The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of natural justice, the right to challenge an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the limitations of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard the parties.

2. The case is being taken up from defect side.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners is directed to submit the original petition along with attested affidavits and also remove all the defects pointed out by the Registry within two weeks from today.

4. The petitioners have preferred this writ petition assailing the order dated 08.09.2020 passed by the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Patna. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that after final award was passed by the Arbitrator no objection in this said regard was filed by the National Highway Authority of India.

5. However, without impleading the petitioners as party, it proceeded to move a fresh application before the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Patna against the order of the land acquisition officer dated 31.10.2016. In the proceedings taken up by the concerned Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Patna, the Arbitrator has proceeded to direct the land acquisition officer to redraw his award under the land acquisition by taking into consideration the different lands as specified by the six members committee report dated 05.10.2019, which has resulted in taking away the substantive right as created in favour of the petitioners earlier.

6. Learned counsel submits that since the petitioners were not given an opportunity of hearing. The award passed by the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Patna deserve to be declared void ab initio as there is a complete violation of principles of natural justice.

7. I have considered the submissions. Award passed by the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Patna under the NHAI Act, 1956 as under the powers given to it under Sections 3G (5) (6) and (7). Thus, any award would be governed by the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides that the award passed therein can be challenged and prayer to set aside the same may be made by moving an application under Section 34 before the concerned learned District Judge.

8. Learned counsel submits that the provisions of Section 34 would have no application as the petitioners is not challenging the original arbitration award and is only challenging the subsequent order passed on 08.09.2020.

9. I have considered the submission, keeping in view of the provisions of Section 34 in mind, this Court finds that the order dated 08.09.2020 passed by the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Patna is an award in itself Independent and earlier award passed by it, In view thereof, the petitioners, would have the remedy under Section 34 available to it.

10. Learned counsel during the course of argument has placed reliance of one judgment passed by this Court in the case of Ram Bachan Singh Yadav @ Ram Bachan Singh & Ors. Vs. The Union of India & Ors. in C.W.J.C. No. 22211 of 2013, decided on 10.03.2014, wherein the co-ordinate Bench has taken the view, which is as under:

“Shri Gupta for the Corporation submits that petitioners have efficacious remedy as per the Railways (Amendment) Act, 2008 to go to Civil Court challenging the order of the Divisional Commissioner-cum-Arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. I am noting this point only to reject it. Availability of alternative remedy is not always a bar to entertain writ petition. No statute can restrict the power of a High Court of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution and any legislation, which seeks to do, is constitutionally void. The doctrine of alternative remedy is a self-evolved restriction but as the Apex Court has held in the case of M/s Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari –Versus– Antarim Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 556, there are at least two well recognized exception to the doctrine with regard to exhaustion of statutory remedies. I need not elaborate but I can only quote from the judgment aforesaid:

“There are at least two well-recognized exceptions to the doctrine with reg