IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD
S.G. MEHARE, J.
Latabai, Wd/o. Bhimsing Jadhav - Applicant
Versus
The State Of Maharashtra – Respondent
29 Bail Application No. 1547 Of 2024
Decided On : 23-09-2024
Bail - IPC Offences - Sections 120-B, 182, 193, 419, 420, 468, 34 of IPC; Section 437(6) of Cr.P.C. - The court interpreted the discretionary nature of bail under Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C., emphasizing that the term 'shall' does not mandate bail if the trial is delayed.
Fact of the Case:
The applicant sought bail in a criminal case where the trial was delayed beyond 60 days. The applicant argued that the delay was not due to their actions and thus deserved bail under Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the term 'shall' in Section 437(6) is discretionary and does not guarantee bail. The reasons for denying bail were deemed legal and proper, considering the applicant's past and the potential for absconding.
Issues: Whether the applicant is entitled to bail under Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C. due to the trial not concluding within 60 days.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the discretion to grant bail under Section 437(6) is not absolute and must consider the totality of circumstances, including the applicant's history and the nature of the case.
Result: The bail application stands dismissed.
JUDGMENT :
(S.G. Mehare, J.) :
1. Heard the learned counsel for the applicant and learned APP for the respondent-State.
2. The applicant seeks bail in Crime No.69 of 2023, registered with Sillod City Police Station, District Aurangabad, of the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 182, 193, 419, 420, 468 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant has vehemently argued that the trial is not concluded within 60 days from the first date fixed for taking evidence. A few witnesses were examined, and thereafter, the trial was stalled for no satisfactory reasons. Since the trial was not concluded within 60 days from the first date fixed for taking evidence, he deserves bail under Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C. He relied on the case of Chandraswami and another Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation ; (1996) 6 Supreme Court Cases 751. He also relied on the case of Sukhdev Singh Vs. State of Punjab ; 2009 Cri.L.J. 2941. Relying on these judgments, he would submit that since the trial has been delayed for no cause at the hands of the applicant, the applicant deserves bail. He would submit that the learned Trial Court rejected the bail application on the incorrect ground that two witnesses remained to be examined. The reasons for rejecting the bail of the Trial Court as well as Sessions Court are against the law. The fundamental rights of the applicant to enjoy liberty have been affected. The prosecution would not ensure a speedy trial. Hence, he may be granted bail. The word “shall” has been used in Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. So, the Court should exercise the powers to make the justice with the accused. Therefore, he may be granted bail.
4. Per contra, learned APP for the State has strongly opposed the application. Relying on the case of U.T. Worldwide India Pvt. Ltd. And others Vs. State of Maharashtra and another; 2007 All M.R. (Cri.) 300 he argued that the word “shall” used in Section 437(6) is not mandatory. The said word has been interpreted in this judgment. The law has been laid down that the term “shall” used in that Section is not mandatory.
5. He also relied on the case of Snehdip Shriram Soni Vs. State of Maharashtra ; 2022 All M.R.(Cri.) 2924, in which the ratio laid in of U.T. Worldwide (supra) was reiterated.
6. The question before the High Court at Bombay at Principal Seat in U.T. Worldwide (supra) was whether the accused has a right to claim the bail under Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C. in view of the term “shall” used in that Section.
7. The Bombay High Court has interpreted the said Section and recorded the findings that the power to grant bail under various Sub-sections of Section 437 is discretionary and has to be exercised on sound judicial principles. The same principle will apply to bail under Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C. It cannot, therefore, be said that bail must be granted to the accused if the trial is not concluded within 60 days from first date fixed for evidence. Merely because the word shall is used in section does not mean that it is a mandate to do so. The word “unless” ….. otherwise in Sub-Section cannot be ignored. Even if the period of 60 days is so over, the Court has discretion to refuse the bail under Section 437(6) but, reasons for that have to be recorded. Provision is not like that under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. If discretion is wrongly exercised, a remedy of appeal can be availed. Power to cancel bail can therefore, be exercised if the order for grant of bail is palpably illegal, perverse and vitiated by total non-application of mind. Similar was the view reiterated in the case of Snehdip (supra).
8. In Chandraswami (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph No.16 that we propose to examine the plea for grant of bail by looking at the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case at this stage, without going into the question of interpretation or applicability of Section 437(6) of Cr.P.C. So also, we do not propose to examine if the cancellation of the ba
Chandraswami and another Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
The court established that the discretionary nature of bail under Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C. allows for denial even if the trial exceeds 60 days, based on the circumstances of the case.
The court emphasized that Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C. is not mandatory but directory, and the accused is entitled to apply for bail if the trial is not completed within sixty days, unless there are....
The court reinforced the principle of timely trials, finding entitlement to bail under Section 480(6) of B.N.S.S. due to significant delay not attributable to the accused, thus safeguarding individua....
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provision of Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is discretionary, and the reasons for refusal must be recorded in writing. T....
The statutory right given to the accused under Section 437(6) of Cr.P.C. cannot be taken away, and the trial court must release the accused if the trial is not concluded within the stipulated period.
Repeating applications under S.437(6) of the Cr.P.C. for bail is not permitted after rejection.
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of Section 437(6) of Cr.P.C. make it obligatory to release the accused if the trial for a non-bailable offence is not concluded....
The central legal point established in the judgment is that prolonged incarceration militates against the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and bail can be granted ba....
Bail under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA cannot be granted solely due to trial delay; it requires examination of prima facie case merits.
The delay in trial and prolonged incarceration can warrant granting bail despite statutory restrictions under the NDPS Act.
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