The bar on property transfer during consolidation proceedings binds all parties involved, and once Chaks and principles are declared, there should be no embargo on the alienation of the property.

JUDGMENT :

Ashutosh Kumar, J.

1. Heard Mr. Binod Kumar Singh, learned Advocate for the appellants.

2. As noted in earlier orders, there is no appearance on behalf of the respondents even though they have been served notice.

3. The appellants herein are the descendants of one Indrasana Kuer, the mother-in-law of the vendor of some of the sale-deeds, which were executed in favour of third party during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings. She had approached the District Collector under Section 32 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act) for declaring such sale-deeds to be null and void in view of the bar for any transfer or alienation of any kind as provided under Section 5 of the Act.

4. The Collector did not agree to the proposition of the objector forcing a litigation ahead before the Bihar Land Tribunal.

5. Before the Tribunal, the issue with respect to sale of a property, which was under the consolidation operation, was raised but the Tribunal found that the sale-deed had been executed only after the Chaks were determined and the principles were declared under Section 13 of the Act.

6. Precisely for this reason, no interference was made by the Tribunal.

7. On similar set of grounds, the learned Single Judge also refused to interfere with the orders passed by the authorities below.

8. Mr. Binod Kumar Singh strenuously argued that in the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Panna Devi Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. 2010(2) PLJR 1066 (FB), it has been conclusively held that the bar operates for the period during which consolidation proceedings are pending and that it binds all the parties.

9. There is no quarrel to this proposition of law.

10. It may be noted that the Full Bench in this instance was constituted for correcting an apparent error in the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Raji Sharma and Anr. Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. 2007(4) PLJR 449, in which it was held that the transaction during the period of operation would be void in so far as the consolidation proceedings are concerned and not inter se the parties to the transaction.

11. Since this was in derogation of the general line of decision, a determination of the issue was required by a Larger Bench. The Full Bench, referred to above, did not find the proposition in Ram Raji Sharma (supra) to be correct and therefore it was conclusively held that any such transaction shall not only govern the consolidation proceedings but shall also bind the parties to the transaction.

12. We have noticed that the learned Single Judge relied upon Kamla Devi Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. 1998(3) All PLR 142, where, taking into account the basic principle of the constitutional right to property and the general practice of the State of Bihar in not coming out with a notification of closure of consolidation operations under Section 26-A of the Act, even when Chaks are determined, it was held that preventing an owner of a property to sell it for such long time would only be an unnecessary curb on his right to enjoy the property. Merely because a formal notification under Section 26-A of the Act has not been issued, that would not fetter the right of the owner to alienate his property by different modes.

13. Taking this to be an unnecessary inconvenience on the right of enjoyment of property and the right being circumscribed only for the purposes of ease of consolidation proceedings, it was conclusively held that if the Chaks and the principle behind it is declared under Section 13 of the Act, there shall be no embargo on the alienation of the property, without the permission of the Collector and no bar under Section 5 of the Act would get attracted for the Collector of the district to pass any order of nullity under Section 32 of the Act.

14. The extension of the bar beyond that stage, it was observed, would not serve any purpose of the Act and, therefore, would be an arbitrary restriction on a