IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
ALOK KUMAR SINHA, J.
CWJC No. 15379 of 2015
(16.12.2025)
Satya Prakash ... Petitioner
vs.
Union of India & Ors. ... Respondents
Central Universities Act, 2009 – Section 33 – Clause 23(2) of University Statute – Termination of Probationer from service – Act and Statutes do not create a separate class of "probationer" as distinct from "employee" – Statutory scheme treats all appointed persons as employees unless otherwise specified and University cannot, by contractual terminology alone, introduce a new category that carries diminished statutory protection – Every employee shall be appointed under written contract – However, statutory recognition of written contracts does not mean that University may by contract override or negate other statutory protections – Contract which is inconsistent with or repugnant to a statutory provision must yield to statute – Private contract cannot supersede a statutory provision and terms of a contract inconsistent with a statute are unenforceable to the extent of such inconsistency – If a contractual term is contrary to a statutory provision, statutory provision shall prevail and inconsistent contract clause shall be rendered inoperative – Acceptance of appointment letter or execution of agreement cannot estop an employee from asserting rights conferred by Statute – Doctrine of Estoppel cannot be invoked to defeat statutory protections, nor can consent validate a clause that is ultra vires – Even though Petitioner signed Agreement, he cannot be deemed to have waived statutory safeguards provided under the Act and Statutes – Statutory rights cannot be waved or contracted out of. (Paras 20, 21, 23, 24 and 26)
University Law – Termination of Probationer from Service – Contractual power of termination cannot be exercised arbitrarily – Employer must demonstrate that pre-conditions and safeguards embedded in relevant contractual clause have been observed – Impugned order does not even whisper about unsuitability or unsatisfactory work of petitioner being raison d'etre for his termination – Bald explanation offered by Respondent that assigning reasons may have rendered the order "stigmatic" cannot be accepted as a legally sustainable justification – There is no material on record to show that Respondent issued prescribed thirty days' notice or tendered/paid salary in lieu thereof at the time of termination – Even till date, payment in lieu of 30 days' notice has not been paid to petitioner – University cannot rely upon Appointment Letter as a source of authority while simultaneously disregarding safeguards embedded therein – Unilateral termination, unsupported by any finding of unsuitability/(dis)satisfactory work and unaccompanied by statutory or contractual notice or payment in lieu thereof, does not meet even minimal standards of fairness expected under contract of employment – Question of operative date of Ordinances is collateral to, and does not detract from Court's finding that termination was legally unsustainable. (Paras 27, 30, 31, 32 and 35)
Central Universities Act, 2009 – Section 11(3) – Power of Vice-Chancellor to terminate service of Probationer – Power is residuary and emergency in character; it is not intended to supplant normal statutory machinery for appointment, confirmation or removal of employees – Exercise of power must be supported by facts warranting a conclusion that immediate action was necessary to meet an unforeseen or urgent situation affecting administration or functioning of University – Bare assertions of unsatisfactory performance or an omnibus statement that employee was "unsuitable" do not meet threshold required to justify extraordinary invocation of Section 11(3) – Where a delegated or emergency power is exercised without factual predicate required by statute, action is illegal and void ab initio – Subsequent ratification by Executive Council cannot validate an act which was originally void for want of jurisdiction or which constitutes an arbitrary and colourable exercise of power – If initial act suffers from jurisdictional defect or is vitiated by non-compliance of mandatory preconditions, later approval by a statutory body cannot confer legality upon that which was void ab initio – Vice-Chancellor's emergency authority is not a licence to bypass prescribed procedures for appointment or termination – Institutional practice and administrative propriety require restraint in invoking Section 11(3) for personnel administration – Vice-Chancellor's order terminating Petitioner's services during probation, exceeded statutory limits and was improper use of Section 11(3) – Termination is void ab initio and cannot be validated by subsequent approval of Executive Council. (Paras 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43 and 46)
Constitution of India – Article 14 – Right to equality – Probationer does not enjoy same security of tenure as a confirmed employee – In cases of termination simpliciter during probation, requirement of a prior notice or opportunity of hearing is not attracted, provided action does not carry a punitive flavour or is not founded on allegations which may visit probationer with civil consequences – In such cases, Doctrine of Natural Justice does not automatically apply, as termination is conceptualised as a non-punitive cessation of a probationary engagement – In present case, termination order does not set out any allegations, charges, or adverse findings against Petitioner – It merely records cessation of services during probation without attributing misconduct – Petitioner cannot successfully invoke protection of Article 14 or Principles of Natural Justice solely on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was afforded – Law does not mandate pre-decisional hearing where action is administrative in nature, non-punitive in character and does not visit employee with stigma. (Paras 47 to 51)
Service Law – Back Wages – Reinstatement in service – Grant of back wages upon reinstatement is a discretionary equitable relief which hinges on facts of each case – Primary burden of proof to show entitlement to back wages rests on petitioner; conversely, where respondent pleads and proves that petitioner was gainfully employed during relevant period, that fact is material and may reduce or extinguish claim for back wages – Principle of mitigation of damages requires an injured party to take reasonable steps to reduce his loss; earnings from alternative employment are taken into account in fixing compensatory relief – Back wages are compensatory for loss actually suffered – Petitioner ought to have produced salary particulars from his intervening employments to seek a differential award; he has not done so – Balance of equities disfavours award of back wages in his favour – Petitioner to be reinstated in service with continuity in service but without back wages – Petition allowed. (Paras 52, 53, 54, 59 to 65)
Alok Kumar Sinha, J.—Heard the parties.
2. The petitioner in the present writ application has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the office order no. 138/15 datd 18.09.2015 whereby, as per the petitioner, the petitioner has been relieved of his duties without any prior information; as the same is wholly without jurisdiction; contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Statute and is, therefore, arbitrary and illegal. Consequent upon the quashing of the office order no. 138/15 dated 18/09/15, the petitioner further prays for direction to treat the petitioner in continuous service without any break of service with all admissible and consequential benefits.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Registrar in the Central University of Bihar (now known as the Central University of South Bihar), pursuant to Advertisement No. CUB/Advt./21/2013 dated 16.09.2013. It is submitted that the petitioner duly participated in the selection process, was selected by the competent Selection Committee, and thereafter appointed on a substantive post by order dated 19.12.2013 (Annexure:1), issued with the approval of the Executive Council, under Clause 23(2) of the University Statute, in the pay band of Rs. 15,600–39,100 with Grade Pay of Rs. 7,600/-. The petitioner joined his duties on 26.03.2014 and the joining report was duly notified.
4. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner discharged his duties diligently and to the satisfaction of all concerned authorities. Except for one instance where he was asked to explain his brief absence from office during an examination period—an explanation which was accepted and the leave regularized—there was never any allegation or show cause issued against him at any point of time. It is asserted that during the entire tenure of service, the petitioner maintained an unblemished record and no misconduct was ever attributed to him.
5. It is further stated that, to the petitioner’s shock, he was abruptly served with a letter dated 18.09.2015 (Annexure:3) issued by Respondent No. 4, intimating him that he stood relieved from the post of Deputy Registrar with immediate effect and that his dues would be released. Along with the said letter, Office Order No. 138/15 dated 18.09.2015 (Annexure;4) was enclosed, directing all departments to complete the “No Dues” formalities. Learned counsel emphasizes that prior to issuance of the impugned communication, the petitioner was never afforded any show cause notice, nor was any assessment of his suitability undertaken, nor was any reason disclosed for the termination of his services.
6. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner is an “employee” within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Central Universities Act, and his conditions of service, including manner of termination, are governed strictly by the Statute. Under Entry 12(2)(iv) read with Entry 25 of the Second Schedule, the Executive Council alone is the competent appointing and removing authority. It is urged that the Statute permits removal only on grounds of misconduct or for good cause, and only after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing and by giving three months’ notice or salary in lieu thereof. In the present case, neither misconduct nor any good cause has been recorded, nor any opportunity granted, and the impugned order is completely silent on these mandatory statutory requirements.
7. It is further contended that the impugned action is without jurisdiction, as no meeting of the Executive Council was convened since July 2015 and upto the date of termination. Learned counsel submits that essential disciplinary powers vested in the Executive Council cannot be delegated to the Vice-Chancellor or any other authority, and any such purported exercise of power would be illegal tantamounting to colourable exercise of power.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, adverting to the supplementary affidavit, states that the
Kumar Pankaj Anand vs. Central University of Jharkhand
Probationary employees possess statutory protections and cannot be terminated without following prescribed procedures under the governing statute, which mandates documented grounds for unsuitability ....
Termination of a probationer must follow prescribed procedures; failure to do so renders the termination illegal and potentially stigmatic.
Termination of a probationary teacher must follow due process and cannot be based on unverified allegations, as it may lead to stigmatization affecting future employment.
A resignation must be accepted by a competent authority, and if accepted without jurisdiction, it is void, allowing for legal withdrawal and reinstatement with back-wages for wrongful termination.
The Vice-Chancellor holding additional charge is not competent to exercise statutory powers vested in a full-fledged incumbent of the post.
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