S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. The significant question in the field of co-operative law which looms large in this reference to the Full Bench is whether the wide ranging, unguided and uncanalised powers conferred by S.65A Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, on the State Government to call for any and every proceedings before the Registrar or his subordinates or any other person and decide them as it may deem fit, suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and thus infract Art.14 of the Constitution ? If not, the narrower question is whether S.65A includes within its sweep the strictly judicial matters pending before the Registrar under S.48 of the said Act ?

2. In this set of four connected writ jurisdiction cases, the representative matrix of facts may be noticed somewhat briefly from C.W.J.C. No. 4067 of 1981 (Piro Vyapar Mandal Sahyog Samiti Ltd. V/s. The State of Bihar), the petitioner, Piro Vyapar Mandal Sahyog Samiti Ltd. is a Society registered under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and respondent 6 is a member of the said society. The petitioner society filed an award case before respondent 4, the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Arrah, for the realisation of a sum of Rs. 3,322/- in principal and Rs. 902/75 paise as interest thereon. After hearing, respondent 4 rejected the aforesaid case by his order dt. 16th Feb. 1981. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner moved an appeal under S.48(6) of the Act before respondent 3, the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Patna Division, Patna. The latter allowed the said appeal and held respondent 6 liable for the amount claimed (vide annexure-2 to the writ petition). Against the aforesaid order, respondent 6 purported to file a review case under S.65A of the Act before the Minister of Co-operation, Government of Bihar, respondent 2, and the latter (vide order, annexure-1) admitted the same and stayed the operation of the orders of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, meanwhile, ex parte. Later the petitioner society, on receipt of a notice, filed a written statement before respondent 2 taking the stand that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the said petition under S.65A of the Act against an order on appeal which had achieved finality. It is the petitioners grievance that thereafter respondent 2 has not fixed any date of hearing of the case and he has no intention of disposing of the case before him. As a consequence, the certificate proceedings under the Public Demands Recovery Act to effectuate the award passed against respondent 6 has also been stayed and the petitioner is left with no remedy. Aggrieved thereby the present petition has been filed.

3. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent 6 the broad factual position is not denied, but it is reiterated that respondent 2, the Minister, has full jurisdiction to send for any proceedings under S.65 irrespective of their finality or otherwise and pass such orders as he deems fit.

4. This case originally came up before a learned single Judge who noticing the significance of the question referred the same to a Division Bench. Before the Division Bench yet again a conflict of precedent within the Court was projected necessitating reference to a larger Bench. During the course of the hearing before the Full Bench itself, the vires of S.65A came to be frontally assailed and permission was granted to amend the petition accordingly. In compliance therewith, a supplementary affidavit has been filed to assail S.65A of the Act as ultra vires the Constitution.

5. The significant and the threshold question herein is whether S.65A suffers from such a vice of arbitrariness as to infract the equality clause under Art.14 of the Constitution. This issue must necessarily revolve round the language of S.65A of the Act and the unguided wide-ranging powers conferred by the said Section and it is thus apt to read it at the very outset -

"65A. The