2003 (1) Crimes 449
Karnataka High Court (DB)
R.V. Raveendran & K.L. Manjunath, JJ.
Shafiulla Rahim Khan —Petitioner
versus
High Court of Karnataka & Anr. — Respondents
Writ Petition Nos. 11607 and 12540 of 1998
Decided on 14-8-2002
Held: The question is whether learned Judge, having correctly stated the principles and having referred to the ground, realities could have gone to the extent of barring petitions under Section 482 for quashing a criminal proceedings unless the petitioner had approached the Court where the pro-ceedings are pending for relief on the same grounds. There can be no doubt that the power under Section 482 should be sparingly used and in the rarest of rare cases. There is also no doubt that it should not normally be exercised when there is a specific provision in the Code for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But, the power under Section 482 can still be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court or to secure ends of justice. When a petition under Section 482 is presented, it is for this Court to find out whether the matter is an exceptional case where the circum-stances necessitates the aggrieved person to approach the High Court under Section 482 without first approaching the Court where the pro-ceedings are pending. Any direction by the Registry which prevents or denies the right of an aggrieved person to approach this Court to quash a procee-dings pending before a Criminal Court would amount to restricting the in-herent right of this Court. (Para 6)
Further held: When a petition under Section 482 is presented and placed before the Court for admission, this Court may refuse to entertain it, if there as are no special grounds to deviate from the general rule that an accused should normally apply to the Trial Court for discharge. But, the Registry cannot refuse to receive peti-tions on the ground that the aggrieved party has not approached the Court where the criminal proceedings are pending, for relief on the same grounds. It should be remembered that the inherent power is intended to be exercised in unforeseen circumstances and extraordinary circumstances. It should also be remembered that only the highest Court exercising criminal jurisdiction in the State has inherent power. Neither the Court of Sessions nor the Magistrates have such power. It is assumed that the High Court will exercise the power under Section 482 responsibly and only in exceptional cases. Inherent power under Section 482 statutorily recognized and jealo-usly safeguarded, should not be truncated or restricted merely on an apprehension that the power likely to be invoked unnecessarily. (Para 9)
Result: Petition dismissed.
Order
R.V. Raveendran, J.— In these petitions (PIL), the petitioners have sought quashing of Circular No. HCE 727 of 1994, dated 28-3-1998 [as amended by Circular No. HCE 272 of 1994, dated 30-3-1998], issued by the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Karnataka. The said amended circular reads as follows:
“HCE 727 of 1994
High Court of Karnataka,
Bangalore.
Dated 28-3-1998
CIRCULAR
In enclosing herewith an extract of paras 13 and 16 and the order por-tion in the order passed in Criminal Petition Nos. 2720 and 2789 of 1995, DD: 26-2-1998, the Section Officer, Receiving and Scrutiny Branch of this office is directed to act upon the directions issued in the above criminal petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in respect of the matters indicated therein. ‘Further, not to receive any such petition filed under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. henceforth’”.
2. The relevant portion of the order of the learned Judge in the case of Kamalanjanamma and others v. State of Karnataka and another1, in compliance of which the said circulars have been issued, reads as follows:
“The object and purpose of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is to prevent the abuse of process of Court and where there is no other alternative or efficacious remedy available it cannot be resorted to if they are to stifle a legitimate prosecution. . . . The Trial Court is not barred from entertaining arguments in regard to the merits of the case or the bar contained under any provision of law, any further proceeding of the case or any other legal contention which the accused persons desire to raise at the preliminary stage itself. Therefore, this Court cannot go into the question directly, bypassing the jurisdiction of the Trial Court. Further, by entertai-ning such petitions, instead of preventing the abuse of process of Court it is being encouraged leading to the abuse of process of Court as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent.
. . . . .Instead of putting an end to the multiplicity of proceedings, the same is being encouraged by entertaining the proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. though the same contentions could be urged before the Trial Court. Their Lordships have held that only in rarest of rare cases, the petition can be entertained. It is the experience of this Court that it has become a regular feature of approaching this Court directly without even appearing before the Trial Court. The comp-lainant does not get equal treat-ment. On the other hand, I am of the considered view that he is dragged to the High Court for having approached the Trial Court for redressing his grievance......
16. The Division Bench of this Court in Y. Krishnamurthy v. Shara-nappa 2, has held:
“We are of the opinion that under normal circumstances, an acc-used person should not be liber-ally permitted to approach this Court for exercise of jurisdiction either under Section 379 or 482 of the Cr.P.C. The aggrieved per-son be insisted upon to first approach the Magistrate or the Court where the proceedings are pending for discharging him under Section 245(2) or dropping the proceedings under Section 258 of the Cr.P.C. Such a course would be beneficial and conveni-ent both to the accused and the complainant. In that event, this Court will also be in a better posi-tion to appreciate the rival con-tentions in the light of the adju-dication made by the Magistrate or the Court. In this way, the object of the Code for minimising the litigation and avoiding the delay could also be achieved”.
Despite this order, it is observed that the accused persons appro-ach this Court directly without appearing before the Trial Court. Under those circumstances, it is just and necessary that the Regis-try may be directed not to register the criminal proceedings to quash the proceedings unless they appro-ach the Trial Court and all the contentions are raised and the Trial Court given a finding thereon”. (emphasis supplied)
The learned Judge has been persuaded to give such a drasti
K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and another
Dr. Raghubir Sran v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1964 SC 1: 1964 Cri.L.J. 1 (SC)
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Moha-mmad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703 : 1964 Cri.L.J. 549 (SC)
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maha-rashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 Cri.L.J. 165 (SC)
State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 (Supp.) 1 SCC 335
S.N. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960 : (2002) 1 SCC 241
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