SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
16th March, 1962
B.P. SINHA, C.J.I., P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND T.L. VENKATARAMA AYYAR, JJ.
Madan Gopal Rungta, Appellant
Versus
The Secretary to the Government of Orissa and others, Respondents.
The Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. Intervener.
Civil Appeal No. 407 of 1961.
Advocates appeared
Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate (Mr. P. K. Chatterjee, Advocate, with him), for Appellant; Mr. C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India (M/s. B.R. Iyengar and P. D. Menon, Advocates, with him), or Respondents; Mr. B. M. Patnaik, Advocate and M/s. S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder Narain and Co., for Intervener.
Judgment
WANCHOO, J. : This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Orissa High Court. The brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. The appellant made an application to the State Government of Orissa in 1949 for grant of a mining lease for manganese ore over an area comprising 5400 acres situated in the district of Keonjhar. The appellant was the first applicant for the lease of the aforesaid area, and subsequently other persons applied for lease of the same area including M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as Tatas), the intervener in the present appeal. The Government of Orissa decided to grant the lease in favour of Tatas and in January 1956 referred the matter in the Central Government for its approval under r. 32 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), which lays down that it more than one application regarding the same land is received, preference shall be given to the application received first, unless the State Government, for any special reason, and with the prior approval of the Central Government decides to the contrary. The appellant made a representation to the Central Government against the recommendation of the State Government. Eventually, on April 9, 1957, the Central Government turned down the recommendation of the State Government about the grant of the mining lease to Tatas. It also directed that the applications received prior to the application of Tatas should be considered according to the Rules but added that in case the Government of Orissa desired to work the area on a departmental basis, the Central Government would have no objection to consider a proposal for that purpose. Thereafter the State Government rejected the application of the appellant in December 1957 on the ground that the State Government proposed to arrange for the exploitation of the area in the public sector.
2. This was followed by an application for review to the Central Government under r. 57 of the Rules. This application was rejected by the Central Government in June 1959. Thereupon the appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court in July, 1959. This petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Art. 226 as the final order in the case was passed by the Central Government which was located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The appellant then applied to the High Court for a certificate to appeal to this Court, which was rejected. He then asked for special leave from this Court, which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.
3. The main question raised before us is the limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 in circumstances like those in the present case. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that as the Central Government had merely dismissed the review petition, the effective order rejecting the appellant s application for the mining lease was that of he State Government & therefore the High Court could have jurisdiction to grant a writ under Art. 226, and that the principle laid down in Election Commision India v. Venkata Rao, 1953 SCR l144 : would not apply. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595
4. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court beginning with Venkata Rao s case 1953 SCR l144 : that there is two-fold limitation on the power of the High Court to grant a writ under Art. 226. These limitations are firstly that the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, that is to say, the writs issued by the High Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and secondly that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be within t
Referred : Election Commission India v. Venkata Rao
A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti
The main legal point established in the judgment is the binding effect of the settlement between the parties, the waiver of the right to seek re-employment by the workmen, and the entitlement of the ....
A lockout is justified if it is declared in response to an illegal strike or a strike that is in breach of a settlement or award.
The combination of eyewitness testimonies, recovery of the weapon used, and forensic examination results can establish guilt in criminal cases, even based on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction of an accused person under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act is not permissible in law if the accused is also charged with committing murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court can enhance compensation based on the deceased's income and family dependency, and adjust the multiplier used by the Tribunal if found unjustified.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.