The High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded in a disciplinary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, but only on the ground of malafide. Where the penalty, in the facts of the case, appears to be excessive, harsh or disproportionate to the misconduct, the Court can direct reconsideration of the quantum.

S. N. Jha, J. - In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order of his removal from service as contained in Annexure-11 dated 24.1.87. He had come to this Court earlier challenging the said order in C.W.J.C. No. 810 of 1988. This Court by order dated 17.2.88 directed the respondents to reconsider the quantum of penalty. By order as contained in Annexure-16 dated 25.4.94 the respondents however, reiterated the previous order of removal. The petitioner has challenged the correctness of the said order as well.

2. The petitioner was subjected to a departmental proceeding on charges relating to transfer order. He was found guilty of the charges and awarded the impugned penalty. This Court in its order dated 17.2.88 did not find any error in the order. The Court observed:-

"It is indeed a case in which the petitioner exhibited arrogance and it seems that the order transferring him was not liked by him and so he tried to avoid it for which, according to the respondent-Company, he even tried to bring outside influence. These no doubt were acts which could not but be viewed with concern."

After making the said observations the learned Judges added-

"yet extreme punishment of dismissal from service may be too harsh. In every case where rights and interests are determined it is necessary to apply rules of law with compassion. A little compassion may save the petitioner from the extreme punishment of dismissal. On the facts of this case, we are inclined to suggest that petitioner deserves reconsideration by the respondent-Company whether extreme punishment of dismissal would be awarded to the petitioner or not. We accordingly direct the respondents to give a further hearing to the petitioner on the penalty (even though not required under the law) and reconsider to reduce the punishment."

3. The Board of Directors of the respondent-Company in its impugned order dated 25.4.94 has observed:-

"Board thereafter considered all the documents and papers relating to the case and oral submission made by Sri S.N. Singh as well as the written submission dated 15.3.94, Corroborating whatever he told orally. After that Board is of the opinion that Sri S.N. Singh has committed serious offence and it will be neither in the interest of justice nor in the interest of organisation to reinstate Sri Singh in the service of the Company. Therefore the Board rejected his appeal. Board further confirms the decision of the disciplinary authority with respect to punishment of removal from the services of the Company imposed on Mr. S.N. Singh."

4. Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, learned counsel for the petitioner firstly tried to impugn the validity of the order of penalty on merits. But in view of the fact that this Court in the previous writ petition did not find any infirmity in the order, it is simply not possible to go into the facts so as to examine as to whether the proceeding was conducted according to law, the findings of the Enquiry Officer are corrector the order of the disciplinary authority is valid or not. It may be stated here that the petitioner had gone upto the Supreme Court challenging the order of this Court aforesaid in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 7099 of 1988 which was "dismissed on merits" on 28.1.91.

5. Mr. Mahto then contended that the punishment of removal is excessive and disproportionate to the charges and, therefore, should be set aside. He submitted that in view of the order of the High Court the respondents had no option but to reduce the penalty. He submitted that where the High Court directs reconsideration (of quantum of penalty) but the authorities fail to consider as to why any alternative punishment would not be sufficient, its action must be struck down not only as being improper but also verging on contempt. When he was reminded of the nature of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters arising out of disciplinary proceeding and told that this Court cannot substitute a penalty of its own and