether the arbitral award was served upon the appellant for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. It is however submitted that the appellant was aware of the arbitration proceedings and deliberately/ intentionally did not participate in the