Preventive detention is unjustified without substantial evidence demonstrating a public order threat, particularly when ordinary law provides adequate remedies.

JUDGMENT :

(Per Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.)

1. Heard learned Advocate Ms. Sunita G. Sonawane for the petitioner and learned APP Ms. Rashmi P. Gour for respondents – State.

2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The petition is heard finally with the consent of the learned Advocates for the parties.

3. The petitioner challenges the detention order dated 21.02.2025 bearing No.DC/Desk-9C1/195/2025 passed by respondent No.2 as well as the approval order dated 03.03.2025 and the confirmation order dated 09.04.2025 passed by respondent No.1, by invoking the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has taken us through the impugned orders and the material which was supplied to the petitioner by the detaining authority after passing of the order. He submits that though several offences were registered against the petitioner, yet for the purpose of passing the impugned order, only one offence was considered i.e. Crime No.422 of 2024 registered with Kopargaon City Police Station, District Ahilyanagar for the offences punishable under Sections 109(1), 126(2), 189(2), 189(4), 191(2), 191(3), 190 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, Section 3 punishable under Section 25, 27 of the Arms Act. Learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the detaining authority had considered Crime No.422 of 2024 as well as two in-camera statements for passing the detention order. Further, in connection with Crime No.422 of 2024, the petitioner came to be released on bail by order dated 27.11.2024, however, the said order was not considered by the detaining authority. Similarly, as regards in-camera witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ are concerned, general public was not involved. At the most, law and order situation would have been created and, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

5. Per contra, the learned APP strongly supports the action taken against the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner is a dangerous person as defined under Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the “MPDA Act”). The detaining authority has relied on the two in-camera statements and the subjective satisfaction has been arrived at. There is no illegality in the procedure adopted while recording the in-camera statements of the witnesses. Due to the terror created by the petitioner, people are not coming forward to lodge report against him and, therefore, it affects the public order. Learned APP is relying upon the affidavit-in-reply filed by Mr. Kailas Wagh, District Magistrate, Ahilyanagar. He supports the detention order passed by him and tries to demonstrate as to how he had arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is a dangerous person. The subjective satisfaction was arrived at on the basis of the in-camera statements and the contents of the FIR. After the subjective satisfaction, the detaining authority has passed a reasoned order, which is then confirmed with the opinion of the Advisory Board and, thereafter, confirmed by the State Government on 09.04.2025. Therefore, no fault can be found in the impugned order.

6. Before considering the case, we would like to take note of the legal position as is emerging in the following decisions :-

(i) Nenavath Bujji etc. Vs. State of Telangana and others , [2024 SCC OnLine SC 367],

(ii) Kanu Biswas Vs. State of West Bengal , [1972 (3) SCC 831] wherein reference was made to the decision in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar and Ors. [1966 (1) SCR 709] ;

(iii) Mustakmiya Jabbar