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1973 Supreme(Cal) 245

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
B. C. MITRA, JANAH AND SHARMA
SERAJUDDIN AND CO. - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF ORISSA - Respondent
AFOO 240  Of  1971
Decided On : SEPTEMBER 7, 1973

Advocates Appeared:
Dipankar Gupta, N.C.CHAKRAVARTI, P.K.Sen, PARITOSH KR.MUKHERJEE, R.C.DE, SUKUMAR BASU

Headnote:

MINES AND MINERALS - Mining lease - Grant of - Revocation of - Validity of - Order of revocation not communicated to the lessee - Whether valid - Order of Central Government in revision - Whether can merge with the order of revocation - Whether doctrine of merger applies to an order which was a nullity - Rules of natural justice - Violation of - Effect of - Article 166 of the Constitution - Compliance with - Whether mandatory or directory - Article 226 of the Constitution - Maintainability of writ petition - Whether legal right of the petitioner infringed or invaded - Whether question of title to immovable property involved.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant applied for grant of a mining lease on December 6, 1949, for 93 and odd acres of land in Village Gurda, P. S. Chamakpur, District Keonjhar, Orissa. The appellant's application along with those of others was considered by the first respondent and by an order dated May 16. 1955, the first respondent directed grant of a mining lease in respect of the said area in favour of the appellant. The lease, however, was to be subject to such condition as the first respondent light incorporate in the deed of lease.

Finding of the Court:

1. The order of revocation purported to have been made on April 4, 1962, was a nullity as it was made in violation of rules of natural justice, and since it was a nullity, it could not possibly merge in the order made by the Central Government in revision on August 6, 1965. 2. The order made by the Central Government in revision even assuming that it was a revision against the order of the State Government, can be of no greater value or effectiveness. 3. The order of the State Government dated April 4, 1962, revoking the grant of the licence was at no stage communicated to the appellant, it did not have the effect of affecting the appellant's rights at all. 4. The provisions of Article 166 were directory and not mandatory in character. 5. No order of revocation was made by the State Government at any point of time, though the office note quoted above authorised issue of such an order. 6. The appellant had the legal right to occupy the land and exploit the mineral, and if such a right is infringed by an order made in violation of rules of natural justice, such an order would be open to review by this court in its exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Issues: 1. Whether the order of revocation purported to have been made on April 4, 1962, was a nullity? 2. Whether the order made by the Central Government in revision can merge with the order of revocation? 3. Whether the order of the State Government dated April 4, 1962, revoking the grant of the licence was communicated to the appellant? 4. Whether the provisions of Article 166 were directory or mandatory in character? 5. Whether any order of revocation was made by the State Government at any point of time? 6. Whether the appellant had the legal right to occupy the land and exploit the mineral?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. An order which is a nullity cannot merge in an order made in revision thereof or on appeal therefrom. 2. The doctrine of merger does not apply to an order which was a nullity. 3. An order made in violation of rules of natural justice is a nullity. 4. The provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution are directory and not mandatory in character. 5. An order of revocation of a mining lease is not valid if it is not communicated to the lessee. 6. A person has a legal right to occupy land and exploit minerals if he has been granted a mining lease.

Final Decision: Appeal allowed. Judgment and order under appeal set aside. Rule made absolute. Writ in the nature of mandamus issued directing the respondent No. 1 to withdraw, recall and cancel the order dated September 22, 1967, and forbear from giving effect thereto in any manner. Each party to pay its costs. The respondents will however, be at liberty to act according to law.

B. C. MITRA, J.

( 1 ) ON December 3, 1949. the first respondent invited applications for grant of a mining lease under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 (hereafter referred to as the 1949 Rules ). These Rules were framed by the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 5 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (hereafter referred to as the 1948 Act ). Both the Act and the Rules were subsequently replaced by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereafter referred to as the 1957 Act) and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 thereafter referred to as the 1960 Rules ).

( 2 ) IN answer to the invitation, the appellant applied for grant of a mining lease on December 6, 1949, for 93 and odd acres of land in Village Gurda, P. S. Chamakpur, District Keonjhar, Orissa. The appellant's application along with those of others was considered by the first respondent and by an order dated May 16. 1955, the first respondent directed grant of a mining lease in respect of the said area in favour of the appellant. The lease, however, was to be subject to such condition as the first respondent light incorporate in the deed of lease.

( 3 ) PURSUANT to the decision of the first respondent to grant the lease to the appellant, the first respondent offered to make ever possession of the land to the appellant for commencing mining operations, on the basis of yearly licence, upon certain terms and conditions. The appellant accepted the offer and thereupon on July 27, 1955, the first respondent directed possession of the land to be made over to the appellant with permission to carry on mining operations for a year, with an assurance to renew the permission from year 1o year, until finalisation of the lease. Possession was delivered to the appellant on August 13, 1955.

( 4 ) FOR 3 years thereafter, the first respondent took no steps for execution of a mining lease in accordance with the 1948 Rules in spite of representations made from time to time by the appellant for that purpose. On July 26, 1958, the first respondent sent a draft lease to the appellant for executing a formal lease. On August 22, 1958, the draft lease with suggested modifications was returned by the appellant to the Collector of Keonjhar for final approval. A date for execution of the lease was fixed by the Collector, but this date was extended more than once at the instance of the appellant.

( 5 ) ON October 25. 1958, the appellant made a representation to the respondent's suggestion that an additional clause be incorporated in the lease to safeguard certain rights of the lessee created by the amended provisions of Rule 41 (I) (ii) of the 1949 Rules. Thereafter somehow or other the matter appears to have been lost sight of. The appellant, however, continued to make representations and send reminders either to the first respondent, or to the Collector, requesting a decision on the suggestions by the appellant for incorporation of a new clause in conformity with Rule 41 (1) (ii) of the 1949 Rules. While this was going on, a dispute arose over payment of royalties by the appellant. The respondents alleged that the appellant was heavily in arrears in payment of royalty and the appellant denied the liabi-lity. On April 4, 1962, the first respondent purported to revoke the grant originally made on May 16. 1955 on the ground that the appellant failed to execute the lease though called upon to do so. According to the appellant, no such decision was taken by the first respondent for revocation of the grant and at any rate the order of revocation was never communicated to the appellant and for that reason the order of revocation itself was invalid.

( 6 ) ON April 11, 1962. the Collector wrote a letter to the appellant in which he stated that the appellant was allowed to execute the mining lease which he failed to do. and for that reason the Government had revoked the order by which the mining lease was granted to the appellant. T

































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