S.Sarwar Ali, J.

1. The tenant is the appellant in this appeal. The landlord brought a suit for eviction of the tenant from the suit premises and for realisation of Rs. 220.00 being the arrears of rent from May, 1964 to February, 1965. Both the courts below have held that the tenant was a defaulter and that the tenancy had been terminated by a proper notice as contemplated under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Both these findings are challenged in this second appeal.

2. The first contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the findings of the courts below that the plaintiff was in default in respect of rent is erroneous in law. During the course of argument, however, nothing has been shown which may induce me to take a view that the finding, which admittedly, is a finding of fact, is vitiated or is erroneous in law. On a consideration of the relevant evidence adduced by the parties both the trial Court and the lower appellate court have accepted the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had not paid rent for a period of ten months. Consequently the courts below were right in holding that he was liable to eviction under the provisions of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947.

3. In view of this finding the defendant-tenant could succeed in this appeal only if he could establish that the notice, terminating the tenancy which according to the finding was served on him, did not conform with the requirement of law. But before noticing and deciding this point I may also state that an argument was advanced to the effect that the finding of the court below that notice was, in fact, served on the defendant is not sustainable. I, however, find that the court below has on the consideration of the relevant evidence come to a conclusion that the notice was sent to the appellant through registered post. This being the position the lower appellate Court was right in holding that there was a presumption that the notice has been delivered to the defendant. The evidence of denial of receipt of the notice having been rejected, I do not think that the court below was in error in holding that the notice will be deemed to have been served on the defendant in this case.

4. I now take up the main question of law that has been raised in this second appeal. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the notice does not fulfil the requirement of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section aforesaid requires that the notice terminating a monthly tenancy should expire with the end of the month of the tenancy. In this case the tenancy being tenancy according to English calendar month, the notice could be valid only if it determined the tenancy at the end of the calendar month. The learned counsel contended that the notice in this case did not expire at the end of the calendar month but expired earlier. It is, therefore, first necessary to refer to the notice itself. Paragraph 4 of the notice is to the following effect:

"That my client needs the house for her own occupation. That my client does not want you to remain in the house and as such determines the tenancy on and from 31st January, 1965".

The concluding portion of this notice says "I, therefore, request you to kindly vacate the premises occupied by you on or before the 31st January, 1965". The question, therefore, which falls for consideration is whether this notice fulfils the aforesaid requirement of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

5. The question as to what is the meaning of certain expression used in a notice is essentially a question of interpretation "of the document. The meaning which has to be given to the expression used determines whether there has been fulfilment of the requirement of the section aforesaid. It is true that the law in this regard is technical and technicality is too deep-rooted to be got rid of. But it has to be remembered, as was pithily observed by Lord Atkinson in the case of Harihar Banerji V/s