A.M. AHMADI, C. J. :---The special leave petitions, civil appeals and writ petitions which together constitute the present batch of matters before us owe their origin to seperate decisions of different High Courts and several provisions in different enactments which have been made the subject of challenge. Between them, they raise several distinct questions of law; they have, however, been grouped together as all of them involve the consideration of the following broad issues :

(1) Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or the State Legislatures, as the case may be, by sub-clause (d) of Clause (2) of Article 323-A or by sub-clause (d) of Clause (3) of Article 323-B of the Constitution, to totally exclude the jurisdiction of 'all courts', except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of disputes and complaints referred to in Clause (1) of Article 323-A or with regard to all or any of the matters specified in Clause (2) of Article 323-B, runs counter to the power of judicial review conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?

(2) Whether the Tribunals, constituted either under Article 323-A or under Article 323-B of the Constitution, possess the competence to test the constitutional validity of a statutory provision/rule?

(3) Whether these Tribunals, as they are functioning at present, can be said to be effective substitutes for the High Courts in discharging the power of judicial review? If not, what are the changes required to make them conform to their founding objectives?

2.We shall confine ourselves to the larger issues raised in this batch of matters without adverting to the specific facts of each of the matters; we shall, however, selectively refer to some of the impugned decisions and the provisions involved to the extent we find it necessary to do so in order to appreciate the policy-conflicts in, and to draw the parameters of, the controversy before us. The broad principles enunciated in this judgment will, at a later time, be applied by a Division Bench to resolve the disputes involved in each of the individual cases.

3.The present controversy has been referred to us by an order of a Division Bench of this Court, reported in (L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India)1, 1995(1) S.C.C. 400, which concluded that the decision rendered by a five-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in (S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India)2, 1987(1) S.C.C. 124, needs to be comprehensively reconsidered. The order of the Division Bench, dated 2-12-1994, was rendered after it had considered the arguments in the first matter before us, C.A. No. 481 of 1989, where the challenge is to the validity of section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. After analysing the relevant constitutional provisions and the circumstances which led to the decision in Sampath Kumar case, the referring Bench reached the conclusion that on account of the divergent views expressed by this Court in a series of cases decided after Sampath Kumar Case, the resulting situation warranted a "fresh look by a larger Bench over all the issues adjudicated by his Court in Sampath Kumar case, including the question whether the Tribunal can at all have an Administrative Member on its Bench, if it were to have the power of even deciding constitutional validity of a statute or (Article) 309 rule, as conceded in Chopra case. The "post-Sampath Kumar cases" which caused the Division Bench to refer the present matter to us are as follows: (J.B. Chopra v. Union of India)3, 1987(1) S.C.C. 422; (M.B. Majumdar v. Union of India)4, 1990(4) S.C.C. 501; (Amulya Chandra Kalita v. Union of India)5, 1991(1) S.C.C. 181; (R.K. Jain v. Union of India)6, 1993(4) S.C.C. 119 and (Mahabal Ram (Dr) v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research)7, 1994(2) S.C.C. 401.

4.Before we record the contentions of the learned Counsel who appeared before us, we must set out the legal and historical background rele