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1991 Supreme(Pat) 279

PATNA HIGH COURT
Satyeshwar Roy , S.Hoda and . JJ.
Balbir Dutta
Versus
Ashish Kumar Mitra
A.F.A.D. No. 38 of 1990 ;
Decided On : AUGUST 1, 1991

Headnote:Bihar Buildings (L.R. & E.) Control Act. 1982, Sec. 11(1)(d) - Default in payment of rent by the tenant-suit for eviction filed for default in payment of rent for a period 3 years prior to filing of the suit-rent lawfully payable-meaning of-the word lawfully in the section is followed by word payable which means that it must not be rent which is not payable, either forbidden by law or will defeat provision of any law-words (in the provision) are lawfully payable and not lawfully recoverable-amount barred by limitation can not be recovered by process of law but such an amount does not be come unlawful on expiry of the period of limitation-in a given case it may be said that amount was not lawfully recoverable through process of court being barred by limitation but it will not mean that the amount has become unlawful or not lawfully payable-any default for two months or more within three years of the date of institution of the suit will be a ground for eviction under clause (d)-AIR 1958 S.C. 328, & AIR 1978 S.C. 287 rel. on, AIR 1976 S.C. 1637 & 1990 (1) S.C.C. 465 dist., AIR 1975 Pat 283 ref., 1964 BLJR 59 held obiter dictrem and not binding precedent, 1985 PLJR 923 not approved.

       (Paras 8, 9, 10, 11 & 13)

Judgment

Satyeshwar Roy, J.

1. Defendant is the appellant. The respondents filed a suit for eviction of the appellant from a building on the ground of default in paying rent from September, 1977 to December, 1977. Prayer was also made for a decree for arrears of rent. Both the courts below have accepted the case of the respondents.

2. The facts are not in dispute. The appellant was inducted as a tenant by Smt. T. M. Mitra. She filed an application under Sec.12 (3) of the bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (the Act) for eviction of the appellant. Ultimately, the matter came up to this Court in civil Revision No.6 of 1973 (R ). On 2-11-1983 it was compromised on the terms that the appellant would pay the arrears of rent amounting to rs.3,200/- and that Mrs. Mitra would accept the appellant as a month to month tenant and the latter would contiuue to remain in possession of the building so long he went on paying arrears and current rents and that if he defaulted for one month, the revision application would stand automatically dismissed.

3. There was an alleged default in paying rent by the appellant and the order passed in the application under Sec.12 (3) was executed against the appellant. Again the matter was brought to this Court by the appellant in civil Revision No.1961 of 1979 (R ). Before that Mrs. Mitra had died leaving behind the respondents as her heirs. The civil revision application filed by the appellant was allowed by holding that the application under section 12 (3) was not maintainable. The special leave petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

4. The respondents thereafter filed a suit for eviction of the appellant on the ground of default in payment of rent for the period mentioned above. The appeal had been listed for hearing before a learned Single Judge. The only question urged before him was that as the period for which the appellant was alleged to have defaulted in paying the rent was with regard to a period more than three years prior to the institution of the suit, the relief for eviction on the ground of such default of payment of rent was not available to the respondents. The learned Single Judge ordered that the case be listed for hearing before a larger Bench.

5. I have already noticed that the period for which the appellant defaulted in paying the rent was September, 1977 to December, 1977. The suit was filed on 28-1-1983. Admittedly, the appellant committed default in paying rent for the period which had taken place more than three years before institution of the suit. The substantial question of law which was agitated for hearing by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and which arose in this appeal was :-

"whether a landlord can file a suit for eviction of the tenant from a building on the ground of default in payment of rent by the latter to the former for the period which was more than three years prior to the institution of the suit".

6. According to Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, no decree for eviction could have been passed against the appellant as the period of default being more than three years prior to the institution of the suit, whereas Mr. Mitter learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the law of limitation has no application. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties relied on a number of decisions which I will - discuss at appropriate places. This decision relied upon by Mr. Debi prasad supporting his contention is a Bench decision of this Court in bhairolal Agarwala V/s. Samir Baran Ghosh, 1964 BLJR 59. This was followed by a learned single Judge in Sri Nand Gopal Prasad Mostt. Prem Lata Devi, 1985 PLJR 923. The respondents prayed for decree against the appellant on the ground covered by Sec.11 (1) (d) of the Act, which is similar to the 1947 Act and 1977 Act. Sec.11 (1) (d) reads as follows :-

11. Eviction of tenants.-Notwithstanding anything contained i









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