JUDGMENT:- 1-22. (After discussing the evidence, his Lordship proceeded) These positions having been ascertained, then comes the question as to the award of damages, which in principle is in the nature of restitution to those who depended on the deceased, and, secondly, for the loss of the life of the deceased itself. It is not punitive in any manner and the Court is called upon to balance every interest as much as possible and to arrive at a reasonable sum which will meet not only the expectation of life but commensurate the demands of those who expect to depend on such life.

23. As far as the present appeal is concerned there are two divergent approaches canvassed before me. On behalf of the appellant-plaintiff who is the head of the family who was expecting Sulabha to grow up and help in the waning years of the father, it is said there is a good case made out for granting damages both under Section 1-A as well under Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act and that Rs. 10,000/- is the minimum measure put by the father on the loss of this brilliant life.

24. On the other hand, the respondents submit that life and the facts of life are to be kept in view while determining the question of damages. It was for the plaintiff to establish as to what would have been the probable life's span and what would have been the probable earnings of the deceased. The evidence, the learned counsel submits, is absolutely wanting and mere guess-work cannot be the substitute for the proof that is required in these matters. At any rate, it is submitted that this being an appeal against the quantum of damages, the figures arrived at by the trial Judge should be treated as standard and there is no case for its enhancement. Certain decisions were cited at the Bar on behalf of both sides and they will be noticed in the later part of this judgment.

25. Suffice it to say, therefore, the approach of both the parties is diametrically opposite. In fact at one stage it was canvassed by the respondents that the trial Judge's judgment is not based on any evidence and is purely a guess-work which is not in accordance with law.

26. Now in the matters of damages of such kind, there cannot be any hard and fast rule nor the estimates given by the witnesses can conclude with accuracy the damages and its award. It appears to be well intended in the provisions of the Act itself to leave the matter to be worked out upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there is no rule of rigidity indicated. As I said earlier, it is for the Court to balance all the circumstances and to work out the sum which will answer a sort of restitution for the loss of life because of an accident caused by negligence. Under Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, it is provided by the legislature advisedly that the Court may give such damages as it may think proportionate to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively. Thus the matter rests in the discretion of the Court to be worked out by balancing out of all interest and further taking an overall view of the whole matter. But the principle underlying Section 1-A is the loss resultant because of the death to the parties claiming the damages. Section 2 is more or less a proviso, though independently enacted, to Section 1-A. By the first part of Section 2 only one action or one suit is contemplated and by the second part it is made clear that in such action or suit the executor, the administrator or the representative of the deceased could insert a claim for and recovery of any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased. The distinction between the two sections is obviously clear. Section 1-A speaks of loss resulting from such death to the parties claiming in such a suit while Section 2 speaks of pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased.

27. The nature of these provisions have been the subject-matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. Veluswami, (AIR 1962 SC 1) as well in C. K. Subra

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