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2022 Supreme(Pat) 581

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
P. B. BAJANTHRI and PURNENDU SINGH, JJ.
LPA No.822 of 2015 in CWJC No.6225 of 2011
(29.11.2022)
Rajeshwar Prasad ... Appellant
vs.
State of Bihar and Ors. ... Respondents

Advocates:
For the Appellant : M/s Binit Kumar, U.B. Roy, P.K. Verma, Sr. Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Anand Kumar.

Headnote:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(s) – Bihar State Road Transport Corporation Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 – Item no. 22 – Dismissal from service – Disciplinary Authority has resorted to impose penalty of dismissal from service – In such circumstances it was bounden duty of Disciplinary Authority to pass reasoned order, since he is exercising quasi-judicial function under Standing Orders of respondent Corporation – Dismissal order is not a speaking order – Any orders which are subjected to judicial review must be reasoned order, in order to ascertain mind of authority – Impugned orders set aside and matter remanded to Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh speaking order after due consideration of each and every relevant material – Intervening period from date of dismissal till passing of fresh order is required to be regulated, depending upon final order to be passed – L.P.A stands allowed in part. (Paras 7, 10, 11, 14 and 15)

P. B. Bajanthri, J.—In the instant LPA, appellant has assailed the order of the learned Single Judge dated 19.01.2015 passed in C.W.J.C No 6255 of 2011. The appellant was appointed as a conductor with the respondent Corporation in the year 1979. He was alleged to have committed misdeed while discharging his duties in not issuing tickets to the number of passengers. During inspection by the Inspecting Squad the appellant was caught and he could not give his explanation in not issuing tickets to passengers. On the other hand, passengers were stated to have purchased tickets from the Inspecting Squad. Based on these allegations appellant was placed under suspension on 06.02.2009 and he was charge-sheeted in a disciplinary inquiry 03.03.2009. The appellant is stated to have submitted his reply and was not satisfied by the Disciplinary Authority. Thus Disciplinary Authority proceeded to appoint inquiring and presenting officers to hold the inquiry on the alleged charges. The Inquiring Officer is stated to have submitted his report on 20.08.2009 in holding that the charges levelled against the appellant were proved. Thereafter disciplinary authority proceeded to issue second show cause notice and on receipt of reply proceeded to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on 21.01.2010. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of dismissal dated 21.01.2010, the appellant has filed CWJC No. 6225 of 2011, the learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition, hence the present L.P.A.

2. On 15.11.2022 the following order was passed:—

We have noticed that appellant- Rajeshwar Prasad was a Conductor with the respondent-Bihar State Transport Corporation. He has been dismissed from service on 21.01.2010 vide Office Order No. 74 contained in Memo No. 669 issued by the Administrator, Bihar State Transport Corporation, Patna. The appellant is the holder of the post of Conductor whether he is workman and it falls under the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or not? Section 2(s) reads as under:—

"(s) workman means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, dis-charged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person.

(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding 59[ten thousand rupees] per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature."

Therefore, prima facie we found that writ application under Article 226 of Constitution is not maintainable. However, it is necessary to examine with reference to various provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with respondent corporation bye law or statute governing the employees of the respondent corporation. Therefore, respondent corporation counsel is hereby directed to furnish relevant statute of the respondent corporation so as to analyze what is the relationship of employer and employee. Further, he is hereby directed to produce Bihar Act, 17 of 2019 by which State of Bihar is stated to have adopted certain provisions of state amendments notified by the Andhra Pradesh. State counsel is hereby directed to apprise this Court in respect of the aforesaid issue on the next date of h






















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