ORDER :

1. None is present on behalf of appellant even in the second round.

2. This appeal is lying in defect side since 2020 but no steps have been taken for removing the same till date. It appears that the appellant is not interested in pursuing with this appeal.

3. This appeal is also barred by 615 days. Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has also been filed but the Court is not satisfied with the reasons recorded in the said application. Even from bare perusal of the order dated 09.04.2018 passed by the Additional District Judge No.11, Jaipur Metropolitan in Civil Misc. Case No.1016/2015, it is clear that the objections filed by the appellant under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act were not submitted within time.

4. For ready reference Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 is reproduced as under:-

“Section 34(3):-An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:”

5. It is not in dispute that the arbitral award was passed on 12.06.2015 and the appellant has received the copy of the same on 27.06.2015, but the objections were submitted after a delay of 32 days. It is an admitted position of law that the application for setting aside the arbitral award can be filed within a period of three months and the same cannot be presented after expiry of said period of limitation. The proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 empowers the Court if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making application within the period of three months to further extend the period of limitation and filing of the application for setting aside the arbitral award by 30 days and not thereafter.

6. Perusal of the statutory provisions clearly shows that the provision under Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply the proceedings contained under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

7. The scope available for condonation of delay being self-contained in the proviso to Section 34(3) and Section 5 of Limitation Act not being applicable has been taken note by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Co. : 2001 (3) Arb. LR 345 (SC), where in it has been held as hereunder:-

“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendible by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need “to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process” This objective has found expression in Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms:

“5. Extent of judicial intervention.—

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”

16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award “in acco