The revisional authority must provide an opportunity for representation if proposing to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be revised, as per Rule 29(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.

JUDGMENT

1. The petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai (hereafter 'the Tribunal', for short) by instituting Original Application No. 221 of 2012 challenging the revisional order dated 2nd January 2012 passed by the Chief Postmaster General, Maharashtra Circle and all orders/proceedings that preceded the same. By the impugned revisional order, the penalty of 'removal from service' was imposed on the petitioner by the revisional authority upon enhancement of the penalty of 'compulsory retirement from service' ordered by the appellate authority. By a judgment and order dated 25th November 2019, the Tribunal dismissed the original application. The judgment and order of the Tribunal is under challenge in this writ petition.

2. Although the petitioner had assailed the orders of the revisional authority, the appellate authority and the disciplinary authority on diverse grounds before the Tribunal, all of which failed, he has restricted his challenge in this writ petition to the revisional order on a short ground.

3. Revision was preferred by the petitioner under Rule 29 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereafter 'the Rules', for short) challenging the appellate order dated 23rd March 2010, whereby the appellate authority, in exercise of power conferred by Rule 27(2)(i), reduced the penalty of 'removal' imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary authority to that of 'compulsory retirement'. As noticed above, the revisional authority restored the penalty of 'removal' passed by the disciplinary authority.

4. The short point that Mr. Kumar, learned advocate for the petitioner canvasses, while assailing the revisional order, is that the penalty of 'compulsory retirement' could not have been enhanced by the revisional authority without giving the petitioner an opportunity of making a representation against the penalty that was proposed to be imposed by way of enhancement. Our attention has been drawn to the first proviso to Rule 29(1) of the Rules by Mr. Kumar which, according to him, is in the nature of a mandate that the revisional authority is required to follow but such mandate had been observed in the breach by not giving him any opportunity to make a representation. Mr. Kumar has, accordingly, prayed for quashing of the order of the revisional authority.

5. The writ petition is opposed by Ms. Masurkar, learned advocate for the respondents. She raises three contentions.

6. According to Ms. Masurkar, no opportunity of making representation was required to be given to the petitioner since, in terms of sub-rule (3) of Rule 29, an application for revision is required to be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under the Rules. Provisions for consideration of appeal are embodied in Rule 27 of the Rules, which do not provide any opportunity of making a representation to the appellant or for granting him an opportunity of personal hearing. She contends that the revision of the petitioner challenging the appellate order was considered in the same manner as if it were an appeal and accordingly, non-grant of opportunity to make representation or to personally hear the petitioner prior to imposition of enhanced punishment, cannot be faulted.

7. It is the further contention of Ms. Masurkar that there has been no enhancement of penalty. What the revisional authority has directed is restoration of the penalty ordered by the disciplinary authority. In such view of the matter, question of invocation of the first proviso to Rule 29(1) of the Rules did not arise and the revisional authority was justified in passing the order dated 2nd January 2012 without putting the petitioner on prior notice.

8. Ms. Masurkar also contends that the appellate authority not having decided the appeal on merits, but having ordered that the petitioner ought to be compulsorily retired from service on humanitarian ground, it was well within the jurisdiction of the revisional au