The court emphasized that sufficient cause must be established for condonation of delay, irrespective of its length, and that merits of the case should not influence the decision.

JUDGMENT :

1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith with the consent of and at the request of the learned counsel for the parties.

2. The instant Writ Petition invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 has been filed praying for directions from this court to set aside and quash the impugned order dated 30.12.2024 passed by the District Court, Panaji in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 152/2024. By way of the Impugned Order, the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was dismissed. The petitioner had filed an application seeking condonation of delay of 73 days in filing a Revision Application under Section 201B of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994.

3. In a nutshell, the origin of the dispute can be traced back to a complaint filed by respondent no.2 against the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Panchayats, submitting therein that the petitioner had undertaken illegal construction on land bearing survey no. 20/1, 20/3 and 20/5 of the Village of Uccassaim, Bardez, Goa. Vide Judgment and Order dated 12.10.2021, the Deputy Director was pleased to allow the complaint. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred an Appeal bearing no. ADP-1/Ucca-Pali-Pun/P.A. 358/2021 before the Additional Director of Panchayat- I, Panaji, Goa, which was dismissed by the Additional Director vide Judgement and Order dated 15.03.2024. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Revision Petition under section 201B of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act on 23.08.2024. Along with the Revision Petition, the petitioner filed an application seeking condonation of delay submitting that the delay of 73 days was on account of sufficient cause. The District Court vide the Impugned Order dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the petitioner has sought relief from this court.

4. In support of the stance of the petitioner, Mr. J.A. Lobo, learned counsel made the following submissions:

4.1. The Impugned Order has been passed based on inferences drawn from the merits of the dispute between the parties, without due consideration of the explanation offered for the delay in filing the Revision Petition. The District Court has been impressed by the history of the dispute rather than being concerned with the delay.

4.2. To illustrate that the mind of the court was prejudiced, it was submitted that the Impugned Order reflects an observation that the delay caused on account of the unavailability of his counsel is not sufficient, as other counsel could have been engaged in the absence of the petitioner's counsel. It is not reasonable to expect the litigant to seek representation from another counsel, whilst the dispute is ongomg.

4.3. The imposition of cost of Rs.25,000/- vide the Impugned Order also illustrates the prejudice that the court proceeded with.

4.4. Moreover, the delay is of a short quantum, of only 73 days and not inordinate in quantum like half a year or a year.

4.5. The reply to The Application filed by respondent no.2 comprises solely of denials of the submissions made by the petitioner without any reasoning or submission offered to substantiate the position adopted by them. The contents of the reply are not reflected in the body of the Impugned Order.

4.6. When seized with an application for condonation of delay, a court should narrow the scope of their attention to the factum of delay rather than the merits of the dispute. The only pressing consideration in such an application is whether a sufficient cause is disclosed in the explanation of the delay.

4.7. The Judgment and Order, against which the revision was sought, was passed on 15.03.2024. The petitioner, on the very same day had applied for a certified copy of the same, but it was only produced to them on 29.04.2024. Subsequently, on the 02.05.2024 the petitioner visited the chamber of the learned counsel that had been engaged by him, during w