Challenges to interlocutory orders of an Arbitral Tribunal must await the final award, as per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard learned Counsel for petitioner and learned Counsel for respondent.

2. The respondent filed his reply. By way of this reply, preliminary objection is raised by the respondent that petition is not maintainable. It is contended that in view of the scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Arbitration Act’), does not permit challenge to the interlocutory orders under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court has time and again emphasized that except where Section 37 specifically provides a right of appeal, the aggrieved party must await for the final award to raise challenges to interim orders. Such challenges can then be raised in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Arbitral Tribunal being a forum chosen by parties through agreement, must be allowed to function without premature judicial intervention.

3. The primary challenge of the petitioner relates to the learned Arbitrator’s decision to exhibit certain documents of the answering respondent, subject to the petitioner’s objections, to be decided at the time of final hearing. It is contention of the petitioner that those objections ought to have been decided then and there only. It is further contention that the objections were duly raised by the petitioner.

4. The Arbitrator exhibited the documents and it was directed that objections will be heard at the time of final hearing. Most important fact is that even photocopy of Audit Report is marked as Exhibit- 50, as such, it demonstrates the arbitrary, unlawful and erroneous decision making process, which petitioner challenge in this petition.

5. It is contended that when specific objection is raised that Audit Report below Exhibit-50 is marked as exhibit, it was brought to the notice to the Arbitrator that the original of the Audit Report is not filed and that the Author of the document is also not examined then it was the jurisdictional obligation of the learned Arbitrator to apply mind and should have refrained from exhibiting the documents which needs interference by this Court.

6. As against this contention of the respondent is that in view of Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, expansive discretion is given to the Arbitral Tribunal in conducting the proceedings is granted. Section 19(1) explicitly provides that the Arbitrary Tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, or the Indian Evidence Act. However, Section 19(3) specifically empowers the Arbitration Tribunal to conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, including the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence. It is submitted that the learned Arbitrator’s decision to exhibit documents while reserving objections falls squarely within the statutory discretion and is aimed at ensuring efficient conduct of proceedings.

7. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for respondent that the petitioner is having opportunity to argue on the same objection as decision on objection deferred at the time of final hearing, as all grounds of challenge remain available. Moreover, the final award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

8. The learned Counsel for petitioner relied on L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, (1997) 3 SCC 261, in support of his contention that the review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution of India. In L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

“To express our opinion on the issue whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we must first attempt to understand what constitutes the basic structure of the Constitution. The doctrine of basic structure was evolved in Kesavananda Bharati case. In Kesavananda Bharati case a thirteen-Judge Constitution Bench, by a majority of