The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Sections 32-O and 32-P of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, which govern the rights and limitations for tenants to purchase land and the consequences of failure to do so, as well as the entitlement of legal heirs to initiate action for restoration of possession.

JUDGMENT :

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the parties.

2. The petitioners are the legal heirs of the original tenant, and the respondents are the legal heirs of the original landlord. The lease was created after the tillers' day. The respondent did not deny that the suit land was leased for 99 years. It is also not disputed that the original landlord never applied for restoration of the land. The original tenant continued tenancy as per the lease agreement. The respondents had applied before the Tahsildar by an application under Sections 32-O and 32-P of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act').

3. The contention of the respondent before the Tahsildar was that the tenant ought to have purchased the land within a year from the commencement of the tenancy. No purchase notice was given to the landlord. Hence, his right to purchase had ceased. Therefore, the petitioner is liable to be evicted, and the land be restored to them. The petitioner was holding the land more than the ceiling limits. Therefore also, he is not entitled to purchase the suit land.

4. The petitioners have opposed the application, contending that the lease should have been terminated by following the due procedure of law. Respondent No.2 was the attesting witness to the said lease deed. He never took any action. Since the original tenant did not terminate the tenancy, legal heirs have no right to seek relief under Section 32-P of the Act. Claim after 32 years is time-barred. The respondents ought to have filed the petition within a reasonable period. Therefore, the right to claim the restoration of the land became inexecutable. The respondents ought to have exercised the powers under Section 29 of the said Act within two years. They never applied for restoration of possession. Hence, they have no right to claim the possession. He has argued that the lease deed was not in their possession at the time of the trial before the Court. Hence, they may be allowed to produce additional evidence of the said lease deed. To bolster his arguments, he relied on the case of Arvind Deochand Mehta and others Vs. Genu Tukaram Bhoir, 2009 (3) Bom.C.R. 858 and Sambhaji Shripati Bankar (Deceased through L.Rs.) Vs. Keshav Rangnath Ekbote (Deceased through L.Rs.), 2010 (3) ALL MR 854. He prayed to allow the petition and quash the impugned orders.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that since the tenant did not exercise the power to purchase the tenanted land within a year as provided under Section 32-O of the Act, they have no right to continue with the possession. Their right to continue as a tenant ceases soon after a year of the commencement of the lease. He also argued that the petitioner has more land than the required holding. The landlords/respondents have lesser land. The petitioners have brought a new case before this Court. He relied on the case of Ramchandrahashadalvi (Deceased) Through Lrs. Vs. D. Patwardhan, 1999 AIR (SC) 2039, Sanganbasappa Channappa Manikhshetti Vs. Vishwanath Shivlingappa Birajdar and others, 2003(2) Mh.L.J. 587, Motiram Jagannath Bhoir Vs. Rajaram Gopal Mhaskar and Others, 2005 (1) Mh.L.J. 169 and lastly he relied on the case of Babu Vithu Gaikwad (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Chintaman Sadashiv and Ors, 2007 (9) SCC 632. He prayed to dismiss the petition.

6. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that under Section 40 of the Act, the tenancy is heritable. Therefore, the petitioners have every right to protect their rights. He has tried to argue that the rule of succession would not apply to the landlord. He is emphasizing that since the father of the respondents did not initiate the proceeding for eviction, the respondents have lost their rights to restore the possession. He also argued that the case laws relied upon by the respondents’ counsel are on the different facts and provisions of law, particularly on the tillers' day. Hence, do not apply to the case