IMPORTANT POINT
A suit can be dismissed for being barred by limitation without requiring further evidence if the facts clearly indicate such a bar.

JUDGMENT :

MILIND N. JADHAV, J.

1. The present Civil Revision Application (CRA) impugns order dated 10.04.2023 passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 25 of 2020 by the Trial Court while rejecting Application filed below Exhibit-22. Application below Exhibit-22 is filed by Defendant No. 9 in Suit proceedings under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) seeking dismissal of Suit and rejection of the Suit plaint. Parties shall be referred to as Plaintiff, Defendant Nos. 1 to 8 and Defendant No. 9 for convenience.

2. Briefly stated, Suit is filed in the year 2020 for specific performance of contract/agreement of the year 1989, cancellation of registered sale deed dated 25.02.2011 and declaration of title. There are three principal prayers prayed for by the Plaintiff in the Suit plaint. The declaratory relief is for declaring Plaintiff as owner of the Suit property. Relief of specific performance of agreement is of an agreement for sale of 1989 executed between predecessor-in-title of Defendant Nos. 1 to 8 and Plaintiff. Relief for cancellation of registered sale deed is of sale deed executed between Defendant Nos. 1 to 8 with Defendant No. 9. Suit is filed in the year 2020. Defendant No. 9 is in possession of the suit property since 2011.

3. Defendant No. 9 filed Application below Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and suffered rejection. He is the Revision Applicant before me. Learned Advocate for Applicant would submit that on the face of record, facts of the present case are such that the suit is not maintainable as it is hit by the bar of limitation. He would submit that no declaratory relief can be passed in favour of Plaintiff on the basis of the prayers prayed for. He would submit that Plaintiff seeks specific performance of agreement of the year 1989 for the first time in the year 2020. He would next submit that Plaintiff seeks cancellation of a registered sale deed between Defendant Nos. 1 to 8 on the one side and Defendant No. 9. He would submit that even if it is assumed to be true that there is a purported Agreement between Plaintiff and the predecessor-in-title of Defendant Nos. 1 to 8 in the year 1989, seeking specific performance of that Agreement in the year 2020 is at a much belated stage. He would submit that Defendants deny the alleged Agreement of the year 1989 which on the face of record is undated, unstamped and unregistered.

3.1. He would draw my attention to the copy of Agreement appended at Exhibit-A to CRA and would contend that the said Agreement does not record handing over possession of the suit property to Plaintiff nor it is witnessed by any person. He would draw my attention to the fact that the said Agreement incorporates a mobile number of the party, when admittedly in the year 1989 mobile services were not in vogue in the first place itself. He would therefore contend that the said Agreement is sham, bogus and a fabricated Agreement, manufactured by Plaintiff to stake a false claim to the suit property. He would submit that assuming for the sake of argument that such an Agreement was executed, the Vendors in the said Agreement namely Pandurang and Chintamani could never have been able to sell the entire property to Plaintiff since there were several coparceners who were entitled to their share in the suit property and in the absence of consent of the remaining five coparceners, such an Agreement would have been null and void.

3.2. He would next submit that Suit property is amenable to the provisions of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948 (for short “the said Act”) and hence the bar under Section 43A of the said Act for sale/transfer would apply, as permission for such sale from the Competent Authority i.e. Collector is a mandatory requirement. He would vehemently submit that if it is Plaintiff’s case that in the year 1989 such an unstamped and unregistered Agreement for sale was executed and monies were paid to the predecessor-in-title of Defendant Nos. 1 to 8,